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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
trategic management has traditionally focused on the strategic 
choices that firms should make in order to gain a sustainable 
competitive advantage. In other words, firms seek to obtain a 
performance that exceeds the average of the industry (Porter, 1985). To 
explain the sources of sustainable competitive advantage, the 
management literature has mainly focused on external (industry-based, 
Bain, 1956, 1968; Mason, 1939) and internal (firm-based, Penrose, 1959; 
Barney, 1991) factors. The continuous change in the focus of analysis 
between these two approaches has been compared to a “pendulum 
swing” (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan and Yiu, 1999).  
The latest swing, which took place in the first decade of the 21st century, 
again focused on two external factors, namely, network effects and 
institutions, as key determinants of firm behavior and performance. This 
has led to the strategic consideration of variables that have traditionally 
been either underestimated or considered as background conditions 
(McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 
2009; Peng, Sun, Pinkham and Chen, 2009; Suarez, 2005). 
First, competition under network effects has its origin in technological 
developments which, since the 80’s, have led to an increasing worldwide 
presence of information industries, such as software, hardware, 
telecommunications and social networks. For instance, at the end of 
2011, the number of tweets per day passed the 200 million mark, there 
were more than 500 million Facebook users and 5,300 million mobile 
users. These are only some examples of industries that have been 
S 
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recently created and have rapidly increased their presence across the 
world. In this type of industries, the presence of network effects means 
that user utility depends not only on product characteristics, such as 
price and quality, but also on the number of other users consuming the 
same product (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). Users prefer to join the network 
with a higher number of users and this accelerates product penetration 
(Gruber, 2005). Shapiro and Varian (1998) determined that network 
effects do not change economic laws and, thus, traditional perspectives 
of strategic management can be applied in this context. But it is 
important to note that competition under network effects introduces 
several particularities in strategic management analysis. In contrast to 
traditional industries in which product characteristics - e.g. price and 
quality – are key variables to determine strategy and performance, in 
network industries, network characteristics – e.g. size and composition –
are more important in conferring competitive advantages (Arthur, 1990; 
McIntyre and Subramanian, 2009; Suarez, 2005).  
The literature has highlighted that, in network industries, value does not 
reside in the product itself, but in the network of users. This means that 
traditional strategies based on quality differentiation and cost leadership 
(Porter, 1985) become less important. In network industries, strategic 
decisions should try to influence users’ expectations about the future size 
of the network to increase current network value. In this way, price and 
quality lose importance as key strategic variables, while reputation and 
brand value become more prominent (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). 
Surprisingly, the analysis of strategic management to increase network 
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value and firm performance in network industries remains 
underdeveloped (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009).   
Secondly, the institutional environment in which firms operate has 
traditionally been considered as a background condition (Peng, Wang, 
and Jiang, 2008). Institutions, such as laws, traditions and culture, have 
been relegated to being control variables in empirical analysis instead of 
constituting key explanatory variables. In the mid 1950’s, the 
neoinstitutionalist perspective emerged in sociological studies to analyze 
the structure and behavior of organizations (Scott, 2008). Several decades 
later, North (1990) incorporated the role of institutions into the 
economic discourse from a transaction costs perspective. However, 
strategic management literature has recently taken into consideration 
the institutional perspective of firm strategy (Peng, Sun, Pinkham and 
Chen, 2009). From this perspective, institutions, along with industry and 
resource conditions, are understood as key determinants of strategic 
choices and firm performance. Under the institution-based perspective 
of strategic management, strategic choices are understood as the result of 
the dynamic interaction between organizations (conditioned by industry 
structure and resource allocation) and institutions (both formal and 
informal). Thus, the behavior and performance of an organization should 
be analyzed within the institutional framework where it operates (Peng 
et al., 2005; Peng, 2002) because strategies which are successful in one 
institutional context can fail in others (Hoskisson et al., 1999). 
Surprisingly, the use of the institution-based view of strategy remains 
underexplored (Peng et al., 2009). 
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Both network effects and institutions have traditionally been considered 
as background conditions and included as control variables in empirical 
analyses (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009; Peng et al., 2009). 
Consequently, there is still a great deal left to do in the strategic analysis 
of these two key elements. Not taking into account the importance of 
managing network value, instead of product value, and the direct impact 
of institutions on the outcomes of strategic choices can result in 
mistaken decisions which prevent firms from achieving a sustainable 
competitive advantage and expel them from the market.  
This dissertation aims to analyze the key role of network effects and 
institutions in strategic management analysis in depth. The following 
sections try to contextualize and develop the basic concepts of both 
research lines. Section 1.2 introduces the main concepts of competition 
in network industries, while Section 1.3 offers a review of the 
institution-based view of firm strategy. Section 1.4 describes the 
structure, content and contributions of the other chapters of this 
dissertation. 
 
1.2. COMPETITION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES 
1.2.1. Network effects: concept and typology 
Network industries are those which exhibit network effects. Network 
effects arise when user utility from consuming a product increases with 
the number of other users consuming the same good or service (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1994; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). 
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The traditional typology of network effects differentiates between direct 
and indirect network effects (Birke and Swann, 2006; Farrell and 
Klemperer, 2007; Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1994; Suarez, 2005). Direct 
network effects appear when the increase in the number of users of a 
network directly benefits network users (Birke and Swann, 2005). 
Paradigmatic examples of industries with direct network effects are 
telephony, fax, e-mail and social networks. In this kind of industries, the 
use of the main product – e.g., a handset or a fax machine – does not 
offer any utility to a user if there are no other users consuming the same 
product because its utility derives from exchanging information. Thus, 
the intrinsic design of the product is usually a driver of direct network 
effects (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009). 
Indirect network effects appear when the increase in the number of 
users of a network indirectly benefits network users by increasing the 
availability of complementary and compatible products to the main 
product of that network (Birke and Swann, 2005). Examples such as 
software, hardware, video consoles and the videogame industry serve to 
illustrate this kind of network effects. The increase in the number of 
users consuming a product stimulates the interest of designers and 
manufacturers to develop complementary products which, ultimately, 
increases the utility of network users of the main product. 
An alternative classification of network effects differentiates, depending 
on the type of user under consideration, between total and marginal 
network effects. Total network effects refer to the increase in the utility 
of current users of a network when a new user is added to that network, 
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whereas marginal network effects refer to the increase in the incentives 
of potential users to join the network when a new user is added (Farrell 
and Klemperer, 2007). In this classification, marginal network effects 
refer to another of the drivers of network effects, namely, user 
expectations. Users choose between networks depending on the future 
size that they expect the network will have. The rise in the number of 
current users increases potential users’ expectations and, thus, their 
incentives to join the network in the future (marginal network effects). 
Finally, it is important to note that network effects can take place at 
industry-level and firm-level. Industry-level network effects occur when 
the increase in the number of users of a firm increases the utility of users 
of that product of other firms in the same industry. It means that there is 
compatibility between products of two firms of the same industry, e.g. in 
the fax-machine industry. Firm-level network effects take place when 
the products of two firms have some degree of incompatibility which 
prevents users of two different networks from being able to exchange 
information without extra costs. An additional user only benefits users of 
the same firm, but not users of the other companies of the industry. For 
instance, firm-level network effects appear in the mobile 
telecommunications industry because firm networks are usually 
technologically compatible (users can make calls between two different 
networks) but are economically incompatible (users have to pay more 
for off-net calls than for on-net calls) (Grajek, 2010).  
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1.2.2. The extent and importance of network industries in the 
worldwide economy 
One of the reasons that strategic management in network industries 
deserves extra attention is that there are numerous examples of 
businesses that exhibit network effects. However, it is important to note 
that the intensity of network effects varies across industries. Table 1.1, 
borrowed from Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy (2004), shows 45 
network industries ordered according to their degree of intensity of 
network effects. They carry out a survey in which experts score, from 1 
to 7, the degree of direct and indirect network externalities of a set of 
products. They build an overall index which is the sum of the scores for 
the intensity of direct and indirect network effects.  The overall index 
has values between 2 (no network externalities) and 14 (high network 
externalities). Industries which show the most intensive network effects 
are software (operating system, word processing and spreadsheet), 
personal data assistant, fax machine, internet service provider and 
cellular telephone industries. 
As McIntyre and Subramaniam (2009) highlight, a high intensity of 
network effects can be explained by factors such as product design (e.g. 
fax machine and mobile telephone), degree of necessity of 
complementary products (e.g. software/hardware and video games/ 
consoles) and importance of social dynamics in product adoption (e.g. 
internet service providers). 
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Table 1.1 Examples of network industries by intensity of network effects 
 
Rank Product Intensity of network effects 
1 Operating system for personal computer 12.1 
2 Personal data assistant 10.7 
3 Fax machine 10.6 
4 Word processing software 10.4 
5 Spreadsheet software 10.2 
6 Internet service provider 10.1 
7 Cellular telephone 10 
8 Database software 9.6 
9 Workstation 9.6 
10 Digital videodisc player 9.4 
11 Home VCR 9.4 
12 Videogame 9.4 
13 Audiocassette player 9.3 
14 CD player 9.3 
15 CD-ROM drive 9.3 
16 Mailframe computer 9.3 
17 3.5 inch floppy disk drive 9.1 
18 Personal computer 9 
19 Automatic teller machine 8.9 
20 Desktop publishing software 8.7 
21 Notebook computer 8.7 
22 Color television 8.4 
23 High-definition television 8.4 
24 Internet browser 7.6 
25 Pager 7.4 
26 Presentation Software 7.1 
27 Antivirus Software 6.8 
28 Computer-aided design software 6.8 
29 Personal finance software 6.8 
30 Flat-bed scanner 6.6 
31 Digital camera 6.2 
32 Ink-jet printer 6.2 
33 Laser printer 6.2 
34 Camcorder 6.1 
35 Dot matrix printer 6 
36 Home microwave ovens 5.8 
37 Projection television 5.6 
38 Instant photography 5.4 
39 Photocopier 4.7 
40 Single-use camera 4.4 
41 Cordless telephone 4.3 
42 Telephone answering machine 4.3 
43 Food processor 4.1 
44 Electric toothbrush 3.4 
45 Pocket calculator 3.4 
Source: Srinivasan, Lilien and Ragaswamy (2004) 
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Network industries do not only have academic interest. They also have 
important economic effects. As an illustration, the FT 500 Index, 
provided by the Financial Times Group, is made up of the 500 largest 
firms in the world by market value (in US dollars). In 2011, 20% of the 
firms belonged to the financial sector (that includes banks, financial 
services and insurance firms). Hardware, software and 
telecommunication firms (which are network firms) accounted for 13%. 
The relative importance of other traditional industries in this index such 
as oil and gas (11%), mining (6.5%), retailing (4.4%) and pharmaceutical 
(4%) is lower than that of network firms.  
Even though the financial sector has the highest number of firms in the 
index, it is important to note that network firms tend to be better 
positioned. Figure 1.1 shows that from 2005 to 2011, on average, 30% of 
network firms in the FT 500 Index rank in the top 100, whereas only 
20% of financial firms do. 
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Figure 1.1. Percentage of FT 500 Index firms in the top 100 by industry 
(2005-2011) 
 
Source: FT 500 Index (2005-2011) 
 
Table 1.2 shows the network firms ranked among the 100 largest firms 
in the world from 2001 to 2011. In the software/hardware industry, 
firms such as Microsoft and IBM have maintained a leading position. 
Apple has climbed up the table and became the third largest firm in the 
world in 2011. In telecommunications China Mobile, AT&T, Vodafone 
and Telefónica are among the 50 largest firms.  
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Table 1.2. Position of network firms in the FT 500 Index (2001-2011) 
 
Firm Industry 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Apple Hardware            85 39 33 5 3 
Microsoft Software 5 2 1 2 3 3 3 7 6 3 10 
IBM Software 18 12 10 14 13 26 31 27 14 21 14 
China Mobile Telecom 34 59 66 67 64 38 16 5 5 10 16 
AT&T Telecom 54 63       37 5 8 7 24 20 
Oracle Software 14 46 45 60 66 77 65 62 37 37 22 
Google Software           60 51 56 39 30 28 
Vodafone Telecom 8 17 13 12 12 29 32 28 34 42 30 
Samsung Hardware   85 67 45 52 35 56 58 51 43 36 
Telefónica Telecom 61 69 57 47 38 64 47 35 32 48 44 
Intel Hardware 9 7 15 8 15 33 46 42 40 40 47 
Verizon Com. Telecom 21 19 22 26 33 41 45 55 38 58 48 
Cisco Hardware 2 20 24 11 27 24 28 32 28 27 57 
Qualcomm Hardware 80     78 75 57 101 99 52 77 62 
Hewlett-Packard Hardware 68   53 50 68 45 48 48 44 39 64 
  Chapter 1. Introduction 
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Table 1.2. Position of network firms in the FT 500 Index (2001-2011) (continuation) 
 
Firm Industry 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
AMX Telecom               87     76 
NTT Docomo* Telecom 16 14 19 25 42 80 77 92 56 83 85 
SAP Software   73   85 97 82     84 97 91 
France Telecom Telecom 39   71 53 49     72 55 91   
Canon Hardware                   93   
Deutsche Telekom Telecom 40 51 56 40 40 75 96 88 67 99   
Nokia Hardware 12 30 31 30 54 46 62 43 81     
Nintendo Videogame               90 92     
Dell Hardware   48 30 36 36 81           
Bellsouth Telecom 53 47 64 83   97           
SBC Telecom 17 18 35 41 45             
Telecom Italia** Telecom 84 64 59 91 74             
Telstra Telecom     96   99             
Texas Instruments Hardware 44 61 99 80               
Vivendi Telecom 66 94                   
* NTT Docomo includes fixed and mobile business from 2001 to 2010     ** Telecom Italia includes fixed and mobile business from 2001 to 2005    
Source: FT 500 Index (2001-2011) 
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With regard to the weight of each type of network industry in the FT 
500 Index, Figure 1.2 shows that most network firms belong to the 
telecommunications industry, followed by hardware and, lastly, 
software. 
Figure 1.2. Percentage of firms by network industry of the FT 500 Index 
(2003-2011) 
Source: FT 500 Index (2005-2011) 
Based on the data presented above, the telecommunications industry, 
and especially mobile telephony, is an interesting research setting to 
analyze competitive dynamics in network industries.  
Mobile telephony ranks 7th among the industries with the most intensive 
network effects, see Table 1.1, and is the network industry with the most 
firms positioned in the top 500, see Figure 1.2.  
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1.2.3. Competing in network industries:  
Changing the focus from product value to network value 
Shapiro and Varian (1998) already pointed out in the last century that 
technology changes, economic laws do not. This means that traditional 
perspectives of strategic management analysis could be used to analyze 
firm competitive behavior in network industries. However, network 
industries have some differences compared to traditional industries that 
must be taken into consideration. For instance, whereas in traditional 
industries value mainly resides in the product offered by the firm, value 
in network industries comes from the network of users which consume 
the same product of the firm (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009). Thus, 
network size determines the incentives of current users to remain in the 
network (total network effects) and the incentives of potential users to 
join the network (marginal network effects) (Farrell and Klemperer, 
2007). The importance of network size to determine the choice of 
potential users of a firm network in the future has several implications 
for strategic management. 
First, the network size of the firm becomes a key element to compete 
with rivals since it gives utility to users. This means that firms which 
entered the market earlier and rapidly built an installed user base are in 
a better position than later entrants. This competitive advantage is based 
on achieving an early network size, even when the quality of the 
product is worse. The literature has highlighted that network industries 
are characterized by path dependence (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 
2009). There are several examples of technologies or products which 
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failed because they entered the market later, even though the quality 
was higher. One was the failure of the alternative standard to the 
QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985) and the light water technology for 
nuclear power reactors (Cowan, 1990). Whereas, in traditional 
industries, product quality is a strategic variable that directly influences 
performance (Porter, 1981), in network industries, strategic choices 
focused on quality improvement will not have the same effect.  
Second, given that an increase in network size increases the incentives of 
potential users to join the network (marginal network effects), an 
increase in the network size in one period will lead to a higher network 
size in the following period. This has been called positive feedback 
(Arthur, 1990). In the words of Shapiro and Varian (1998), positive 
feedback makes the strong get stronger and the weak get weaker. If this 
process continued over time, it would result in markets with a 
monopolistic company. This case has been conceptualized as the winner-
take-all situation and it would appear if all customers considered that 
only one firm will dominate the market in the future (McIntyre and 
Subramaniam, 2009). Thus, expectation management plays a key role in 
determining the success of firms in network industries. Strategic choices 
which increase user expectations about the future network size of the 
firm, such as brand and reputation management, will be especially 
important for achieving a better performance than its rivals (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1994; Shapiro and Varian, 1998).  
Finally, Katz and Shapiro (1985) determined that, when network effects 
exist, if consumers expect a seller to be dominant, then consumers will 
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be willing to pay more for the firm’s product, and it will, in fact, be 
dominant. In contrast to traditional industries, in network industries 
users are willing to pay more to be part of a firm network even when 
there are competitors that offer lower prices because users want to 
benefit from a larger network size. The product is more valuable as more 
people use it (Doganoglu and Gryzbowski, 2007). Thus, strategic choices 
based on price management are less important in network industries. 
In sum, network effects require a change in the focus of attention from 
product value to network value. Strategic decisions based on managing 
users’ expectations and network size will take on a key role in achieving 
competitive advantage, in contrast to traditional decisions based on price 
and quality. Economic laws do not change but the key elements of 
strategic management do. Overall, strategic management analysis in 
network industries remains underexplored (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 
2009) and this dissertation tries to shed light on this issue. 
1.3. THE INSTITUTION-BASED VIEW OF STRATEGY 
1.3.1. An overview of strategic management research 
The institutional perspective of strategic management has received 
increasing attention in recent years (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; 
Makino, Isobe and Chan, 2004; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009; 
Peng et al., 2009). This interest in institutions is a result of an evolution 
in the theories of strategic management, whose attention has varied in a 
“pendulum swing” between internal and external factors  (Hoskisson et 
al., 1999).  
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During the 1960’s, strategic management literature mainly consisted of 
case studies which focused on the role of manager skills (Andrews, 1971; 
Ansoff, 1965; Chandler, 1962). The next swing of the pendulum in the 
1980’s highlighted the importance of industry structure in determining 
differences in performance between firms. The structure-conduct-results 
paradigm and the analysis of external competitive forces emerged in 
strategic management literature (Bain, 1956, 1968; Mason, 1939; Porter, 
1980, 1981, 1985). However, explanations about differences in 
performance between firms of the same industry remained 
underexplored. As a consequence, a new perspective based on the 
internal factors of firms was developed during 1990’s. The resource-
based view proposed resource and capabilities allocation as drivers of 
firm performance (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Penrose, 
1959; Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). The firm, as a set 
of valuable, rare, inimitable and irreplaceable resources, once again 
became the unit of analysis. 
As could be expected, the 21st century has seen the return of the 
environment as a key determinant of firm behavior and performance. 
However, strategic management analysis has not focused on specific 
industry environments, as it did in the 1980’s. The new perspective 
highlights the macroeconomic environment which is common to all 
industries. Formal institutions, such as laws and regulations, and 
informal institutions, such as customs, traditions and culture, are 
understood to determine both strategic decisions and performance (Peng 
et al., 2009). Interest in institutional variables, which are usually country 
specific, is mainly a consequence of the globalization process which most 
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industries have undergone in recent decades (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008). 
1.3.2. The institution-based view of strategic management  
Institutions are defined as the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, as the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction (North, 1990: 2). They have been also defined as cognitive, 
normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability 
and meaning to social behavior (Scott, 2008: 33).They are gaining more 
and more relevance in the explanation of market competition and firm 
performance. It is argued that strategic choices do not only depend on 
industry structure (industry perspective) and firm resources and 
capabilities (resource perspective), but also on formal and informal 
restrictions from the institutional context (institutional perspective). It is 
acknowledged that firm strategies, organization structures, and 
governance mechanisms successfully pursued and implemented in a 
particular institutional context may not achieve the same outcomes in 
another institutional context (Hoskisson et al., 1999: 445).  
The interaction between institutions, organizations and strategic choices 
has recently become a research issue in management literature (Peng et 
al., 2008). The behavior and performance of an organization should be 
analyzed within the institutional framework in which it operates (Peng 
et al., 2005; Peng, 2002; Singh, 2007). According to the model of Peng 
(2000) (Figure 1.3), strategic choices are the outcome of a dynamic 
interaction between institutions and organizations which is conditioned 
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by formal and informal rules, industry conditions and resource 
allocation.  
Figure 1.3. Institutions, organizations and strategic choices 
 
Source: Peng, MW (2000). Business Strategies in Transition Economies. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage 
 
The difference between this institution-based view of strategic 
management and previous theories is that it integrates the industry and 
resource-based perspectives. The institution-based view complements 
previous theories and, according to Peng, Sun, Pinkham and Chen 
(2009), constitutes ‘a third leg for a strategy tripod’. This perspective uses 
the theory of transaction costs economy (TCE) to explain how 
institutions reduce uncertainty and asymmetric information between 
contractual parts (North, 1990) and how this can affect strategic choices 
and performance (Meyer et al., 2009). 
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The introduction of the institution-based view into strategic literature is 
recent. Empirical analyses have mainly focused on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) decisions made by multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
(Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2008; Chan, Isobe and Makino, 2008; 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Meyer et al., 2009). These studies have 
focused on the effect of macroeconomic institutions, such as property 
rights protection, corruption, rule of law and cultural distance, in host 
country selection and entry mode choice (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). 
In sum, although the institution-based view of strategy is considered a 
third key perspective in strategic management analysis (Peng et al., 
2008), its integration with previous perspectives and strategic 
management issues requires further attention. Moreover, the influences 
of formal and informal institutions in strategic management have been 
analyzed separately, instead of being considered as complementary parts 
of the same puzzle (Makino and Tsang, 2011). Thus, further research 
which incorporates the role of context, both formal and informal, in the 
strategic management analysis is necessary (Bamberger, 2008; Peng, 
2002). 
1.4. STRUCTURE  
This dissertation aims to analyze the key role of network effects and 
institutions in strategic management analysis in depth. In the following 
chapters, the traditional consideration of both these elements as 
background conditions is replaced by their taking on a key role in 
explaining firm choices and performance within an industry. Figure 1.4 
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shows a summary of the structure of the dissertation, which is explained 
below. 
Chapter 2, titled “Research Setting: Mobile Telecommunications 
Industry”, describes the evolution of the mobile industry in European 
and non-European countries and identifies the main characteristics 
which make this industry an adequate research setting for the three 
empirical analyses of the following chapters.  
Chapter 3, “Strategic choices, network value and performance: a strategic 
approach to network value in network industries”, aims to extend 
previous literature by analyzing the role that firm strategy plays in 
markets where network effects are important. In a context of 
competition under direct and firm-level network effects, this chapter 
posits that firms can benefit from the existence of network effects 
through their strategic choices. It proposes a theoretical model in which 
strategic choices can improve network value by influencing the 
antecedents of network effects, i.e. expectations, coordination, and 
compatibility.  
The main contributions of Chapter 3 are the following. First, it proposes 
a theoretical model about how strategic choices influence network value 
and, thus, firm performance. Second, it empirically tests this model by 
considering the impact of three key strategic choices on network value, 
namely, timing of entry, the degree of internationalization and 
switching costs management. Finally, Chapter 3 proposes a new measure 
of network value which corrects previous measures by considering not 
only network size but also the intensity of network effects.  
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Chapter 4, “Strategic choices and institutions in the FDI process: where 
to enter”, aims to analyze the influence of the institutional environment, 
both formal and informal, on host market selection by MNEs. This 
chapter takes as its context the process of internationalization, which has 
been the traditional focus of attention of the institution-based view. It 
proposes that strong formal institutions, such as laws, regulations and 
judicial systems which support economic exchanges by reducing 
contractual risks, can diminish the negative effect that cultural distance 
has on the likelihood of entering a country. 
The main contributions of Chapter 4 are the following. First, formal and 
informal institutions are considered complementary in explaining host 
market selection, whereas previous studies have tended to focus on 
formal and informal institutions separately. Second, this chapter offers a 
very rich empirical setting by covering home and host countries from 
five continents, while previous studies have tended to focus on entry 
decisions of MNEs from the same home country. 
Chapter 5, “Institutions and performance after a radical technological 
change: How the value of specialized complementary resources varies 
across markets”, aims to analyze the impact of formal institutions on the 
achievement of incumbents’ advantages after a radical technological 
change. The institutional perspective is used in a research topic which 
has traditionally been analyzed from the resource-based view. This 
chapter posits that, after a radical technological change, the value of 
specialized complementary resources – resources attained by incumbents 
that help them to commercialize the innovation and are difficult for 
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newcomers to replicate – depends on the institutional environment in 
which the firms operate. The key hypothesis of this chapter is that the 
degree of development of formal institutions (weaker vs. stronger) 
moderates the relationship between the stock of specialized 
complementary assets and firm performance.  
The main contributions of Chapter 5 are threefold. First, the technology 
management and the institution-based view literature are integrated to 
understand how complementary resources can help incumbents to 
succeed in turbulent environments. Second, it offers additional empirical 
support for incumbents’ advantages in technological dynamic 
environments. Third, evidence based on a wide sample of countries 
covering the five continents is presented, which allows a higher level of 
generalizability for our results. 
Finally, “Summary and Conclusions”, includes a summary of the main 
findings and contributions of this dissertation. 
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Figure 1.4. Dissertation structure 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 he mobile communications industry has attracted the attention of 
scholars from many different disciplines (Birke and Swann, 2006; 
Fuentelsaz, Maicas and Polo, 2012; Gruber and Verboven, 2001, Jang, 
Dai and Sung, 2005; Maicas, Polo and Sese, 2010), which is not 
surprising given the social and economic importance of mobile 
communications in our society (Fuentelsaz, Maicas and Polo, 2008). 
Mobile telecommunications are now part of daily life. To illustrate this, 
Figure 2.1 shows that the mobile penetration rate grew substantially 
from 12% in 2000 to 78% in 2011. This means that, nowadays, almost 
everybody around the world possesses at least one handset. Having a 
mobile has become the rule when 10 years ago it was the exception. This 
quick diffusion of mobile technology has no precedents in other 
technologies. Figure 2.1 also shows that, for instance, fixed telephony 
and the Internet have not reached such high penetration rates and their 
growth rhythms are very different to that of mobile telephony. 
Although the worldwide presence of the Internet is increasing, its 
annual growth is lower than that of mobile communications. The 
penetration rate of fixed telephony and its comparison with mobile 
communications will be the focus of our attention in Section 2.5. 
T
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Figure 2.1. Worldwide penetration rate (2000-2010) 
 
Source: WDI (2012) 
It is important to note that there are remarkable differences in the 
mobile penetration rate across the world. For instance, in 2011, mobile 
telecommunications in Europe and America had a penetration rate of 
over 100%, whereas other regions, such as Africa (61%), Asia Pacific 
(78%) and the Middle East (78%), had lower penetration rates (Figure 
2.2). However, if we look at the penetration rates in 2000 the situation 
was somewhat different. Although Western Europe and USA/Canada 
had penetration rates of above 40% - mainly because they were the 
birthplace of mobile communications -, the industry had a low diffusion 
rate in other regions. Only 2% of the population in Africa had a handset, 
7% in Eastern Europe and Asia, 10% in the Middle East and 12% in 
Latin America. Only 10 years later, Eastern Europe and Latin America 
had penetration rates of over 100%.  
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Figure 2.2. Mobile penetration rate by region (2011) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from Wireless Intelligence (2012) 
The rapid diffusion of mobile technology around the world is strongly 
linked to the existence of network effects (Doganoglu and Gryzbowski, 
2007; Gruber, 2005). As Economides and Himmelberg (1995) highlight 
that, in network industries, it is necessary to achieve a critical mass after 
which network effects start to work. In the case of the mobile 
communications industry, this threshold in the critical mass was 
encouraged by the introduction of the GSM standard, initially in Europe 
(birthplace of the GSM technology) and subsequently in the rest of the 
world. 
In what follows, Section 2.2 analyzes the evolution of the mobile 
communication industry and the introduction of the GSM standard in 
the different regions previously defined. The next sections are devoted 
to highlighting the characteristics which make the mobile 
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communications industry an adequate research setting in which to carry 
out the three empirical analyses of the following chapters. Section 2.3 
describes the type of network effects, according to the classification in 
Chapter 1, which takes place in mobile communications industry. 
Section 2.4 shows that international groups which operate in very 
different institutional contexts have become the big players in this 
industry. Section 2.5, describes in depth the technological change which 
took place between fixed and mobile telephony. Section 2.6 closes the 
chapter by relating mobile industry characteristics to the research lines 
of this dissertation. 
 
2.2. EVOLUTION OF MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
2.2.1. Evolution of mobile communications industry in Europe 
The European region is characterized by an early and homogeneous 
development of mobile communications in most countries. The first 
mobile telephone system in Europe was commercialized by Swedish 
Telecom in 1956. Later, mobile systems were launched in Germany 
(1959), the United Kingdom (1959) and other European countries in the 
60’s and 70’s (Gruber, 2005). In spite of these first attempts, the industry 
was not really developed until the 80’s, with the introduction of 
analogue systems. 
The analogue systems were based on radio waves that varied in 
frequency and technology across countries (Gruber, 2005). As can be 
seen in Figure 2.3, the early 80’s show a substantial growth in the 
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number of subscribers, probably due to the novelty of the technology. 
Nevertheless, the number of users was still moderate in this first stage in 
comparison with the following years. The literature has suggested 
several reasons for this low number of users, including the high prices in 
a monopoly regimen, the inexistence of a critical mass and the 
technology restrictions derived from incompatible standards between 
the networks of different countries. As an example of the latter, it can be 
mentioned that the independent development of mobile systems in each 
country made international roaming impossible in a European Union 
area that was moving towards integration (Fuentelsaz et al., 2008). 
Consequently, increasing concern arose about the necessity of making 
mobile systems compatible. As a result, the Group Special Mobile (GSM) 
was created in 1982 to work on the development of a compatible 
standard across European countries aimed at improving the quality and 
efficiency of phone services. Although the first agreement to implement 
the GSM standard was signed in September 1987 by 14 operators from 
13 countries (Hillebrand, 2002), its commercial take-off occurred in 
1992. This year can be considered as the beginning of the digital era of 
mobile technology in Europe. 
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Figure 2.3. Number and growth of subscribers in European Union countries (1982-2010) 
 
Source: WDI (2012) 
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As can be observed in Figure 2.3, the number of subscribers started to 
grow radically after 1992. The success of GSM was based on several 
advantages over the analogue system that Fuentelsaz et al. (2008) 
summarize as (i) a more efficient use of the radio spectrum, (ii) cost 
advantages related to microelectronic technology, (iii) the possibility of 
international roaming, (iv) the exploitation of scale economies by 
manufacturers and (v) a better distribution of the sunk costs of R&D 
among the European countries. The fast increase in the number of 
subscribers was accompanied by a growth in wireless technology 
penetration. The success of the GSM system is also reflected in the high 
intensity of network effects (Gruber, 2005; Srinivasan, Lilien and 
Ragaswamy, 2004), which leads to faster mobile adoption. After the 
introduction of the UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System) standard in 2003, the annual growth has declined, which shows 
that the mobile communications industry in Europe has reached an 
advanced maturity stage in its life cycle.  
 
2.2.2. Evolution of mobile communications industry in the U.S. 
In the United States, the first mobile communication took place in 1921 
(Noble, 1962) and radio communications had an important role of radio 
communications during the Second World War. The first true mobile 
telephone appeared in 1946 and it allowed an interconnection with the 
fixed telecommunications system (Gruber, 2005). At that time, mobile 
communications started to take place at city level and were extended to 
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regional level, mainly under the control of the old AT&T. In the 1980s, 
the first analogue systems appeared in United States under the AMPS 
(Advance Mobile Phone System) standard. The introduction of this 
standard, as occurred with the GSM in Europe, allowed interstate 
roaming and handset compatibility (Fuentelsaz et al., 2008). After the 
introduction of the AMPS standard, other incompatible standards 
appeared in the United States in the 1990s’ as part of 2G technologies, 
such as TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access), CDMA (Code Division 
Multiple Access) and GSM. This essentially meant that users from 
different companies in the same market were unable to communicate 
with each other. The situation arose because the regulator allowed the 
market to decide which standards to employ in contrast to the European 
case (Church and Gandal, 2005). According to Gans, King and Wright 
(2005: 247) the failure of the U.S. to adopt a common 2G standard, with 
the associated benefits in terms of roaming and switching of handsets, 
meant the first-generation AMPS system remained the most popular 
mobile technology in the U.S. throughout the 1990s. The lack of 
technological compatibility also resulted in the penetration rate in the 
United States usually being lower than that of Europe (Gans et al., 2005). 
As can be seen in Figure 2.4, the number of subscribers gradually 
increased in the United States until it reached more than 275 million in 
2010, which meant a penetration rate of close to 100%. As in Europe, 
this industry has reached an advanced maturity stage in its life cycle and, 
thus, annual growth in recent years has been decreasing slightly. But, in 
comparison to Europe, the mobile communications industry in the 
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Figure 2.4. Number and growth of subscribers in the United States (1985-2010) 
 
Source: WDI (2012)
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United States did not grow suddenly with the introduction of digital 
technology during the 1990’s. This slower growth of the mobile 
communications industry in the United States can be explained by the 
initial incompatibility between standards and, thus, the lower intensity 
of network effects (Gans et al., 2005; Gruber, 2005). 
 
2.2.3. Evolution of mobile communications industry in other regions 
Other regions, given the success of the GSM standard in European 
countries, chose the GSM standard as the main technology in order to be 
compatible and benefit from European technological improvements 
(Fuentelsaz et al., 2008). This has led to technological compatibility 
among most of the networks of different firms in different countries. 
This technological compatibility has encouraged mobile adoption. As 
Gruber (2005:147) states, with positive network effects, standards lead to 
faster market growth. 
It is important to note that mobile penetration still differs among the 
regions analyzed. Curwen and Whalley (2008) describe some 
characteristics of these regions that can explain the differences in mobile 
diffusion. For instance, the Asia Pacific witnessed an important growth 
in mobile penetration rates from 7% in 2000 to 78% in 2011 (Figure 2.2). 
This rapid growth took place mainly in China, India, Japan, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Malaysia, 
Taiwan and Australia. Although these countries do not have a common 
regulator (as in the United States and the European Union), national 
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authorities decided to join the GSM system. However, penetration rates 
are still lower than in Europe and the United States because of the later 
introduction of mobile technology and the lower average income.  
Latin America is an example of a very fast introduction of mobile 
communications industry. Whereas, in 2000, only 12% of the population 
had a handset, in 2011, the penetration rate reached 105%. Curwen and 
Whalley (2008) highlight that competition in Latin America has been 
high because of the presence of international groups , such as América 
Móvil, Telefónica, Telecom Italia and Portugal Telecom which, 
operating under the GSM standard, have encouraged mobile penetration 
by adapting to local conditions.  
Africa has seen a more moderate growth in the number of users and 
penetration rates than other regions. Africa is a region of contrasts in 
terms of mobile penetration. In 2011, there were countries whose 
penetration rate exceeded 100%, e.g. Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, 
Libya and Tunisia, while penetration rates did not reach 30% in other 
nations, e.g. Burundi, Congo D.R., Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The 
lower penetration rates can be explained by a lower level of competition, 
which is a consequence of the late liberalization of mobile 
telecommunications. This has discouraged, along with political and 
institutional instability, corruption, foreign exchange, economic 
instability, inflation, high interest rates, lack of financial markets, 
inadequate regulation, poor corporative governance and unpaid bills 
(Curwen and Whalley, 2008: 101), the entry of foreign investors into 
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African markets. The lower level of competition has resulted in higher 
prices in a region with a low average income.  
In sum, the birthplace of the GSM standard was Europe. Technological 
compatibility and the existence of network effects allowed a quick 
diffusion of mobile communications industry in this area. The GMS 
standard was also adopted in most regions (with the exception of the 
United States) (Figure 2.5), making networks of different countries 
technologically compatible and also encouraging a late and rapid mobile 
phone penetration. Nevertheless, mobile phone penetration varies 
between and within regions depending on factors such as average 
income, competition and institutional conditions.  
 
Figure 2.5. Percentage of subscribers by technology (2011) 
 
                   Source: Wireless Intelligence (2012) 
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2.3. Network effects in mobile communications industry 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, mobile communications industry is 7th in 
the classification of industries with intensive network effects.  It has 
been considered as a paradigmatic case of an industry with direct or pure 
network effects in which a new user increases the utility of current users 
of the network because the possibilities of communication increase (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1995). 
From a technological viewpoint, networks of different firms - given the 
generalized adoption of the GSM standard – are compatible. Users from 
one network can communicate with users from other networks. Thus, it 
could be thought that an increase in the number of users of one network 
directly benefits users from other firms’ networks. In other words, that 
the mobile industry is characterized by industry-level network effects. 
However, part of the literature has suggested that the mobile industry is 
really characterized by firm-level network effects because the increase 
in the number of users of one network mainly benefits users from the 
same network (Church and Gandal, 2005). This occurs because of the 
economic incompatibility between firm networks. Given that on-net 
calls are usually cheaper than off-net calls1, users perceive economic 
incompatibility between networks. This incompatibility has been 
highlighted by Grajek (2010:141) who finds compatibility between 
(firm) networks to be low, in particular, when operators’ pricing strategy 
involves on-net discounts, in which case networks are perfectly 
                                                            
1 On-net calls refer to calls that are originated and terminated on the same firm 
network, whereas off-net calls refer to calls between two different networks. 
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incompatible. Thus, firm-level network effects exist and users prefer to 
join the firm network with the greatest number of users to avoid 
additional costs from making off-net calls. Firm-level network effects 
have also been called tariff-mediated network effects because they have 
their origin in differences in prices between on-net and off-net calls 
(Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998). 
 
The existence of firm-level network effects allows a 
better understanding of the role of strategy in the 
management of firm network value to increase 
performance. As Chapter 3 “Strategic choices, network 
value and performance: a strategic approach to network 
value in network industries” aims to analyze how 
strategy helps firms to manage network effects to 
increase their own network value and performance, the 
mobile communications industry is an adequate research 
setting for the empirical analysis. 
 
2.4. Mobile communications players in network competition:  
From national operators to international groups 
Nowadays, international groups have become the big players in network 
competition.  In the last two decades, they have increased their presence 
in mobile communications industry. This section tries to explain the 
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evolution of these international groups in terms of the number of 
subsidiaries and the distance of these subsidiaries from their home 
markets.  
The introduction of a common worldwide standard through the GSM 
system not only improved mobile technology diffusion, but also 
encouraged the internationalization of wireless operators. Gerpott and 
Jakopin (2005: 636) argue that the internationalization of telcos received 
an additional impetus with the licensing of digital mobile networks in 
numerous countries with most of these networks using the Global 
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard.2 
As Sarkar, Cavusgil and Aulakh (1999) explained, the 
internationalization of telecom firms was in part driven by exploiting 
scope and scale economies based on factors such as, for example, the 
achievement of an efficient use of network capacity and a higher 
negotiating power over equipment suppliers. The existence of a common 
standard allowed multinationals to take advantage of the technology 
knowledge of their home countries to develop networks in other 
countries. It resulted in cost reductions, with the subsequent positive 
impact on performance. 
Given that the telecom industry had been a traditional regulated 
industry and the radio spectrum was considered a scarce resource, the 
authorities controlled the number of competitors in each market by 
                                                            
2 GSM was initially the abbreviation of Group Special Mobile but it was changed to 
refer to the standard, Global System for Mobile Communications, when the group was 
renamed Standard Mobile Group (SMG).  
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offering few GSM licenses. Thus, when firms decided to internationalize, 
they usually had to acquire equity of existing national operators which 
had obtained GSM licenses during 1990’s. In most cases, the 
international groups acquired a minority participation in a national 
operator which was later extended. For instance, Gerpott and Jakopin 
(2005:648) observed that based on the minority investment experiences 
until the mid-1990s some of the European MNO [Mobile Network 
Operators] began to implement new majority takeovers of foreign firms, 
which had already been in the MNO business, and to transform several 
of their minority stakes into majority holdings.  
The introduction of 3G standards gave a second boost to the 
internationalization of telecom operators through the launching of new 
licenses by authorities. It gave international groups the possibility of 
expanding into new markets through the purchase of 3G licenses 
(Curwen and Whalley, 2008). For instance, in 2003, the international 
group Hutchison (Hong Kong) acquired 3G licenses to enter Austria, 
Denmark, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and, in 2005, Ireland. 
In sum, the internationalization of telecom firms started in the 1990’s 
and increased during the 2000’s, especially with the introduction of 3G 
technology. This increasing scope of MNEs can be appreciated in Table 
2.1 that shows the number of countries in which each international 
group is present in 2000 and 2010. As can be observed, most 
international groups have increased the number of countries in which 
they operate in this 10-year period with the only exceptions of AT&T, 
KPN, Millicom, TDC and Telecom Italia. 
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Table 2.1. Evolution in number of subsidiaries by MNE (2000 – 2010) 
Group 2000 2010 
Abu Dhabi - 5 
Access Industries - 3 
AF  - 4 
Altimo - 17 
América Móvil 6 17 
AT&T 5 3 
Axiata 7 8 
Batelco 1 4 
Belgacom 1 2 
Bharti Airtel 1 19 
Bite 1 2 
Cable & Wireless 24 26 
Deutsche Telecom 10 18 
Digicel - 32 
Elisa 2 2 
Etisalat 2 16 
France Telecom 34 42 
Hutchison 13 13 
JT 1 2 
KPN 8 3 
Magyar 1 3 
Maroc Telecom 1 5 
Maxis 1 3 
MegaFon 1 4 
Millicom 18 14 
Mobistar 1 2 
MTN 6 23 
MTS 1 6 
NII 5 5 
NTT Docomo 7 8 
Oger - 2 
Orascom 4 12 
OTE 5 7 
Portugal Telecom 3 7 
Qtel 1 14 
Saudi Telecom 1 8 
SingTel 5 26 
Sistema  1 7 
Sonatel 1 4 
Sudatel - 6 
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Group 2000 2010 
TDC  6 1 
Tele2 6 7 
Telecom Argentina 2 2 
Telecom Italia 8 5 
Telefónica 16 20 
Telekom Austria 4 8 
Telekom Slovenije 1 4 
Telekom Sribija 1 3 
Telenor 10 21 
Telia Sonera 13 25 
Telstra 2 2 
Trilogy - 4 
Turkcell 6 8 
Viettel - 3 
VimpelCom 1 10 
Vivendi 5 8 
Vodacom 3 5 
Vodafone 23 33 
Wataniya 1 6 
Wind - 13 
Zain 1 9 
Source: Wireless Intelligence Database (2012) 
 
International groups in this industry come from different regions 
although European MNEs are the most internationalized groups because 
of their longer experience in this industry. Figure 2.6 shows the 
international groups that were operating at the end of 2010 by region of 
origin. As can be observed, most international groups come from Europe 
and Asia, whereas Oceania and Latin America show the lowest number 
of international groups. 
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Figure 2.6. International groups by worldwide region (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wireless Intelligence (2012) 
 
Although international groups tended to expand first to geographically 
close countries, most of them have gone one step further by entering 
countries in other regions which differ in terms of language, law, 
tradition and customs from their home countries.   
To illustrate this, we have selected one international group from each 
region that is representative of this gradual expansion process. Figure 2.7 
shows a summary of regions in which Telefónica (Europe), Hutchison 
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Whampoa (Asia), Telstra (Oceania), América Móvil (Latin America), 
Orascom (Africa) and Trilogy (United States) have invested.   
Orascom started its operations in Egypt in 1998 and entered other 
African countries including Algeria, Ghana, Burundi, Congo, Chad, 
Central African Republic, Namibia, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. Orascom has 
also expanded into countries in the Middle East such as Israel, Iraq and 
Syria. This company acquired a minority participation in Hutchison in 
2005 in order to be present in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Macao, Sri Lanka 
and Vietnam, but finally sold it in 2007. Since 2009, Orascom has 
operated in Canada after acquiring 65.08% of Wind Mobile. 
Hutchison has mainly expanded from Hong Kong to Europe (Austria, 
Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom) by acquiring 
3G licenses. It also entered Paraguay and Ghana, although it sold these 
participations in 2005 and 2008, respectively.  
Telefónica (Spain) initially expanded during the 90’s to Latin American 
countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. In the mid-2000’s, it started its European 
expansion to the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Slovakia and 
the United Kingdom. Although Telefónica also entered Morocco by 
acquiring 31.74% of Meditel, it finally sold off this investment in 2009. 
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Figure 2.7. FDI location by MNEs from all regions 
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América Movil, a Mexican international group, has mainly expanded 
into Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Thus, this 
international group has become Telefónica’s main competitor in the 
region. Although América Móvil has focused on Latin America, in the 
second quarter of 2012, it acquired 27.70% of the European KPN. This 
operation has allowed América Móvil to enter The Netherlands (home 
country of KPN), Germany and Belgium. 
Telstra is the only international group from Oceania and its international 
presence is limited, only operating in Australia (its home country) and 
Hong Kong.  
Trilogy is based in the United States and has entered Oceania (New 
Zealand) and Latin America (Bolivia, Dominican Republic and Haiti). It 
is important to note that US and Canadian international groups, such as 
Trilogy, AT&T and NII Nextel, are present in few countries because 
their domestic markets are so large that they have traditionally focused 
on regional instead of international competition. 
In sum, the number of international groups and the markets in which 
they are operating has increased greatly in the last two decades. 
Moreover, the examples given above illustrate that mobile MNEs have 
entered countries with important differences in terms of language, law, 
culture, etc. to their home countries.  
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Chapter 4 “Strategic choices and institutions in the FDI 
process: where to enter” aims to analyze how host market 
selection by MNEs depends on the institutional context, both 
formal and informal, of the host countries. The mobile 
communications industry is an adequate research setting to 
empirically analyze host market selection from the 
institution-based view because MNEs have entered countries 
whose institutions greatly differ from those of their home 
countries. 
 
2.5. The change from fixed to mobile communications  
Mobile and fixed communications have coexisted in the market in the 
last two decades. The evolution of the penetration rates of the two 
technologies seems to reflect a substitution process (Cadima and Barros, 
2000; Gans et al., 2005; Horvath and Maldom, 2002). The existence of  
advantages in mobile services compared to fixed telephony such as, 
higher competition, lower prices and higher functionality, may explain 
this substitution effect (Gruber and Verboven, 2001; Gans et al., 2005; 
Rodini, Ward and Woroch, 2003). 
As can be seen in Figure 2.8, the number of adopters of mobile 
technology has continuously increased during the last decade. On the 
contrary, the number of users of fixed-telephony remains, roughly 
speaking, steady and, from 2007, starts slightly decreasing. More 
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importantly, from 2002 on, the number of mobile users is substantially 
higher than the number of fixed users. 
Figure 2.8. Worldwide millions of subscribers by technology  
(2000-2010) 
 
Source: Wireless Intelligence Database (2012); WDI (2012) 
 
This substitution effect can be more clearly observed in Figure 2.9. If the 
total number of connections (fixed and mobile) is considered, mobile 
technology has evolved from representing 43% of connections 
worldwide in 2000 to 82% in 2010. This confirms the substitution of 
fixed by mobile telephony. 
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Figure 2.9. % of connections by type of technology over total  
(2000-2010) 
 
Source: Wireless Intelligence Database (2012); WDI (2012) 
 
This phenomenon has been previously analyzed by Gans et al. (2005) 
and Cadima and Barros (2000). It is a consequence of the radical 
technological change from fixed technology – based on a solid medium, 
such as metal wire or optical fiber – to wireless technology – based on 
new methods of exploitation of the radio spectrum to allow voice 
transmission (Rothaermel and Hill, 2005).  
In this context of radical technological change, most fixed 
telecommunications companies– which were usually state-owned – 
invested in mobile communications. When the 2G mobile system 
appeared and new networks were launched in most markets, incumbents 
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had to face competition from new entrants. This new competitive 
framework was established in most countries because of the worldwide 
scope of mobile telephony (Figure 2.2). 
 
As Chapter 5 “Institutions and performance after a radical 
technological change: How the value of specialized 
complementary resources varies across markets” aims to 
analyze how incumbents’ advantages, based on the possession 
of complementary resources, depend on the institutional 
context of the market in which they operate, the mobile 
communications industry is an adequate research setting 
because of the radical technological change from fixed to 
mobile technology in this worldwide industry. 
 
2.6. SUMMARY 
Figure 2.10 summarizes the main characteristics of the mobile 
communications industry which justify its use as the research setting of 
this dissertation.   
First, mobile telephony ranks 7th in the classification of industries with 
intensive network effects. This industry is a paradigmatic case of an 
industry driven by direct and firm-level network effects. This allows us 
to test, in Chapter 3, the effect of strategy in leveraging network effects 
to achieve a greater firm network value and performance. 
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Second, the mobile industry has recently been internationalized with 
the entry of MNEs in all regions. International groups and their 
subsidiaries have recently increased and have entered into countries 
whose institutions (laws, culture, etc.) greatly differ from those of their 
home countries. This institutional variability is suitable for us to test, in 
Chapter 4, the effect of the institutional context, both formal (e.g. laws) 
and informal (e.g. culture) in MNEs’ entry decisions.  
Finally, the mobile industry is the result of a radical technological 
change from fixed telephony. The worldwide presence of this industry 
and the permanence of fixed companies as mobile operators will allow us 
to test, in Chapter 5, the moderating role of the institutional context in 
the achieving of incumbent advantages based on the possession of 
complementary resources. 
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Figure 2.10. Mobile communications industry as an adequate research setting 
Chapter 2. Research setting: mobile communications industry 
63 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Birke D, Swann P. 2006.  Network Effects and the Choice of Mobile Operator. 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 16(1/2):  65-84. 
Cadima N, Barros P. 2000. The impact of mobile phone diffusion on the fixed-
link network, CEPR Discussion Paper 2598, London  
Church JR, Gandal N. 2005. Platform Competition in Telecommunications. Prepared 
for The HandBook of Telecommunications Vol. 2 edited by M.Cave, S. 
Majumdar and I. Vogelsang. 
Doganoglu T, Gryzbowski L. 2007. Estimating Network Effects in the Mobile 
Telephony in Germany. Information Economics and Policy 19(1):  65-79. 
Fuentelsaz L, Maicas JP, Polo Y. 2008. The evolution of mobile 
communications in Europe: the transition from the second to the third 
generation. Telecommunications Policy 32(6):  436-449. 
Fuentelsaz L, Maicas JP, Polo Y. 2012. Switching costs, network effects and 
competition in the European mobile telecommunications industry. 
Information Systems Research 23(1): 93-108. 
Harzing, A-W. 2002. Acquisitions versus greenfield investments: international 
strategy and management of entry modes. Strategic Management Journal 
23(2): 211-227. 
Gans JS, King SP,Wright J. 2005. Wireless Communications. Chapter included 
in the book Handbook of Telecommunications Economics Vol. 2, 
Technology Evolution and the Internet. The Netherlands. North-Holland 
and Elsevier. 
Chapter 2. Research setting: mobile communications industry 
64 
 
Gerpott, T.J. and Jakopin, N.M. (2005). The degree of internationalization and 
the financial performance of European mobile network operators. 
Telecommunications Policy 29(8): 635-661. 
Grajek, M. (2010). Estimating Network Effects and Compatibility: Evidence 
from the Polish mobile market. Information Economics and Policy 22(2):  
130-143. 
Gruber, H. and Verboven, F. 2001. The Diffusion of Mobile 
Telecommunications Services in the European Union. European 
Economic Review 45(3):  577-588. 
Gruber, H. 2005. The Economics of Mobile Telecommunications. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom 
Jang, S-:., Dai, S-C. & Sung, S. 2005. The Pattern and Externality Effect of 
Diffusion of Mobile Telecommunications: the Case of the OECD and 
Taiwan. Information Economics and Policy 17(2): 133-148. 
Laffont, J.J., Rey. P. and Tirole, J. 1998. Network Competition: II. Price 
Discrimination. Rand Journal of Economics 29(1):  38-56. 
Maicas, J.P., Polo, Y. and Sese, J. 2009. The role of (personal) network effects and 
switching costs in determining mobile users’ choice. Journal of Information 
Technology 24(2):  160-171. 
McIntyre, D.P. and Subramaniam, M. 2009. Strategy in Network Industries: A 
Review and Research Agenda.  Journal of Management 35(6):  1494-1517. 
Srinivasan, R., Lilien, G.L. and Rangaswamy, A. 2004.  First in, First out? The 
Effects of Network Externalities on Pioneer Survival. Journal of 
Marketing 68(1):  41-58. 
Chapter 2. Research setting: mobile communications industry 
65 
 
Noble, D. 1962. The history of land mobile communications. Proceedings of 
the IRE, Vehicular Communications 50(5): 157-179. 
Wireless Intelligence Group. 2012. Wireless Intelligence Database. 
World Bank Group. 2012. World Development Indicators Online. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2. Research setting: mobile communications industry 
66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3. 
STRATEGIC CHOICES, NETWORK 
VALUE AND PERFORMANCE: 
A Strategic Approach to Network Value in 
Network Industries 
 
  
 
 
  
Chapter 3. Strategic choices, network value and performance 
69 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
etwork industries, defined as those in which network effects are 
important to understand how firms compete, represent a large and 
growing portion of today’s economy. As shown in Chapter 1, software, 
mobile communications and video games are just a few examples of 
industries where network effects drive market competition (Shankar and 
Bayus, 2003; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008). In recent years, management 
and economic literature have devoted increasing attention to these 
industries (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007; McIntyre and Subramaniam, 
2009; Shankar and Bayus, 2003). This may be a reaction to evidence that 
network industries seem to challenge much of the thinking derived from 
previous models and findings (Shapiro and Varian, 1998; Suarez, 2005). 
However, although recent literature recognizes that the foundations of 
network effects have received an increasing amount of attention from 
researchers (Varian and Shapiro, 1998; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007), a 
deeper understanding of the role that firm strategy plays in leveraging 
network effects is needed (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009). 
One of the main premises of businesses such as software and 
telecommunications is that the firm’s installed customer base can be 
considered a key strategic asset to gain sustainable competitive 
advantages (Shankar and Bayus, 2003). This is because the existence of 
network effects implies that consumers’ utility is directly affected by the 
number of consumers using the same product or technology (Shy, 2011) 
and, thus, customers’ willingness to pay increases, with the subsequent 
N 
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potential impact on firm performance (Shapiro and Varian, 1998; 
Shankar and Bayus, 2003). 
There is a growing body of literature that attempts to measure network 
effects in a variety of industries. This stream of research is mainly 
focused on technological standards competition (Cowan, 1990; David, 
1985; Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993), technology adoption and 
diffusion (Gandal, Kende and Rob, 2000; Goolsbee and Klenow, 2002; 
Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1998; Park, 2004) or the analysis of 
hedonic price functions for products exhibiting network effects 
(Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; Hartman and Teece, 1990, Gandal 
1994). However, only a few papers have analyzed how firms’ strategic 
decisions may influence performance when network effects are 
important. These papers have paid attention to the impact of strategic 
dimensions such as entry timing and learning orientation (Schilling, 
2002), product diversification (Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008) and pioneers’ 
advantages (Eisenman, 2006). One commonality of these works is that 
they focus their attention on specific attributes of strategic choices, 
without establishing a general model about how strategy helps firms to 
gain a competitive advantage in network industries. 
This chapter attempts to explain how firm-initiated strategic actions can 
help firms to benefit from the existence of network effects. Following 
McIntyre and Subramaniam (2009), this chapter aims to study the 
implications of strategy in network industries in greater depth. It is built 
on both economic and strategic literatures under the premise that 
understanding the drivers of network effects will allow firms to adopt a 
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more proactive position and intensify the network effects to their own 
benefit. This chapter also extends previous research by suggesting that 
network value, defined as the value stemming from other consumers 
already using the product (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009:1496), is 
more accurate than network size for assessing a firm’s competitive 
position in the presence of network effects. In contrast to most of the 
existing empirical literature (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; Schilling, 
2002), this chapter proposes an adjusted measure of network value, based 
on Metcalfe’s law, that includes not only network size but also network 
intensity.  
Previous literature has identified three elements that act as antecedents 
of network effects (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007; Katz and Shapiro, 1994; 
Shapiro and Varian, 1998), namely, users’ expectations, users’ 
coordination and compatibility among competing networks. This 
chapter postulates that firms, by managing these elements through their 
strategic decisions, can leverage network effects and increase network 
value in the industries in which they operate. In particular, it is analyzed 
how several strategic initiatives based on the management of the 
installed base, such as entry timing, internationalization and switching 
costs, are related to users’ expectations, users’ coordination and 
compatibility among competing networks and, eventually, to network 
value. 
Focusing on firm-initiated actions that shape the firm’s competitive 
destiny in network industries, this chapter brings a strategic dimension 
to the research in this field by offering a theoretical model that relates 
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strategic actions and the drivers of network effects. This analysis focuses 
on the concept of network value, which has been previously analyzed 
from a theoretical perspective in the literature. The main contribution of 
Chapter 3 lies in the proposal and analysis of an improved measure of 
network value that integrates the size and intensity dimensions of 
network effects in an empirical analysis. Finally, this chapter not only 
seeks to expand on prior findings by including the effect of firm strategy 
on network value, but also analyzes the impact of network value on firm 
performance. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section develops 
the theoretical model, paying special attention to the relationship 
between network effects and network value and between the latter and 
its main antecedents: expectations, coordination and compatibility. This 
section also provides a theoretical explanation of the effect of three 
strategic initiatives, namely, entry timing, internationalization and 
switching costs management, on network value. Section 3.2 also analyzes 
the relationship between network value and the performance of firms. 
The data from the European mobile communications industry and the 
variables used are presented in the third section 3.3, while the section 
3.4 describes the estimation procedure. Following that, evidence on the 
impact of entry timing, internationalization and switching costs on 
network value and the influence of the latter on firm performance is 
provided. Section 3.6 closes the chapter by discussing its main findings 
and its managerial and policy implications. 
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3.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1. Installed Base, Network Effects, Network Value and Network 
Intensity 
Previous literature has highlighted the role of the installed base as a 
strategic asset in network industries (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; 
Chacko and Mitchell, 1998; Shankar and Bayus, 2003). The installed base 
can be defined as the cumulative number of users at any given time in 
the product’s life (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009:1495). This 
strategic consideration of the installed base in network industries is 
explained by the existence of network effects that are present when the 
utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with 
the number of other agents consuming the good (Katz and Shapiro, 1985: 
424). Thus, user utility is dependent on the size of the installed base 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1998) and this results in interdependent demand 
(Rohlfs, 1974). 
The importance of the installed base to gain competitive advantages is 
clear in markets whose network effects are direct or pure,1 such as the 
telephone, fax and e-mail industries. Stand-alone benefit is negligible 
because the product or service has to be integrated into a network to 
obtain value from it (DePalma and Leruth, 1996; Grajek, 2010). Given 
                                                            
1 The literature has traditionally distinguished between direct and indirect network 
effects. The first refer to when adoption by different users is complementary, so that 
each user's adoption payoff, and his incentive to adopt, increases as more others adopt. 
The second arise through improved opportunities to trade with the other side of a 
market (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007: 1974). This Chapter focuses its attention on 
direct network effects, although most of the arguments offered would also stand for 
indirect network effects. 
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the existence of network effects, the main competitive advantage of the 
firm is based on creating a higher network value than its rivals, and not 
exclusively on generating a higher network-independent value based on 
quality issues (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009).2 Network value has 
been defined as the value stemming from other consumers already using 
the product and it is the reflection of the benefits associated with a large 
cohort of fellow adopters (installed base) for the product (McIntyre and 
Subramaniam, 2009:1496). As a consequence, network value directly 
depends on the size of the installed base. The higher the number of users 
of a network, the higher the interaction possibilities between its 
members and, thus, the greater the utility they receive from belonging 
to that network. 
It is necessary to note that network value is not merely the size of the 
installed base. Network value must also take into account the existence 
of network effects, which make it important for users to consume the 
product within a community. McIntyre and Subramaniam (2009) 
recognize that the relationship between the installed base and network 
value is not linear but depends on the strength of network effects or 
network intensity, which can be defined as the relative value generated 
                                                            
2 This chapter focuses on the network value that is directly dependent on the 
existence of other users consuming the product, that is, the value that comes from the 
existence of network effects. McIntyre and Subramaniam (2009) also identify a part of 
network value that can be network-independent. This network-independent value 
captures quality characteristics of the product that “are under the full control of the 
producer” (Bental and Spiegel, 1995:197), such as, in our industry, network coverage 
or network reliability. Accordingly to McIntyre (2011), companies with higher 
network value also tend to offer, from the organizational learning perspective, greater 
network-independent value since they have accumulated more experience and 
capabilities in the industry. 
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by network size for the consumer. Thus, network value is a growing 
function of both network size and network intensity. 
Network intensity depends on variables such as the product design 
(McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009), the stage of the product life cycle at 
which users adopt the product (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007),3 the value 
of rival networks (Shapiro and Varian, 1998)4 and the existence of local 
network effects (Suarez, 2005). For example, the importance that users 
confer to the existence of other users consuming the same good is higher 
in communication markets than in the videogames industry (Shankar 
and Bayus, 2003). Early adopters of a technology tend to obtain a higher 
utility from the existence of other users than late adopters (Farrell and 
Klemperer, 2007). Users take into consideration the number of users 
who consume the product of rival incompatible networks (Shapiro and 
Varian, 1998). They do not confer the same importance to the network 
as a whole because they achieve more utility by interacting with only 
part of it – friends or family, for example – (Birke and Swann, 2006; 
Suarez, 2005).  
Due to possible economic and technological incompatibility between 
two firms’ services or products (García-Mariñoso, 2001; Grajek, 2010), 
network effects often appear linked to the users of a given firm instead  
                                                            
3 As I will explain in Section 3, the importance of the stage of the product life cycle 
has been considered in our measure of the network value by differentiating between 
early and late adopters. 
4 The value of rival networks has also been taken into account when calculating the 
measure of network value that I propose in the chapter. For more details, see Section 
3. 
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of being linked to the installed base of the industry as a whole.5 When 
the installed base of a firm grows, so does the network value of that firm 
as a result of network effects. But the extent of this growth of network 
value when the installed base increases will depend, precisely, on the 
network intensity. 
3.2.2. The Antecedents of Network Value:  
Expectations, Coordination and Compatibility 
It is important to identify the circumstances under which network 
effects lead to a reinforcement of network value. The literature on 
network industries has highlighted three main elements that interplay 
with network effects and allow a reinforcement of installed base and, 
thus, of network value: users’ expectations, users’ coordination and 
compatibility among competing networks (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). 
The management of expectations has received attention from extant 
literature (Chacko and Mitchell, 1998; Eisenmann, 2006; Shapiro and 
Varian, 1998). The current installed base of a firm affects users’ 
expectations about which firm will dominate the market in the future 
(Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; Farrell and Saloner, 1986). Users 
                                                            
5 It must be noted that this Chapter will focus on the scope of the firm’s network and 
not on the total size of the market. This is because, in some cases, the products or 
services of different firms do not necessarily facilitate interaction between users. 
Apart from technological incompatibility, it can also be found artificial or economic 
incompatibility, which is based on price discrimination between on-net and off-net 
communication exchanges (Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998). Price discrimination 
generates tariff-mediated network effects, which appear at firm-level instead of 
industry-level (Grajek, 2010). This is precisely the situation of the research setting, as 
told in Chapter 2. A further discussion about economic incompatibility and price 
discrimination in the mobile communications industry is contained in Section 3.3. 
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prefer to consume goods and services from a firm with a larger installed 
base (Kim and Kwon, 2003; Birke and Swann, 2006). As a consequence, 
expectations are important because, if consumers believe a firm will 
dominate the market, then it will (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
Given that expectations condition the size of the installed base, firms 
have strong incentives to launch signals to influence user expectations 
about their future network dominance. These signals can be quantitative 
or qualitative. Among the former, it can be mentioned the size of the 
installed base (Kim and Kwon, 2003) or the early achievement of a large 
market share (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996). Qualitative signals 
include brand value or reputation (Katz and Shapiro, 1994) or the 
preannouncement of a new product or service that is not yet in the 
market, as in the case of the battle between Div-X and DVD (Dranove 
and Gandal, 2003). 
While expectations have an individualist orientation, coordination 
requires a plural action. Users’ coordination implies that several users 
join a system that allows them to interact with one another (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1994). When there are other incompatible networks, 
coordination of all users in a market to the same network is difficult for 
several reasons: confusion about what other people will do, different 
expectations about the dominant network, fear of taking the first 
decision, etc. Farrell and Klemperer (2007) use the term inertia to refer 
to a possible instrument that drives coordination. Inertia arises because 
later adopters choose a firm with a larger installed base even though 
there are better options. This literature has also referred to inertia as 
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bandwagon effects, and this concept assumes that users tend to do the 
same thing as others (Liebenstein, 1950; Rohlfs, 2001). It means that 
consumers are conformists because they have a “desire to join the 
crowd” (Grajek, 2010). Examples of how inertia can determine the 
standard chosen by the industry even though it is not the best option are 
the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985) or the light water technology for 
nuclear power reactors (Cowan, 1990). 
The third element in network industries is compatibility. Compatibility 
arises when the products of different firms can be used together (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985). In these situations, the scope of the users’ network 
includes the installed base of the reference firm as well as the base of 
compatible industry competitors (Grajek, 2010). Users will prefer 
compatibility because it offers them greater communication possibilities. 
Incompatibility prevents firms from achieving a maximum network size 
since users are fragmented in different networks and are not able to 
interact between them. In the presence of incompatibility, the user’s 
perceived utility will be lower (Katz and Shapiro, 1994; Lee and 
Mendelson, 2007) and, thus, network value will also decrease. 
Expectations and coordination have to do with users’ behavior whereas 
compatibility is a firm or policy decision. Compatibility is preferred by 
small rivals. It is a less risky option for entering into a market and allows 
them to exploit the network effects that come from the larger installed 
bases of their rivals. Therefore, compatibility often neutralizes the 
competitive advantage of a large network (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). 
On the contrary, larger competitors with a strong reputation or brand 
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value prefer incompatibility in order to deter the entry of new rivals 
(Katz and Shapiro, 1994). However, incompatibility is also a risky option 
because users may not have so much trust in a new network (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985). Sometimes the regulator decides to make compatibility 
obligatory among networks in order to increase social welfare and avoid 
the dominance of a less efficient technological standard in the market 
due to path dependency. This is the case, for instance, of the mobile 
communications industry in Europe, where the European Union decided 
to establish a supranational and common standard among networks 
(Fuentelsaz, Maicas and Polo, 2008; Gruber, 2005). 
An example of the trade-off between large and small companies with 
respect to compatibility can be found in the competition between 
Microsoft and Apple. In recent years, Apple has designed a strategy 
based on increasing the compatibility between its computers and 
Windows applications. Apple has opted for compatibility to increase 
users’ utility and reduce the obstacles they perceive if they choose its 
network. The increase in network value derived from being able to 
exchange compatible information with other Macintosh users has put 
Apple in a better competitive position. Microsoft, on the contrary, has 
made no effort to be compatible with other operating systems because it 
has the largest network value and the positive feedback helps it to 
continue growing. 
This preference of small firms for compatibility can also be found in the 
research setting. Big operators tend to establish a higher gap between 
on-net and off-net calls, increasing the (economic) incompatibility with 
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rivals’ networks. On the contrary, small operators offer very similar 
conditions to their users regardless of the destination of their calls. For 
instance, Ofcom (2009) determined that Three and T-Mobile, two of the 
smallest operators in United Kingdom, were the only operators which 
charged the same price for on-net and off-net calls in both prepaid and 
postpaid plans. 
3.2.3. Strategic Choices, Network Value and Performance 
First-mover advantages (FMA) and network value. The study of FMA 
has been one of the cornerstones of the strategy and management 
literatures (Carpenter and Nakamoto, 1989; Kalyanaram and Urban, 
1992; Lambkin, 1988; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). FMA have 
also played an important role in the context of network effects research 
(Farrell and Klemperer, 2007; Katz and Shapiro, 1994; Srinivasan, Lilien 
and Ragaswamy, 2004). 
In markets with network effects, firms will be interested in building a 
large installed base as an indicator of future dominance (Brynjolfsson 
and Kemerer, 1996). These efforts will be especially important in the 
early stages of competition. Firms that enter the market earlier will 
increase their possibilities of achieving an advantageous position 
(Arthur, 1990). As a result of early entry, the firm will be able to 
determine the dominant design of the product (Arthur, 1989) and 
influence the formation of users’ preferences (Carpenter and Nakamoto, 
1986) given that pioneers usually receive disproportionate attention 
from consumers because of the newness of their product (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988). As a consequence, I suggest that a firm with a 
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longer time in the market has a larger network value because it has had 
more time to make efforts in the management of users’ expectations 
through the achievement of an early installed base before the entry of 
rivals. 
It is also important to note that the inertia that has been discussed before 
will lead late users to choose the firms with a larger installed base. If a 
pioneer is able to convince early users about its dominance, late 
consumers will prefer to follow them into the same network and the 
pioneers’ product will become the standard in the industry 
(Schmalensee, 1982; Carpenter and Nakamoto, 1986; Farrell and 
Klemperer, 2007). Having achieved a leading position, the pioneers’ 
installed base will persist because of the difficulty of modifying users’ 
preferences (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). This is the main idea of 
the bandwagon effects which have been previously referred to. 
Accordingly, it is expected that time in the market increases the firms’ 
opportunities to influence user expectations about their networks. As a 
result of inertia, the network value of a firm that has been in the market 
a long time will be higher. 
H1. The time that a firm has been operating in the market has a 
positive effect on its network value 
Internationalization and network value. The literature has tended to 
study markets with indirect network effects in which diversification in 
complementary products plays an important role (Hill, 1992; Schilling, 
2002; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008). However, less attention has been paid 
to other growth strategies in markets with direct network effects such as 
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international diversification, especially when international network 
effects operate (Gruber and Verboven, 2001). 
Internationalization is, nowadays, an important topic of discussion 
because many firms are trying to compete globally (Barkema and 
Drogendijk, 2007; Grant, 2005). As a result, not only are firms present in 
various countries, but customers also “think” globally. National and 
regional preferences are disappearing as a consequence of a process of 
homogenization derived from technology, communication and travel 
(Grant, 2005). This means that customers are becoming more and more 
familiar with international firms and their brands. The 
internationalization of firms could be a means of attracting the interest 
of users in different countries since users value established brands (Lane 
and Jacobson, 1995). It would be expected the internationalization of a 
firm to influence its network value through its impact on expectations, 
coordination and perceived compatibility. 
First, internationalization can be understood as a signal that influences 
users’ expectations about future network dominance. There is an 
advantage for a firm entering a new local market when it has a wide 
international scope. It will have a larger perceived installed base 
compared to new domestic firms. Accordingly, the literature has 
highlighted the existence of international network effects through 
which the utility of each consumer rises with the increase in the number 
of consumers who use the same brand regardless of whether they live in 
their own country or abroad (Shy, 2001: 92). Thus, an international firm 
will reinforce the positive expectations of users about its future survival 
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on the basis of being present in other countries and the familiarity of 
domestic users with its brand through the leverage of international 
network effects.  
Consequently, I also expect that internationalization will facilitate 
coordination through international bandwagon effects. If users know 
that a firm has been chosen by users in other countries, inertia could 
lead them to make the same choice in their home market. Users will 
have more incentives to choose the international firm, replicating the 
choices of foreign users, since they want to imitate global trends (Grant, 
2005). Firms with an international presence try to create 
interdependences among different countries, which result in a close 
relation between the competitive position in one national market and 
the competitive position in others (Ghoshal, 1987: 425). 
Finally, it is also important to note that compatibility among inter-
country networks is necessary to influence users’ decisions. In the case 
of mobile telecommunications, Gruber and Verboven (2001) suggest 
that, with GSM wide-ranging international roaming, users may have 
greater incentives to adopt mobile communications since they benefit 
from international network effects. The firms that offer comparable, 
seamless and compatible services across international markets will obtain 
the commitment of users that exchange information internationally 
(Sarkar, Cavusgil and Aulakh, 1999). 
As a consequence, it is expected that the presence of the firm in various 
countries will create a larger network value through its influence on 
expectations and coordination as firms try to compete globally in order 
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to attract users across countries. Compatibility will reinforce the 
influence of internationalization on network value by allowing 
international network effects.  
H2. The level of internationalization of a firm has a positive effect 
on its network value  
Switching costs and network value. Switching costs are present in all 
network markets and their management has a strategic dimension 
(Gomez and Maicas, 2011; Shapiro and Varian, 1998). Consumer 
switching costs appear when consumers who have previously purchased 
from one firm have (or perceive) costs of switching to a competitor’s 
product, even when the two firms’ products are functionally identical 
(Klemperer, 1995: 515). The literature has highlighted how switching 
costs can increase the market power of a firm, allowing it to create entry 
barriers (Karakaya and Stahl, 1989; Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson, 
1992) and obtain abnormal returns that allow the firm to achieve 
sustainable competitive advantages (Amit and Zott, 2001; Klemperer, 
1987; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Schmalensee, 1982). However, 
the effectiveness of this mechanism as a basis for sustainable competitive 
advantages in information markets has been questioned (Mata, Fuerst 
and Barney, 1995). The effect of high switching costs may result in the 
loss of network value through their impact on expectations and 
coordination, as argued below. 
As mentioned before, network value depends on the installed base and 
users’ utility in the presence of network effects. While switching costs 
have been used as an instrument to maintain the installed base by 
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reducing customers’ desire to leave their current provider (Burnham, 
Frels and Mahajan, 2003), these costs reduce users’ utility (Maicas, Polo 
and Sese, 2009) not only because switching from one provider to another 
is costly but also because users perceive the threat of opportunistic firm 
behavior that could lead to future price increases in a bargain-then-rip-
off pricing strategy (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). It is not surprising 
that this expected opportunism leads users to form a negative image of 
the firm (Mata et al., 1995). Since potential users tend to form 
expectations about the future survival of the firm not only with 
quantitative signals such as the installed base, but also with qualitative 
signals like brand image or reputation (Katz and Shapiro, 1994), they 
will be reluctant to choose a firm with high switching costs. Frels, 
Shervani and Srivastava (2003) comment that a network of previous 
adopters is believed to influence adoption among non-adopters by 
providing opinions by word of mouth and observation. The negative 
experience of the current installed base will result in the formation of 
negative expectations about a firm network with higher switching costs 
and will prevent user coordination with this network, leading to a 
negative impact on network value. Mata et al. (1995: 490) explain that 
the value of opportunities lost because of a reputation for exploiting 
captured customers can be much larger than the value extracted from 
those captured customers. 
Switching costs are especially high when networks are incompatible. In 
particular, technological incompatibility is one of the main drivers of 
consumer switching costs (Garcia-Mariñoso, 2001). It is costly to 
abandon a network because of learning costs or loss of communication 
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possibilities with current users. Economic or artificial incompatibility 
also arises when the costs of communication among users are cheaper if 
they belong to the same network (Grajek, 2010). In this case, economic 
incompatibility increases the pecuniary switching costs derived from the 
higher costs of communicating with users of the previous network. 
Thus, incompatibility will reinforce the negative effect of switching 
costs on utility and, consequently, on network value. 
H3. Switching costs have a negative effect on firm network value. 
Network value and performance. In network industries, current 
performance is strongly dependent on past events (Farrell and 
Klemperer, 2007; McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009). This is the so-
called positive feedback that reinforces that which gains success or 
aggravates that which suffers loss (Arthur, 1996: 100).  
The literature has suggested that a continuous increase in network value 
is followed by an increase in the willingness to pay to have access to that 
network (Doganoglu and Grzybowski, 2007) and the subsequent 
decrease of the marginal costs of each information interchange (Arthur, 
1990). This is because the value does not lie in the product itself, but in 
the size and intensity of the network (De Palma and Leruth, 1996; 
Grajek, 2010). The product is more valuable as more people use it 
(Doganoglu and Gryzbowski, 2007). While a greater network value 
permits a higher price, marginal costs decrease as more and more 
information ties take place. In spite of a large initial investment, the 
marginal costs of producing an additional exchange are relatively cheap 
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(Shapiro and Varian, 1998) because information markets are knowledge-
based (Arthur, 1990). 
It is expected that a firm with a larger network value will also obtain a 
higher marginal net income from each information exchange derived 
from a higher price and lower marginal costs. Thus, performance will be 
positively related to network value. 
H4. Network value has a positive effect on firm performance. 
According to previous arguments, I build a model to test in the following 
sections as it is shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Strategic Choices, Network Value and Performance (Hypotheses) 
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3.3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
3.3.1. Research Setting: the European Mobile Communications 
Industry6 
As told in Chapter 2, mobile technology has reached the highest 
penetration rate in European countries given the consecution of a 
common standard at the beginning of 1990s’. The European mobile 
communications industry represents a large, fruitful and growing 
portion of Europe’s economy. This industry has become an important 
source of wealth in Europe. For instance, the telecommunications 
industry made up 2.83% of the GDP at the end of 2007, whereas, for 
example, agriculture constituted 1.82% (World Bank Group, 2010). The 
Financial Times Global 500 Index (2011) shows that 11 of the 50 largest 
firms in the world belong to network industries, five of them being 
mobile operators of which two, moreover, are European (Vodafone in 
the United Kingdom and Telefónica in Spain). 
The literature emphasizes the role of expectations and users’ 
coordination on users’ choice of mobile network (Doganoglu and 
Grazybowski, 2007; Gandal, 2002; Church and Gandal, 2005). It has been 
                                                            
6  Given that Chapter 3 does not introduce yet the institution-based view of firm 
strategy and focuses on strategic management on network industries, it has been 
preferred to focus on the mobile telecommunications in European countries. Using 
this mature industry in Europe assures a higher homogeneity in terms of competition, 
users’ preferences and regulation. It will allow that sample is not biased by 
institutional differences between countries in terms of technology acceptance and 
regulation. Moreover, taking European countries assures the existence of a common 
standard and, thus, roaming availability between countries (in order to test 
Hypothesis 2). 
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shown that, among other factors, the total installed base of an operator 
plays an important role in users’ expectations and coordination (Birke 
and Swann, 2006). Because of this, small operators in European markets 
may fail if they do not achieve a minimum critical mass to influence 
users’ expectations and coordination (Economides and Himmelberg, 
1995). 
Incompatibility issues have been especially remarkable in the European 
context in determining the scope of networks and understanding the 
existence of tariff-mediated or artificial network effects. As previously 
mentioned, the scope of networks is dependent on technological and 
economic compatibility. With regard to technological compatibility, in 
1984, the European Commission, through the Group Special Mobile 
(GSM), encouraged the development of a common technological 
standard which allowed mobile services within national and 
international networks. As a consequence, a user can employ his/her 
handset to make calls to the mobile phones of any firm in the country 
without technological restrictions and can use the same handset in any 
European country thanks to international roaming agreements. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this technological compatibility guided by 
supranational authorities, an economic incompatibility between firms’ 
networks comes from the price discrimination between on-net and off-
net calls. It generates what the literature has called tariff-mediated 
network effects, which appear at firm-level (Grajek, 2010; Laffont, Rey 
and Tirole, 1998). Users prefer to belong to a larger network to reduce 
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the probability of making off-net calls and benefit from lower on-net 
prices. 
Price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls has been 
identified by different authorities, including the Commission of the 
European Communities and Ofcom (the UK regulator), in most 
European countries (e.g., United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal and 
Germany).7 Although authorities have considered price discrimination to 
be an issue, only Ofcom quantifies it. A report from 2007 observes that, 
between 2002 and 2006, price discrimination in the United Kingdom 
decreased from 17.5 to 5.4 pence per minute. In spite of the decrease, 
price discrimination still exists in the market (Ofcom, 2011). 
This research setting is appropriate for analyzing the strategic actions 
described in the hypotheses above. First, entry timing strategies have 
been analyzed in the mobile communications industry and the results 
show that being the first into the market does pay (Bijwaard, Janssen and 
Maasland, 2008; Gomez and Maicas, 2011; Usero and Fernandez, 2009). 
Second, European mobile operators started their expansion around the 
world in the last years of the 20th century. The result of this 
internationalization process is that several groups, such as Vodafone, 
Teléfonica and T-mobile, have evolved from being mostly local 
operators to become highly internationalized. The internationalization 
of these operators has been studied in previous literature (Curwen and 
Whalley, 2008; Gerpott and Jakopin, 2005; Graack, 1996). Finally, 
                                                            
7 For further information, see Commission of the European Communities (2007, 2009) 
and Ofcom (2007). 
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switching costs have been found to be linked to the industry and their 
impact on firm performance has been analyzed (Shy, 2001; Viard, 2007). 
3.3.2. Sample 
The database includes the whole population of mobile communications 
providers that operated in twenty European markets between the last 
quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 20088. This long period is 
important because the sample does not suffer from survival bias. It 
should be clarified that the data refers to the activity of each operator in 
each country because, in mobile communications, competition takes 
place within national markets.9 Information comes from multiple sources 
but the main one is the Merrill Lynch Global Wireless Matrix. This 
publication provides quarterly information on several of the variables of 
interest such as the name of the firms, the number of subscribers, the 
number of firms per market and their performance. I have also collected 
information about the date of entry of the firms and their shareholder 
                                                            
8 The European countries considered in our research are Austria, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom. Since the measure of network value which will be used in this study 
does not take into account price considerations, it has been considered the period 
1998 to 2008 to avoid changes in the importance that users could confer to the price 
variable in selecting a network as a consequence of the recession which started to be 
noticed from the middle of 2008. 
9 Licenses granted by governments give the number of firms competing in a country. 
These licenses allow operators to use the radio spectrum inside the country. This 
means that, although international groups operate in several countries, our unit of 
analysis is the firm-market pair (e.g., Vodafone Spain, Orange France and O2 
Germany). 
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structure, mainly from industry reports and the corporate information of 
the firms. 
3.3.3. Measurement of Variables 
Network value. The literature offers different approaches to the 
measurement of the network value of a firm. Swann (2002) describes the 
traditional ways to determine it. The simplest way, Sarnoff’s Law, 
measures network value through the size of the installed base, n (Reed, 
1999).  
Nevertheless, it has been argued that network value does not only 
depend on the size of the installed base. My interest lies in network 
industries with direct network effects. In these industries, the 
possibilities of communication increase with the number of users 
consuming the good and, thus, their perceived utility grows. According 
to Church and Gandal (2004:3), an adopter’s link to the network has no 
value except to facilitate the transmission of information to, and from, 
other adopters. Farrell and Klemperer (2007) suggest that the users of a 
communication network gain directly when other users adopt it because 
they have more opportunities for interaction with peers. Stabell and 
Fjelstad (1998: 431) also consider that in network industries the 
dependency among customers is the main product delivered. Thus, a 
second option for measuring network value is to proxy it by the number 
of possible communication ties that exist among the users of the same 
network. This is known as Metcalfe’s Law and is measured as n*(n-1). 
With this measure, I mainly focus on the possibilities of connectivity 
between users (Ross, 2003). 
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Metcalfe’s Law has been criticized for giving the same importance to all 
users (Grajek, 2010; Briscoe, Odlyzko and Tilly, 2006). As mentioned in 
the second section, network intensity determines the relationship 
between network size and network value (McIntyre and Subramaniam, 
2009). This intensity depends on several factors, including the stage of 
the product-life cycle in which users adopt the product. Farrell and 
Klemperer (2007:1975) suggest that early adopters are more important 
than later adopters, first adopters having an “excess early power” to 
determine the dominant network in the future. Early adopters generate 
more network value for the firm than later ones because of the inertia 
operating in these markets. For this reason, the literature has suggested a 
third approach that considers a decreasing marginal network value as 
n*log(n), known as Zipf’s Law (Briscoe et al., 2006). This expression 
acknowledges both the idea of users’ connectivity and the differences 
between early and late adopters. It will be used this approach as first 
measure of network value (NETWORK VALUE).  
However, Zipf’s Law only considers the firm’s own network size in the 
calculus of the network value of the firm. That is, with the same number 
of users, network value will be the same in different markets 
independently of the market characteristics (number of rivals, 
differences in size…). This does not introduce any bias into the calculus 
of network value if there is total compatibility among networks. 
Nevertheless, in mobile communications there is some degree of 
incompatibility among networks (Grajek, 2010). In this industry, 
economic incompatibility is reflected in the differences between on-net 
and off-net tariffs. For this reason, I propose an alternative measure of 
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network value that tries to overcome some of the inconveniences of 
Zipf’s Law by taking into account the particular conditions of each 
market (e.g., number of rivals and differences in size) and, thus, the 
existence of different network intensities in different networks. With 
this measure, I try to determine which firms are capable of leveraging 
more intensive network effects or, in other words, which firms are more 
attractive to users depending on market structure (McIntyre and 
Subramaniam, 2009).  
A very simplistic but illustrative example of the previous reasoning is 
going to be offered. Consider two markets, A and B, with two firms, 
firms 1 and 2, operating in each and the market shares shown in Table 
3.1. 
Table 3.1.  Example 
 Market A Market B 
Firm 1 60% (1,200 subscribers) 80% (1,200 subscribers) 
Firm 2 40% (800 subscribers) 20% (300 subscribers) 
 
In the two markets, firm 1 has the same network value using Zipf’s Law 
(1,200*log(1,200)) and offers more communication possibilities than firm 
2. However, users of firm 1 in market A have twice the probability of 
making off-net calls (40%) than users of firm 1 in market B (20%). 
Following the anecdotal evidence in the industry, there is a tendency in 
mobile communications to penalize off-net calls through a higher price 
than on-net calls (Birke and Swann, 2006; Grajek, 2010). Thus, users of 
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firm 1 in market B receive a higher utility from having selected firm 1 
instead of firm 2 than in network A. In other words, the network of firm 
1 in market B is more attractive than in market A and can leverage more 
intensive network effects, because of the price differences between on-
net and off-net calls.10 
The higher the expected probability of making on-net calls over the 
probability of making off-net calls, the more attractive the network of a 
particular firm is. I propose amending Zipf’s Law with the ratio of on-net 
over off-net call probabilities (probon-net / proboff-net), assuming that the 
calls from one network to another are proportional to the sizes of the 
installed bases. In this way,  a firm that has achieved a larger installed 
base in comparison with its direct rivals in its specific market is 
rewarded since the probability of users that have chosen it supporting an 
additional cost derived from making off-net calls is inferior (probon-net > 
proboff-net). Likewise, this ratio penalizes those firms that have a lower 
network size, with a higher probability of their users making off-net 
calls and, thus, supporting higher call costs (probon-net < proboff-net). 
In order to calculate the expected probability of making on-net calls 
over off-net calls (probon-net / proboff-net), I borrow the example provided 
by Birke and Swann (2006) who develop a likelihood matrix that 
represents the pattern of calls between rival networks in a given market. 
Let’s assume that there are four operators (i = 1,…, 4) competing in a 
market and that the market share of each is given by mi. Assuming that 
                                                            
10 As mentioned in footnote 5, the literature has referred to this phenomenon as tariff 
or price-mediated network effects (Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998; Birke and Swann, 
2006), and these lead to artificial or economic incompatibility among firm networks. 
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there are no price differences between on-net and off-net calls and 
accepting that the calls from one network to another are proportional to 
the sizes of the installed bases, the expected call probability among users 
of different networks is given by the product of their respective market 
shares as shown in the following matrix (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2. Likelihood Matrix of Calls Across Networks 
  To Network 
  1 2 3 4 
Ca
lls
 fr
om
 N
et
w
or
k 1 m1 m1 m1 m2 m1 m3 m1 m4 
2 m2 m1 m2 m2 m2 m3 m2 m4 
3 m3 m1 m3 m2 m3 m3 m3 m4 
4 m4 m1 m4 m2 m4 m3 m4 m4 
              Source: Birke and Swann (2006). 
The probability of making on-net calls (probon-net) is given by the 
elements of the matrix diagonal (݉௜݉௜	), whereas the off-diagonal 
elements (݉௜݉௝) refer to off-net call probability (proboff-net) between 
networks for each firm. Thus, the probability of making on-net calls 
over off-net calls for each firm i in a market with M companies is given 
by the ratio: 
                 ௠೔௠೔	∑ ௠೔௠ೕಾషభೕసభ
ൌ 	 ௠೔ଵି	௠೔      [i≠j]  (3.1) 
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By modifying Zipf’s Law with this ratio, the adjusted network value 
(NETWORK VALUE’ ) is expressed as: 
                                               (3.2) 
As a consequence, the adjusted network value will be higher when: a) 
there is a larger installed base that allows greater communications 
possibilities among current users of the network (network size 
dimension of network value); b) there is a larger difference between the 
network sizes of the reference firm and its rivals, which gives it a 
competitive advantage to leverage more intensive network effects and 
make its network more attractive to potential users (network intensity 
dimension of network value). 
Performance (PERFORMANCE). Firm profitability is measured through 
EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization) divided by the total revenues of the firm. Both EBITDA 
and revenues are calculated for each firm in each national market.  
Time in the market (TIME). Different concepts of pioneering have been 
used when modeling first-mover advantages. Srinivasan et al. (2004) 
consider the pioneer to be the first firm to commercialize a new product. 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) suggest some alternative measures 
such as the numerical order of entry, rates of company survival, duration 
of advantages and time from pioneer entry. Brown and Lattin (1994) 
suggest time in the market as an adequate measure of FMA.  
i
i
i
m
mnn i 1)log(
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Finally, this variable counts the number of months that a firm has been 
operating in digital wireless technology (GSM). The decision to take 
GSM as the starting point of the market responds to the scarce 
acceptance of analogical technology. For example, in the ten years 
between 1980 and 1990 when analogical technology was available, the 
rate of penetration only grew from 0.0% to 0.92%. Accordingly, it is 
assumed that the market was almost non-existent before the 
introduction of the digital generation. 
International presence (INTERNATIONALIZATION). The literature has 
traditionally measured international diversification through variables 
such as international sales over total sales (Strike, Gao and Bansal, 2006), 
number of workers abroad (Brock, Yaffe and Dembovsky, 2006), sales in 
a country weighted by the importance of this market (Hitt et al., 1997), 
number of international subsidiaries (Barkema and Drogendijk, 2007; 
Strike et al., 2006) and the number of countries in which the firm 
operates (Brock et al., 2006). In this chapter, it has been chosen the 
number of countries in which the firm is present with an ownership of 
above 50%. The theoretical rationale is that to influence network value, 
the level of firm internationalization has to be in the users’ minds. 
Therefore, the main reason to choose the number of countries in which 
the firm is operating is that this information is known by the user, while 
other alternatives previously mentioned – number of workers abroad, 
international sales… – are not easy for the user to identify.  
More importantly, the criteria of 50% of ownership has been selected to 
assure that the international group considers the national operator as 
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part of the core organization and that international network effects can 
develop. After reviewing annual reports of international groups in 
Europe, it is observed that there has been a gradual acquisition of the 
ownership of national operators, from minority to majority, by 
international groups. Only after acquiring more than 50% of the 
ownership, have international groups included the national companies 
as part of their organizational chart. Moreover, for international 
network effects to exist, users must be able to recognize the same firm 
operating in different markets (Shy, 2001), so the international groups in 
Europe have started to build global brands. The rebranding of acquired 
operators by international groups has only taken place after the 
acquisition of an ownership above 50%. 
Switching costs (SWITCHING COSTS). According to the existing 
literature, there is an important gap between the theoretical and the 
empirical research on switching costs (Stango, 2002; Grzybowski, 2007; 
Chen and Hitt, 2007; Viard, 2007). Only a few articles have tried to 
properly measure their magnitude. I closely follow the model proposed 
by Shy (2002). This author develops a method for estimating switching 
costs among firms in a context where it is only needed to have 
information about prices and market shares. It is important to note that 
Shy’s method has been previously used in the literature with very 
similar purposes to those of this chapter (Carlsson and Löfgren, 2006; 
Gomez and Maicas, 2011; Krafft and Salies, 2008). 
Shy (2002) considers a market with two firms (A and B). Consumers are 
assumed to be distributed between the firms so that, initially, NA 
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consumers have already purchased brand A (type a consumers) and NB 
consumers have already purchased brand B (type b consumers). pA and 
pB represent firm A and B prices, respectively, and s is the cost of 
switching brands. The utility UA (UB) for a user who is now buying from 
A (B), can be written as: 
 
The number of subscribers for A (B), nA (nB) in the following period is 
given by,  
 
If it is assumed that the firm’s production costs are zero, the profit, ߨA 
(ߨB), of each firm is: 
 
Shy (2002) postulates that the pair of prices that solve the problem for 
firms A and B and constitute a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium are: 
 
Shy (2002) extends the model to a multi-firm industry. He considers the 
possibility of more than two firms, each indexed by i, i = 1,…, M (firms 
         s taying  w ith  b rand  A      
     sw itch ing  to  b rand  B
Adef
A
B
p
U
p s
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in order of higher to lower market share). The expressions for switching 
costs in a multi-firm industry are: 
 , if I {1, …, M-1} and   
In this model, it is important to have a precise measure of sizes and 
prices. Sizes are incorporated into the switching costs function through 
the market shares of the firms. A more controversial issue is to define 
prices in mobile communications. Prices usually vary depending on the 
characteristics of the user, the receiver of the phone call (on-net vs. off-
net calls) or the time of the day. To solve this problem, Shy (2002) 
derives prices from the Average Revenue per User (ARpU) in his 
calculation of switching costs in mobile communications in Israel. 
Furthermore, the use of ARpU as a proxy of prices is also motivated by 
its widespread use in industry and regulatory circles (McCloughan and 
Lyons, 2006:523). An additional advantage of ARpU is that it makes 
comparisons among countries possible.  
Control variables. Besides the variables described to test the proposed 
hypotheses, models also control for additional covariates. First, there is a 
control for the population in each national market (POPULATION), 
which is expected to have a positive relationship with network value and 
performance because the communication possibilities in each national 
market will be higher. Given that population can be considered as a 
proxy of the potential size of the industry, the introduction of this 
variable also allows us to control for the existence of industry-level 
network effects. Country-specific rivalry is also controlled by taking into 
Mi
MM
ii NN
PNps   MMM NN
PNps  1
11
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account the number of firms operating in each market (FIRMS). This 
variable is expected to negatively affect firm performance. However, the 
relationship between the number of firms and network value is not so 
clear. A higher number of firms would probably result in smaller 
networks, decreasing network value. But the increase in the number of 
firms could also constitute an improvement in the competitiveness of the 
market and price reductions. It might enhance users’ utility and 
technology adoption, with a subsequent increase of network value. 
Finally, the model also includes year dummies to control for time-
specific influences (YEAR). 
3.3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The first includes 
the determinants of the network value model and the second those of 
the profitability model. The existence of missing values in dependent 
variables implies that the final sample has 2,032 observations for the 
network value model and 1,991 for the profitability model. 
As can be seen in Table 3.3, the average value of the first measure of 
network value (NETWORK VALUE) is 15.28, while it is 9.25 for the 
adjusted network value (NETWORK VALUE’). Moreover, the average 
European firm has been operating in the market for nine years (107.5 
months) at the end of the study range, has established a presence in 8 
countries around the world and has positive switching costs of around 17 
euros per user. The average number of firms per market is 3. When the 
correlation matrix is analyzed, it can be observed that both network 
value and adjusted network value are highly correlated with population 
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and with time in the market. Nevertheless, the correlation among the 
independent variables is moderate. Table 3.4 shows that the performance 
is better than the performance in the previous period, exhibiting a 
positive relationship with network value but a negative one with 
population and number of firms. 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics Model 1 (n= 2,032) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. NETWORK VALUE 15.28 24.09 -0.37 140.08 -       
2. NETWORK VALUE’ 9.25 17.14 -0.13 105.38 0.92* -      
3. TIME 107.48 44.36 3.00 258.00 0.37* 0.33* -     
4. INTERNATIONALIZATION 7.95 7.04 1.00 28.00 0.28* 0.21* 0.31* -    
5. SWITCHING COSTS 17.22 11.19 -18.28 56.51 0.07* 0.15* 0.24* 0.13* -   
6. FIRMS  3.27 0.65 2.00 5.00 0.14* 0.03 -0.10* 0.15* 0.02 -  
7. POPULATION 27.12 25.64 3.87 82.541 0.76* 0.56* 0.08* 0.13* -0.02 0.31* - 
*p < 0.01 
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Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics Model 2 (N=1,991) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. PERFORMANCE t 0.29 0.24 -3.57 .58 -   
2. PERFORMANCE t-1 0.28 0.38 -9.17 0.58 0.90* -   
3. NETWORK VALUE 15.59 24.29 -0.37 140.08 0.16* 0.17* -   
4. NETWORK VALUE’ 9.54 17.49 -0.07 105.38 0.18* 0.18* 0.91* -   
5. FIRMS 3.28 0.66 2.00 5.00 -0.14* -0.15* 0.14* 0.03 -  
6. POPULATION 26.48 25.57 3.87 82.54 -0.01 0.01 0.73* 0.57* 0.31* - 
*p < 0.01 
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3.4. METHODS 
In this section, I develop two econometric models that help to describe 
and empirically examine the determinants of network value and the 
impact of the latter on firm performance. First, the network value and 
firm profitability models are presented separately. After that, I discuss 
the procedure to estimate the system of equations. 
3.4.1. Network Value Model 
It is modeled the network value of firm i (competing in market k) in 
period t (NETWORK VALUEikt) as a function of the time that firm i has 
been competing in the market (TIMEikt), the international presence of 
firm i (INTERNATIONALIZATIONit), and the switching costs of firm i 
(SWITCHING COSTSikt). To control for additional sources of variation in 
network value, I introduce a set of control variables that include the 
population in market k in period t (POPULATIONkt), the number of 
firms competing in market k in period t (FIRMSkt) and year effects 
(YEAR). The network value model is presented in Equation (3.3) as 
follows: 
NETWORK VALUEikt = β1 TIMEikt + β2  INTERNATIONALIZATIONit  
                                       + β3  SWITCHING COSTSikt  +  β4  POPULATIONkt   
                                       + β5  FIRMSkt + β6  YEAR + εikt             (3.3) 
3.4.2. Profitability Model 
Consistent with the proposed conceptual framework, I relate the 
network value of the firm to performance outcomes. The performance of 
Chapter 3. Strategic choices, network value and performance 
108 
 
firm i in market k in period t (PERFORMANCEikt) is modeled as a 
function of network value. Following previous literature, especially in 
industries with increasing returns where there is a path dependency 
from performance in previous periods, I control for past realizations of 
the dependent variable (PERFORMANCEikt-1). Additional factors that 
potentially affect profitability are also controlled, including the 
population in market k in period t (POPULATIONkt), the number of 
firms in market k in period t (FIRMSkt) and time controls (YEAR). 
PERFORMANCEikt = λ0 + λ1PERFORMANCEikt-1 + λ2 NETWORK VALUEikt  
         + λ3 POPULATIONkt + λ 4FIRMSkt + λ5 YEAR + φikt       (3.4) 
3.4.3. Estimation Procedure 
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) are estimated as follows. I propose static panel 
estimators to explore the determinants of network value (Hypotheses 1 
to 3). A fixed effect model where network value is the dependent 
variable is estimated. The fixed effects estimation method is used in 
longitudinal panel analyses and allows the unobserved individual effects 
to be correlated with the included variables (Greene, 2003). The 
existence of these individual effects has been tested by the Lagrange 
multiplier of Breusch and Pagan (1980) and the preference for fixed 
effects estimation over random effects derives from the test of Hausman 
(1978). However, dynamic panel estimators are considered for the 
profitability model (Hypothesis 4) since the lagged performance is 
introduced as the explanatory variable of the performance equation 
(4.2). 
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Hypothesis 4 is tested by estimating a System Generalized Method of 
Moments model (System GMM), proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and fully developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). It is frequently used in 
profitability models in which current performance is highly conditioned 
by firm performance in the previous period. Jointly with the lagged 
performance, I also include network value as a regressor to test the 
impact of this key element on firm performance. 
3.5. RESULTS 
3.5.1. Strategic Choices and Network Value 
Table 3.5 reports the parameter estimated for the fixed effects models. 
All the equations present heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) estimates. To test the three first hypotheses, eight 
regressions with two dependent variables have been run: network value 
(NETWORK VALUE) from equation A.1 to A.4 and adjusted network 
value (NETWORK VALUE’) from B.1 to B.4. Equations A.1 and B.1 only 
include the control variables, while the remaining explanatory variables 
are added consecutively in a nested way, so that models A.4 and B.4 
present the estimation that includes all the explanatory variables. The 
hypothesis that the independent variables are jointly equal to zero is 
rejected for both models, A.1 and B.1 (p < 0.01), as can be inferred from 
the F-test (not shown). Compared with equations with no explanatory 
variables, the full models, A.4 and B.4, show a significantly better fit. 
Model A.2 shows that the variable time in the market presents a positive 
and highly significant effect, which supports Hypothesis 1: network 
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value increases with the time that the firm has been operating in the 
market. Model A.3 adds the variable internationalization. Its value is also 
positive but non-significant, thus, Hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted. 
Finally, model A.4 also includes the variable switching costs, with a 
negative and significant coefficient: the presence of switching costs 
decreases the network value, as proposed in Hypothesis 3. The F-test, 
which compares different nested models, is also shown at the end of 
Table 3.5 and confirms that the estimation presented in column A.4 is 
the one that best fits the data. In this model, the global fit is quite 
satisfactory, with an R-squared around 0.6. In any case, it is also 
important to note that the value of the coefficients of the main 
explanatory variables of the model remains highly stable in all the 
estimations.  
With respect to the control variables, population in each national market 
has a positive and significant influence on network value in all models. 
This means that the total size of the market, proxied by population, is 
positively related to the dependent variable and reveals that the mobile 
communications industry also presents network effects at industry-level, 
which is consistent with previous findings (Kim and Kwon, 2003). The 
variable firms is significant only in the final model A.4. One possible 
explanation may be the low but positive correlation between firms and 
switching costs. When both are included in model A.4, they are 
significant. When the switching costs variable is dropped in model A.3, 
its impact on network value might be partially captured by the 
remaining variables. In this case, firms in equation A.3 may reflect the 
positive influence of firms on network value but also the negative one of 
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switching costs on network value. This results in a reduction of the 
direct positive effect of firms on network value by the introduction of 
the negative effect of switching costs, making the final coefficient non-
significant. 
If it is considered the set of models that use the adjusted network value 
as the dependent variable, the sign and significance of the main 
coefficients does not change. As can be seen in Table 3.5, time in the 
market increases adjusted network value and switching costs decrease it, 
supporting Hypotheses 1 and 3, respectively. Internationalization has no 
significant effect on network value, which means that Hypothesis 2 is 
not supported. These coefficients remain highly stable in all the 
estimations. As for the control variables, time dummies are globally 
significant and population preserves its positive and significant influence 
on network value. However, the variable firms loses its positive 
significance. The F-test confirms that model B.4 is the estimation that 
best fits the data. In this model, R-squared presents a value of 0.46. Note 
that the measure of network value that takes into account the disutility 
perceived by the existence of rival networks in the presence of economic 
incompatibility reduces the coefficients of the main explanatory 
variables although the sign of the relationship with network value does 
not substantially change.  
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TABLE 3.5. DETERMINANTS OF NETWORK VALUE (FE)  
 
 NETWORK VALUE NETWORK VALUE’ 
 (A.1) (A.2) (A.3) (A.4) (B.1) (B.2) (B.3) (B.4) 
         
TIME  0.242*** 0.229*** 0.224***  0.117*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 
  (5.70) (5.46) (6.06)  (4.81) (4.74) (5.31) 
         
INTERNAT.   0.230 0.168   0.076 0.035 
   (1.02) (0.79)   (0.59) (0.30) 
         
SW. COSTS    -0.539**    -0.348***
    (-2.60)    (-2.90) 
         
FIRMS 1.899 1.971 1.781 4.636** 0.006 0.042 -0.020 1.823 
 (1.12) (1.17) (1.09) (2.37) (0.01) (0.04) (-0.02) (1.44) 
         
POPULATION 6.225*** 6.210*** 5.991*** 6.434*** 2.855** 2.847** 2.776** 3.062*** 
 (3.48) (3.47) (3.16) (4.06) (2.50) (2.49) (2.35) (3.07) 
         
YEAR Dummies YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES* YES** YES** YES** 
         
Number of observations 2,032 2,032 2,032 2,032 2,032 2,032 2,032 2,032 
R2 0.524 0.530 0.534 0.600 0.370 0.373 0.375 0.463 
F-Test vs. 1  32.55*** 16.70*** 15.37***  23.14*** 11.80*** 11.51*** 
F-Test vs. 2   1.03 3.68**   0.34 4.21** 
F-Test vs. 3    6.74**    8.41*** 
 t -statistics in parentheses 
 *  p < 0.10  
**  p < 0.05  
***  p < 0.01 
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3.5.2. Performance and Network Value 
The results of the estimations of the performance model are shown in 
Table 3.6. Model C.1 introduces the control variables and the lagged 
performance, whereas models C.2 and C.3 add network value and 
adjusted network value, respectively. The specification choice is based 
on a System GMM with first differences, a one-step estimation that is 
robust to heteroskedasticity and takes into account the potential 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. To assess the validity of the 
System GMM estimators, I run the Arellano-Bond test for first-order and 
second-order serial correlation. Table 3.6 reports the significant m1 and 
insignificant m2 serial correlation statistics. This indicates that there is 
no second-order correlation in the level of residuals. The Hansen test is 
also reported and its non-significance validates the robustness of 
estimations. 
Lagged performance has a positive and significant influence on 
performance with a coefficient that is highly stable in the three 
estimations. This means that performance in the previous period 
positively influences current performance. This result justifies the use of 
the GMM estimator in this part of the analysis. Firm network value has, 
as expected, a positive and significant impact on performance (models 
C.2 and C.3), which supports Hypothesis 4. The variable firms has a 
negative and significant influence on firm performance as a result of 
increasing rivalry and year dummies are also statistically significant. 
Population does not seem to influence performance, except for model 
C.2 in which the influence is marginally negative.  
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TABLE 3.6. PERFORMANCE AND NETWORK VALUE (SYSTEM GMM) 
 
 (C.1) (C.2) (C.3) 
 PERFORMANCEt PERFORMANCEt PERFORMANCEt 
    
NETWORK VALUE  0.002***  
  (3.99)  
    
NETWORK VALUE’   0.003*** 
   (2.97) 
 
PERFORMANCE t-1 
 
0.467*** 
 
0.467*** 
 
0.464*** 
 (20.56) (19.60) (19.75) 
    
FIRMS -0.047*** -0.041*** -0.036** 
 (-3.04) (-2.92) (-2.46) 
    
POPULATION 0.001 -0.001* -0.001 
 (1.24) (-1.75) (-1.21) 
    
YEAR Dummies YES*** YES*** YES*** 
    
    
Constant 0.316*** 0.286*** 0.274*** 
 (7.26) (7.48) (6.94) 
 
Number of observations 1,991 1,991 1,991 
m1 -2.92*** -2.95*** -2.94*** 
m2 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Hansen Test 37.64 53.76 48.16 
F-Test vs. 1  15.88*** 8.85*** 
t -statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10  
** p < 0.05  
*** p < 0.01 
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3.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter contributes to the study of markets with network effects 
from a strategic perspective by introducing network value as a key 
concept. I have empirically tested a conceptual model in which the 
firm’s strategy may condition network effects and firm profitability 
through the three main elements that the literature has highlighted in 
network markets, i.e.: expectations, coordination and compatibility. This 
chapter, by focusing on firm-initiated actions to leverage network 
effects, has led to a greater understanding of firm-level strategy in 
network industries. 
Results reveal the importance of entry timing in markets with network 
effects. This result is highly consistent with previous findings (Gomez 
and Maicas, 2011; Usero and Fernández, 2009). Switching costs also 
appear as a key strategic tool that influences network value. High 
switching costs have been shown to dissuade the selection of a firm 
network by potential users with the subsequent negative effect on 
network value. Users distrust firms with high switching costs because 
they suspect that these firms will behave opportunistically (Mata et al., 
1995), thus decreasing the effectiveness of network effects. 
Consequently, firms have to find a trade-off between creating high 
switching costs to retain their customers and being less aggressive so as 
to be perceived by potential customers as an appealing and trustworthy 
alternative. Contrary to what was expected, operating in various 
international markets is not a strategy that greatly influences users’ 
expectations and, thus, its impact on network effects is not significant. 
Chapter 3. Strategic choices, network value and performance 
116 
 
The explanation I can provide for this unexpected finding in the 
industry is threefold. First, while it is true that a number of mobile 
service providers are competing globally, users are restricted in their 
choices to companies operating in their local markets. In mobile 
telecommunications, users take into account only the network of the 
country where they live whereas, in other information industries such as 
software, hardware and online auctions, users do not perceive national 
boundaries in their decisions. Second, the internationalization of mobile 
operators could have become a strategic necessity. This seems to be clear 
from an analysis of the recent evolution of the industry in which the 
international diversification of the main operators has been quite similar. 
Finally, the availability of roaming services in all European countries, 
the similarity of roaming coverage and charges within operators, and the 
lack of complete information for users about roaming charges within the 
operators of the same international group (Salsas and Koboldt, 2004) may 
limit the existence of international network effects. Summarizing, 
although international network effects could exist in the industry, 
current market conditions do not favor them. 
This chapter also analyzes how network value is an element that is 
positively related to firm performance. The main premise is that users 
are willing to pay more for being part of a network with a larger 
installed base since the product does not provide any value by itself. The 
value comes from the communication ties that the network offers to 
users and this allows firms to increase the price of their product or 
service. 
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Through the analysis of the above relationships, this research makes a 
contribution by offering a more accurate measurement of network value. 
Traditionally, network value has been considered to be proportional to 
network size. Although this can be reasonable, this chapter has added 
the intensity dimension to the traditional approach. I have adjusted 
previous measures by considering not only the firm’s own network, but 
also its rivals’ networks, that is, market competition is introduced into 
the assessment of network intensity and, thus, network value. Although 
the main findings do not substantially change, the adjusted measure I use 
shows a lower network value, which is perfectly understandable as it is 
considered the existence of other firms’ networks that reduce users’ 
utility since the probability of making off-net information exchanges 
with higher costs increases. 
Chapter 3 has several managerial implications. It recommends paying 
special attention to entry timing strategies in network industries. Firms 
should try to attract users to their network as soon as possible to gain 
competitive advantage. Because of this, it is not surprising to observe 
that bargain-then-rip-off strategies are very common in the first stages 
of market evolution as an adequate mechanism to attract users that will 
be exploited at a later stage. Thus, entry timing and price strategy have 
to be considered simultaneously when network effects are important. 
However, firms in these markets should be aware of not overexploiting 
their customers when lock-in is a likely market outcome. The perception 
of high switching costs may lead users to suspect that firms will behave 
opportunistically, which could result in fewer incentives to enter into a 
relationship with the firm. This chapter also has implications for 
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managers about the international diversification of mobile operators. 
Apparently, international presence has no impact on network value, 
which, in my view, does not mean that firms need not pay attention to 
their international strategy, but rather that it may have become a 
strategic necessity to survive in the industry. 
It is important to note that the research setting refers to an industry in 
which the regulator plays a key role. For this reason, several policy 
implications can also be derived. Importantly, the effectiveness of FMA 
in the mobile communications industry depends on the winning of a 
license that is granted by national authorities and that is compulsory to 
compete for. Governments should be aware of the direct impact that 
their decisions have on competition in each local market. A reduced 
number of licenses or restrictive criteria to start an activity could reduce 
the number of competitors. This initial restriction could constitute an 
entry barrier in the future because a firm that cannot obtain a license at 
the first stage of competition will lose time in the market, which has 
been revealed as a valuable resource. Additionally, results show the 
important effect of switching costs in reducing network value and 
consumers’ welfare in network markets. Thus, the regulator should bear 
in mind that switching costs are a prevailing feature in the industry that 
can be harmful to customers’ interests. Indeed, in the context of mobile 
communications, the regulator has already recognized the importance of 
this dimension, reducing switching barriers and developing several 
measures to make switching easier and less costly. Mobile number 
portability is, perhaps, the most noteworthy effort in this direction and 
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it has had, according to the literature, the desired effects (Lee, Kim, Lee 
and Park, 2006).  
To our knowledge, this chapter is one of the first attempts to empirically 
integrate network size and network intensity as part of network value 
into firm strategy. However, several issues deserve further attention. 
First, I use an adjusted measure of network value, which does not confer 
the same importance to all users and takes into account the market 
position of each firm as a source of different network intensities. 
However, while it is true that it is made an effort to incorporate several 
dimensions into my network value approach, the way in which I 
consider the tendency to make on-net communication only includes 
market shares and not price differences. Future research should try to 
improve the measure of network value with detailed data that reflects a 
more accurate dimension of the probability of making on-net over off-
net connections by incorporating an explicit quantification of price 
discrimination. Although I take the existence of price discrimination as 
an issue, the inclusion of the degree of price discrimination as a source of 
network intensity and its evolution over time would improve the 
measure of network value. In the same vein, another possible extension 
would be to incorporate the existence of social network effects that 
reinforce network value. Users do not only select a firm because they 
believe it will be bigger than the others. Consumer behavior is also 
influenced by the previous decisions of the people who are socially 
related to them. 
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Second, this chapter has taken a theoretical approach to refer to the 
three antecedents of network effects and network value, i.e. user 
expectations and coordination, and compatibility. Although they have 
been useful to build the theoretical foundations of the impact of strategic 
choices on network value, a deeper understanding and quantification of 
these elements would constitute a promising avenue for further research. 
Third, it has been shown that time in the market is an important 
determinant of network value. However, it would be interesting to 
analyze how this expectation of dominance of the first mover can be 
counteracted by late entrants and diminished over time. Although this 
chapter has focused on the network-dependent value of a firm, further 
analysis should study how the improvement of network-independent 
value by late entrants can reduce the network-dependent advantages of 
early movers. 
Finally, international presence has been shown not to have any 
significant impact on network value. Although some explanations have 
been put forward, a better understanding of how the 
internationalization process has influenced firm performance in these 
markets and become a strategic necessity is needed. The fact that various 
operators are competing simultaneously in the same markets would 
suggest the use of institutional or multimarket contact theories. 
Moreover, I have adopted a measure of the degree of internationalization 
that theoretically fits the mobile telecommunications industry. This 
measure assumes the existence of international network effects, but does 
not quantify them. With the aim of overcoming this limitation, further 
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studies should try to develop additional measures of international 
diversification to the specific context of network industries with 
international network effects. 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
n recent decades, foreign direct investment (FDI, hereafter) has 
undergone an impressive worldwide growth. For instance, outward 
direct investment stocks of OECD countries increased from 1,714 billion 
US dollars in 1990 to 13,294 billion US dollars in 2007. Similarly, inward 
direct investment stocks grew from 1,292 to 10,996 billion US dollars in 
the same 17-year period (OECD, 2010). One of the main consequences of 
this process is that multinational enterprises (MNEs) have become 
important organizations that have extended their scope beyond their 
country boundaries. Since the 60’s, there has been a transition from 
national to global firms whose drivers have attracted the attention of 
scholars.   The main arguments for understanding this process are related 
to the exploitation of ownership advantages (Hymer, 1960, 1968), stage 
of product cycle in home country (Vernon, 1966), risk diversification 
(Lessard, 1976; Rugman, 1976; Agmon and Lessard, 1977), exchange 
rates theories (Aliber, 1970) and behavioral perspectives (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977, 1990).  
One of the most prominent issues that has attracted the attention of 
scholars in international business (IB) literature is the host market 
selection. It has been identified as a key ingredient in the FDI decision 
(Xu and Shenkar, 2002: 609). Host market choice is the first step in the 
FDI process and has been traditionally linked to both exploiting the 
resource advantages of multinationals in their home countries for 
carrying out activities in foreign countries (ownership advantages) and 
appropriating the resources of host countries (location advantages). 
I 
Chapter 4. Strategic choices and institutions in the FDI process 
 
138 
 
Extant literature has offered numerous examples of ownership 
advantages which MNEs seek to exploit in host countries, including 
product innovations, financial resources and non-codificable knowledge. 
Location advantages are related to exploiting, for instance, natural 
resources, a qualified workforce and a key geographic situation 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Peng, 2009).  
From a theoretical point of view, the analysis of host market choice and 
internationalization advantages has mainly focused on traditional 
strategic perspectives, i.e. industry and resource-based views of strategy 
(Conner, 1991; Dunning, 1980, 1993). However, as Peng, Wang and 
Jiang (2008) point out, these perspectives ignore the potential influence 
of macro-institutions, such as regulation, culture and tradition, in 
strategic FDI choices and MNE performance.  
One of the reasons that may explain why the IB literature has not fully 
considered the macro-institutional context is that it has traditionally 
focused on the inward and outward FDI of developed countries. Formal 
institutions in developed countries tend to be strong, in the sense that 
they help to reduce information asymmetries and enhance the 
protection of property rights derived from contractual relationships 
(Meyer et al., 2008). Informal institutions play a less important role than 
formal rules in enhancing market exchanges in developed countries 
because the latter can better support more complex transactions than the 
former (North, 1990; Peng, Sun, Pinkham and Chen, 2009). As McMillan 
(2007) explains, in developed countries, the market-supporting 
institutions are almost invisible, precisely because they work well in 
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supporting economic exchanges. This has meant that institutional 
considerations have been traditionally ignored by IB literature (Peng, 
Wang and Jiang, 2008). However, recently, interest has arisen for 
understanding the internationalization of successful MNEs from 
developing countries, which are characterized by weaker formal 
institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Meyer et al., 2009). According to 
McMillan (2007), in developing markets, the absence of [formal] 
institutions is conspicuous. In this context, informal institutions become 
more ‘visible’ as mechanisms to support economic exchanges (Peng et al., 
2009). This has made it necessary to consider the role of the formal and 
informal institutional contexts, as well as industry and resource 
conditions, in the determination of the FDI decisions, such as host 
market selection (Meyer et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2008; Xu and Shenkar, 
2002). 
Host market selection as a key strategic choice of international business 
strategy, is not only driven by industry conditions and firm capabilities, 
but [is] also a reflection of the formal and informal constraints of a 
particular framework that managers confront (Peng et al. (2008:923). 
Formal (e.g. law, regulation and the judicial system) and informal 
institutions (e.g. culture, religion and tradition) are thought to influence 
host market selection (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Peng, 2009). From 
being considered simply as background conditions, institutions have 
become key determinants of host market choice (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). 
This has led to the institution-based view as a third leading perspective 
of strategy (Ingram and Silverman, 2002; Peng et al., 2008). 
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In incorporating the institution-based view to the IB literature, cultural 
distance and formal institutional development1 have been two key 
concepts which have gained increasing attention to determine how 
formal and informal institutions influence MNE host country selection 
(Kogut and Singh, 1998; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009). 
This chapter aims to further analyze how formal and informal 
institutions jointly determine MNE host market choice. Although host 
country selection, cultural distance and formal institutional development 
are three parts of the internationalization puzzle, previous studies have 
tended to separately analyze the influence of formal or informal 
institutions on host market selection. For instance, García-Canal and 
Guillen (2008), Hermelo and Vassolo (2010) and Holburn and Zelner 
(2010) analyze the impact of formal institutional development on market 
choice, while Hutzschenreuter and Voll (2008, 2011) and Makino and 
Tsang (2011) focus on the effect of informal institutions on the 
destination of FDI. Few studies have analyzed the effect of both formal 
and informal institutions on host country selection and, in general, from 
a theoretical approach (e.g. Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Moreover, most 
previous literature has not simultaneously considered formal and 
informal institutions (North, 1990; Peng, 2002) in supporting MNEs’ 
choices. Makino and Tsang (2011) propose a research line to explain how 
formal and informal ties are linked together and how they jointly or 
independently influence FDI flows. 
                                                            
1 Although formal institutional development is formulated in positive terms, it has 
also been defined as formal institutional risk from a negative perspective (Schwens, 
Eiche and Kabst, 2011). 
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The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, the institution-based 
view of strategy is brought into international business literature by 
simultaneously considering how formal and informal institutions 
influence host market choice. This simultaneous consideration of both 
types of institutions has not been considered in previous studies which 
take an empirical approach (Makino and Tsang, 2011). We consider all 
the entry decisions of all the international groups from the same 
industry, i.e. mobile communications, from 2000 to 2010. This is 
precisely what constitutes the second contribution of the paper. We 
offer a very rich empirical setting by covering the five continents, which 
allows a high level of generalizability for our results. 
Employing the institution-based view of IB strategy, the chapter shows 
the reticence of MNEs to enter countries whose informal institutions (or 
culture) differ greatly from those of their home countries. It also 
proposes that a higher development of formal institutions (or stronger 
formal institutions) increases the incentives of MNEs to enter a host 
country. Finally, the chapter studies the simultaneous consideration of 
formal and informal institutions by showing that stronger formal 
institutions of a host country reduce the importance of cultural distance 
on host market selection.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, a review of 
the literature about internationalization and institutions is offered. 
Section 4.3 develops the hypotheses of how cultural distance and formal 
institutional development influence host market choice. Section 4.4 
describes the data and variables, and Section 4.5 describes main findings. 
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The chapter closes with a discussion of its main conclusions, limitations 
and further research questions. 
4.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1. A key decision in the internationalization process: where to go  
In general terms, a MNE can be understood as a firm that makes a 
foreign direct investment (FDI) or, in other words, invests in, controls, 
and manages value-added activities of a subsidiary in other countries 
(Peng, 2009). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
determine that MNEs make a foreign direct investment (FDI) when they 
own at least 10% of the subsidiary equity in order to exercise 
management control rights. What do MNEs expect to gain when they 
make a FDI? According to the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1980, 1993), 
MNEs expands to other countries with the aim of obtaining ownership 
(O), location (L) and internalization (I) advantages. First, they seek to 
extend skills, capabilities and resources accumulated in the home 
country, such as property rights, intangible asset advantages (e.g., 
experience, brand, reputation, non-codifiable knowledge and innovatory 
capacity) and governance skills, to subsidiaries in host countries. The 
exploitation of ownership advantages has been traditionally used to 
justify internationalization in the IB literature (e.g. Caves, 1971; Hymer, 
1960, 1968; Johnson, 1970). Entering new markets allows MNEs to 
exploit accumulated resources to gain scale economies, synergies, 
complementary resources and innovation capacities. Ownership 
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advantages have been considered the ‘why’ of MNE activity (Dunning 
and Lundan, 2009). 
Second, once a firm considers that it already has the skills and 
capabilities to internationally expand, it has to decide the target market 
of its FDI flows. The OLI paradigm links FDI destination choice to the 
exploitation of location advantages. Host market selection has been 
understood as a key ingredient in the FDI decision that affects location 
advantages (Xu and Shenkar, 2002: 609). Accordingly to Peng (2009), 
MNEs choose a host country looking for location-specific advantages 
that may come from the acquisition of natural resources, transport and 
communication infrastructures, strong market demand with customers 
willing to pay high(er) prices, economies of scale, low-cost factors and  
the abundance of innovative individuals, firms and universities. Dunning 
and Lundan (2009) add other location-specific advantages of some 
locations such as government policies (e.g. in import controls, 
investment incentives, taxes and labor costs).  
Finally, entering a new country through FDI allows MNEs to change 
from incurring market transactions costs in foreign countries to costs of 
developing transactions inside the MNE organization. When external 
costs are higher than the internal costs of establishing a hierarchical 
system of transactions controlled by the firm, MNEs achieve 
internalization advantages by entering new markets through FDI 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2009). Entering a country through FDI seeks to 
reduce transaction or information costs, buyer ignorance and 
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uncertainty and protect property rights, among other reasons (Dunning 
and Lundan, 2009).  
4.2.2. Institutions: cultural distance and formal institutional 
development 
Institutions, as has been defined in Chapter 1, are the rules of the game 
in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction (North, 1990:2). They impose restrictions by 
defining legal, moral, and cultural boundaries, setting off legitimate from 
illegitimate activities (Scott, 1995: 50). Institutions are important in a 
society because they help to reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
economic transactions by defining the expected behavior of individuals 
and organizations. Given that institutions reduce information 
asymmetries, they play an important role in supporting economic 
exchanges in the market by decreasing risks (Arrow, 1971; Casson, 1997; 
Meyer et al., 2009). 
The traditional classification of institutions differentiates informal and 
formal institutions (North, 1990). Informal institutions can be 
understood as those constraints that people in a society impose upon 
themselves to give a structure to their relations with others (North, 
1990). These rules are transmitted from one generation to another by 
teaching and imitation (Boyd and Richerson, 1995) and, according to 
North (1990:37), are a part of the heritage that we call culture. Tradition, 
religion, language, customs, values and trust-based relationships are 
some examples of informal institutions (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). 
The knowledge of this kind of institutions has been considered a 
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valuable firm resource (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002) which is difficult to 
obtain given that it is tacit and experiential (Hennart, 1982).  
Informal institutions have their source in the values of a society, they are 
difficult to change over time (North, 1990) and are country-specific 
(Dikova and Sahib, 2010). Given that MNEs may operate in different 
informal institutional contexts, the IB literature, acknowledging the new 
institutionalism perspective, has created several terms to refer to the 
institutional disparity between two countries. Cultural distance (Kogut 
and Singh, 1988) and psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) have 
been the most frequent concepts used to refer to these factors, e.g. 
differences in language, traditions, education and behavior codes, which 
makes the flow of information from and to the market difficult 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).  
Following North (1990), who denotes informal institutions as culture, 
we will refer hereafter to differences in informal institutions between 
two countries as cultural distance. Previous studies have tended to 
analyze how cultural distance between home and host countries (Kogut 
& Singh, 1988) and within host-countries – added cultural distance – 
influences FDI decisions (see, for example, Tihanyi et al., 2005). The 
knowledge of informal rules becomes a key element in gaining 
internationalization advantages because it allows firms to be part of the 
informal business network and gain legitimation in a country (Helfat 
and Lieberman, 2002; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). Accordingly, this 
informal knowledge will be important to take accurate FDI decisions (Xu 
and Shenkar, 2002; Harzing, 2002). 
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Formal institutions refer to explicit rules in a society such as laws, 
regulations, property rights protection, discipline of economic and 
political markets and contracts (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Meyer et 
al., 2009). They have been explicitly established by an authority (such as 
the government or the judicial system in the case of laws and judicial 
resolution) or an organization/individual (e.g., in the case of a 
contractual relationship). They can change over time and can anticipate 
the desirable behavior of individuals and organizations from general and 
simply exchanges (e.g. through laws) to specific and complex ones (e.g. 
by a contract or a judicial resolution).  
The MNE literature has incorporated the degree to which formal 
institutions are capable of favoring economic exchanges in each country. 
It has been observed that issues such as the extent to which property 
rights are enforced by judicial systems and the degree of respect of the 
state and citizens for formal rules vary across countries (Cuervo-Cazurra 
and Genc, 2008; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999).  MNE 
literature has defined the concept of formal institutional development as 
the extent to which the formal institutions in a country favor the 
effectiveness of economic exchanges (Meyer et al., 2009). 
4.2.3. Institutions and host market selection 
Cultural distance and host market selection. As explained above, reason 
a firm chooses to internationalize is to transfer skills, capabilities and 
resources from its headquarters to subsidiaries in order to exploit 
ownership advantages (Dunning, 1993). However, the routines 
developed in the home country are based on organizational structures 
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that are influenced by the national culture (Calori, Lubatki and Very, 
1994). When cultural rules are similar in the home and host countries, 
the behavior of organizations is more predictable and increases trust 
between contractual parts (e.g., suppliers, customers or the workforce). 
In other words, when the cultural distance is low, there is a higher 
external conformity of firm values and structures with environmental 
requirements, which increases firm legitimation to operate in the market 
and survive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Sharing the same language, 
religion, norms and conventions – sometimes determined by the 
existence of historical ties between countries, not only by geographic 
proximity (Makino and Tsang, 2011) – may facilitate economic 
exchanges and, thus, reduce the liability of foreignness (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977). 
On the contrary, the greater the cultural distance between the home and 
host countries, the more difficult is the transmission of these strategic 
routines to a subsidiary (Kostova, 1999). The ownership advantages that 
MNEs expect to obtain can be reduced by cultural distance (Henisz, 
2000; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Miller and Eden, 2006; Zaheer, 1995). 
Even the location advantages that the MNEs expect to obtain may be 
reduced when the cultural distance is high. The existence of high 
cultural distance can result in greater difficulties in exploiting and 
appropriating local resources, such as workforce or agglomeration 
advantages (Peng, 2009). The foreign company lacks the informal ties 
necessary to be considered as part of the business network in the 
country, which leads to problems with suppliers, investors and human 
resources recruitment. Johanson and Vahlne (2009) refer to this fact as 
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the liabilitity of outsidership. The greater the cultural distance between 
the home and host countries, the more difficult it will be to have this 
informal knowledge and these social ties with the business network of 
the country. It will make the appropriation of local resources by MNEs 
more costly. 
Given the previous arguments, MNEs will prefer to enter countries that 
are more culturally similar to their home countries to better benefit from 
ownership and location advantages. Accordingly, the first hypothesis of 
this chapter is the following: 
H1. The higher the cultural distance between the home and the host 
country, the less likely it is that MNEs will enter the latter. 
Formal institutional development and host market selection. Another 
element that may condition host market selection is the level of formal 
institutional development. A high level of development of formal 
institutions implies the existence of rules that do not depend on the trust 
relationships that a foreign firm has to build in the new country. There 
are economic and political agents that are responsible for enforcing 
formal rules, including market intermediaries (e.g. financial analysts, 
investment banks, auditors, solicitors, brokers, consultants) and 
government organizations (Meyer et al., 2009). It implies a higher 
enforcement of contracts, a reduction of information asymmetries and 
the protection of property rights. A local environment that reduces the 
uncertainty associated with contractual hazards diminishes the 
transaction costs of doing business abroad and, thus, increases 
internalization advantages. 
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Hermelo and Vassolo (2010) observe that a higher level of development 
of formal institutions favors the entrance of new firms, resulting in 
higher levels of FDI. They determine that strong formal institutions that 
enhance intellectual property rights encourage local investment in 
technology and knowledge, (and) favor technology transfers from 
foreign firms to local subsidiaries. This makes it possible to take 
advantage of ownership and location advantages, with a lower risk of 
asset expropriation (Feinberg and Gupta, 2009).  
Following the previous reasoning, it is posited that MNEs will prefer to 
enter countries with a higher formal institutional development because 
internationalization advantages can be maintained with fewer risks. 
H2. The higher the institutional development of a country, the more 
likely MNEs are to enter that country. 
Cultural distance, formal institutional development and host market 
selection. It has been suggested that, whereas a higher development of 
formal institutions can even replace informal institutions (North, 1990), 
in a context of a low development of formal institutions, informal 
constraints will play a larger role in reducing uncertainty, providing 
guidance, and conferring legitimacy and rewards to managers and firms 
(Peng et al., 2009). This means that a knowledge of the informal rules in 
a society with a low level of formal institutional development becomes 
an important asset for an organization in order to develop economic 
exchanges. It has been observed that, in this context, firms can take 
advantage of institutional advantages through having a better 
understanding of the informal environment. Helfat and Lieberman 
Chapter 4. Strategic choices and institutions in the FDI process 
 
150 
 
(2002) consider a knowledge of the local environment (including 
informal rules) as an intangible and specialized resource that can be a 
source of competitive advantage. In this context, it is important to 
develop network-centered strategies based on informal relationships 
(Peng, 2003). As a consequence, the liability of outsidership of MNEs 
which come from countries with a high cultural distance becomes more 
damaging because MNEs lack both a knowledge of their informal 
environment and their informal connections with the business network 
of the market.    
On the contrary, if the development of formal institutions is high, 
formal rules can replace informal ones because they are able to facilitate 
more complex economic exchanges (North, 1990). The existence of 
regulatory bodies that assure the effective engagement of contracts and 
law will reduce the necessity of creating trust-based relationships (Peng, 
2002). Moreover, there are market intermediaries which help new 
entrants to integrate into the business network of the country (Meyer et 
al., 2009). This makes the liability of outsidership as a constraint to MNE 
entry less important.  
In accordance with the previous arguments, it is posited that a higher 
development of formal institutions increases the likelihood of a MNE 
entering a country with a high cultural distance. Thus, the third 
hypothesis of this chapter is as follows: 
H3. The higher the formal institutional development of a country, the 
lower the negative impact of cultural distance on the likelihood of a 
MNE entering that country.  
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Figure 4.1 summarizes the previous hypotheses. 
       Figure 4.1. Institutions and FDI strategic choices 
 
 
 
4.3. DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1. Data 
As explained in Chapter 2, the mobile telecommunications industry has 
been selected as the research setting because, since the late 90s, it has 
experienced an important worldwide internationalization process. This 
industry has also been previously selected as a suitable research setting 
in internationalization studies (Curwen and Whalley, 2008; Gerpott and 
Jakopin, 2005). Moreover, given the worldwide expansion of mobile 
communications, this industry is particularly suitable for measuring 
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divergences in cultural distance and formal institutional development. 
Figure 4.2 shows the 62 countries included in the sample and that 
constitute the destinations of FDI flows of 32 MNEs. 
The database includes 213 entries of 32 international groups. Table 4.1 
shows the distribution of entries by region from 2000 to 2010 for all the 
international groups under analysis.2 As can be observed, international 
entries have taken place worldwide, but particularly in Europe (34.3%), 
followed by Asia Pacific (19.2%), America (18.8%), Africa (17.8%) and 
Middle East (9.9%).  
The data come from multiple sources, but the main one is the Wireless 
Intelligence Database. This publication provides information about the 
yearly ownership participation of international groups around the world 
by country and year in the mobile telecommunications industry. 
Country data, such as governance indicators, population, GDP growth 
and colonization links, has been obtained from the World Bank Group 
and the CEPII Database. 
 
                                                            
2 In Chapter 4, the period 2000 to 2010 has been selected due to the availability of 
information. The percentage of ownership of international groups in national firms 
has been obtained from the Wireless Intelligence Database, which offers data from 
2000. Given that part of the country-level data for 2011 was not available at the 
moment of the analysis, the time series ends at 2010. 
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Figure 4.2. Countries by region in the sample 
 
UAE = United Arab Emirates; USA = United States of America; UK = United Kingdom. 
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Table 4.1.  Sample Entries by Group and Region 
 
 
 
Group Host Country America Africa Asia  Pacific Europe Middle East TOTAL 
1. América Móvil México 11 0 0 0 0 11 
2. AT&T USA 2 2 0 0 0 4 
3. Axiata Malaysia 0 2 3 0 2 7 
4. Bharti Airtel India 0 6 0 0 0 6 
5. Centennial † USA 1 0 0 0 0 1 
6. Deutsche Telekom Germany 1 0 0 7 0 8 
7. Digicel Jamaica 3 0 0 0 0 3 
8. Etisalat UAE 0 3 2 0 1 6 
9. France Telecom France 2 2 2 10 1 17 
10. Hutchison  Hong Kong 0 1 4 6 1 12 
11. KPN Netherlands 0 0 1 5 0 6 
12. Maxis Com. Malaysia 0 0 2 0 0 2 
13. MTN South Africa 0 3 0 0 1 4 
14. NTT Docomo Japan 1 0 6 4 0 11 
15.Orascom Telecom Egypt 0 1 3 0 2 6 
16.Portugal Telecom Portugal 1 0 0 0 0 1 
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Table 4.1.  (cont.) 
 
 
Group Host Country America Africa Asia  Pacific Europe Middle East TOTAL 
17. Saudi Telecom Saudi Arabia 0 1 3 0 2 6 
18. SingTel Singapore 0 5 6 1 0 12 
19. TDC Denmark 0 0 0 4 0 4 
20. Tele2 Sweden 0 0 0 1 0 1 
21. Telecom Italia Italy 5 0 0 1 1 7 
22. Telefónica Spain 10 0 0 7 0 17 
23. Telenor Norway 0 0 4 4 0 8 
24. Telia Group† Sweden 0 0 0 2 0 2 
25. Telia Sonera Finland 0 0 0 5 2 7 
26. Telstra Australia 0 0 1 0 0 1 
27. Vivendi France 0 1 0 0 0 2 
28. Vodacom South Africa 0 1 0 0 0 1 
29. Vodafone UK 1 5 3 14 1 24 
30. Wataniya Kuwait 0 0 0 0 2 2 
31. Wind† Italy 0 1 1 1 2 5 
32. Zain Kuwait 0 6 0 0 3 9 
TOTAL 40 38 41 73 21 213 
 18.8% 17.8% 19.2% 34.3% 9.9%  
UAE = United Arab Emirates; USA = United States of America; UK = United Kingdom; † Merged. 
Source: Based on Wireless Intelligence (2012). 
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4.3.2. Measurement of variables 
Dependent variable 
Host market choice. This variable is defined through a dummy variable, 
which takes value 1 from the moment the international group enters a 
country and 0 otherwise. Value 1 implies that the international group 
owns at least 10% of the equity of an operator in the country of 
reference. This variable has been calculated for each of the 32 groups in 
each of the 62 countries for each period of time. It has resulted in a 
database with 16,621 observations corresponding to this dependent 
variable.  
Independent  variables 
Cultural distance. Cultural distance between the home and host country 
is measured through the Kogut and Singh (1988) index. This index is 
based on the differences in scores of each dimension of the Hofstede 
Index (1980) of national culture: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, and masculinity.3 It has been extensively used in other 
studies with similar purposes (e.g., Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006; 
Slangen and Hennart, 2008). 
Formal institutional development.  This variable is measured through an 
index based on the yearly Governance Index provided by the World 
Bank. Following Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), the 
                                                            
3 Given that the Hofstede Index is not available for all countries, the final selection of 
62 countries consists of those that have a score in this source and allow the calculation 
of the cultural distance between the home and host countries. 
Chapter 4. Strategic choices and institutions in the FDI process 
157 
 
governance index measures the degree to which institutions in a country 
allow the monitoring of political and social relationships in order to 
obtain an effective implementation of public policies and observation of 
contracts and laws. The index has six dimensions that can vary from -2.5 
to 2.5 – voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. 
This index has been extensively used in previous FDI studies for very 
similar purposes (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2003). Following Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008), to make 
interpretation easier, the original spread of – 2.5 to 2.5 has been 
modified to 0 to 5 by adding 2.5 to each score.4 The next step has been to 
calculate the average of these six dimensions for each country and 
period. It is important to know that the Governance Index highly 
correlates with other institutional measures, such as the Economic 
Freedom Index (r=0.80) or the Transparency Index (r=0.91) also used in 
similar studies. 
Control variables 
There are control variables for the most important other factors that 
have been found to affect host market selection. First, there is a control 
for the market attractiveness of each country through two main 
variables. GDPpc growth takes into account the yearly growth of GDP 
per capita in each country (Hermelo and Vassolo, 2010) and population, 
in a logarithmic expression, measures the millions of inhabitants in each 
                                                            
4 This does not alter the statistical significance of the coefficients (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008). 
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country, which determine the size of the potential market (Holmes et 
al., 2011). Both variables are expected to positively influence the 
likelihood of MNEs entering a country because more habitants in a local 
economic growth cycle can favor the sustainability of firms in that 
country.  
Second, there is also a control for the degree of internationalization of 
the group as the number of countries in which the group is operating in 
each period (Reus and Lamont, 2009). This variable tries to capture the 
previous international experience of the group. A positive influence of 
this variable is expected on the likelihood of group entering a country 
under the hypothesis that greater internationalization experience 
confers greater skills and capabilities to MNEs to diversify 
internationally. 
Third, given that evolution of internationalization has been explained by 
the proximity between countries and by the historical ties between them 
(Makino and Tsang, 2011), two dummies to control for these expected 
effects in FDI decisions have been included. Colonization takes value 1 
when there has been a colonial relationship between the home and host 
countries in the past, whereas Proximity takes value 1 when the home 
and host countries share land borders.  
A control for the industry structure in each national market has been 
also included by considering the degree of market concentration, 
measured through the Herfindhal Index. A negative relationship is 
expected between the degree of market concentration and the likelihood 
of a MNE entering that market because MNEs prefer markets which are 
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more favorable to the entry of new competitors (Hermelo and Vassolo, 
2010). 
Finally, there is a control for time and international group effects which 
may come from ownership advantages such as management skills, 
industry experience and implicit internationalization capabilities. 
 
4.3.3. Methodology 
The model analyzes the presence of the international groups in the 62 
countries under analysis from 2000 to 2010. We have a panel data 
structure with a binary dependent variable that changes over time and 
across countries. This means that the most suitable estimation technique 
is the binary logistic regression with panel data. We estimate the 
following model referring to group i in country k in period t. Logistic 
regression models with panel data are formally expressed as: 
 
where is the dependent variable,  is the vector of 
independent variables, is the intercept parameter and  is the vector 
of regression coefficients. The dependent variable equals 1 when an 
international group has entered a country, so a positive regression 
coefficient indicates that a particular independent variable increases the 
probability of selecting that country as the destination of a FDI, all other 
factors being constant. 
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It is important to note that, because we are dealing with a decision 
model, we consider that MNEs take the decision in t according to the 
observation of independent and control variables in t-1. This implies 
that independent and control variables are included in the model with 
one lag ( ). The justification for this is that country and group 
conditions in t-1 set the context within which MNEs determine FDI 
investments in period t (e.g., for R&D investment, see Hansen and Hill, 
1991). 
4.3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for our 16,621 observations are 
shown in Table 4.2. It can be observed that the cultural distance index 
between the home and host countries ranges from 0 to 9.27 and the 
formal institutional development from 0.58 to 4.48. Thus, the sample 
offers substantial variability in the institutional conditions to allow an 
accurate analysis of the influence of the institutional dimension on the 
likelihood of a group selecting a country as a FDI destination. The 
correlation matrix shows that a group entering a country (host market 
choice = 1) is positively related to country population, the degree of 
internationalization of the international group, colonization ties and 
geographic proximity between the home and host countries. However, it 
is negatively related to cultural distance and the degree of market 
concentration. Formal institutional development seems not to have a 
significant correlation to host market choice. In any case, the correlation 
between independent variables is moderate. The only exception is 
between formal institutional development and population, and 
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population and the degree of market concentration (r = -0.31). Larger 
populations are concentrated in countries, such as Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan, with a lower level of formal 
institutional development. Furthermore, countries with a large 
population, such as India, Brazil and the United States, have a greater 
number of operators without important market share differences 
because they have tended to focus on regional instead of national 
competition. 
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Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics (N=16,621) 
Variable Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Host market choice 0.08 0.26 0 1 -         
2. Cultural Distance 2.29 1.56 0 9.27 -0.10* -        
3. Formal institutional development 2.91 0.95 0.58 4.48 0.01 0.10* -       
4. Population (log) 3.03 1.35 0.66 7.05 0.07* -0.13* -0.32* -      
5. GDPpc Growth 2.10 4.26 -42.77 42.83 0.01 -0.02 -0.11* 0.07* -     
6. Number of countries 10.64 8.34 2 40 0.21* -0.07* -0.00 0.01 -0.02* -    
7. Colonization 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.21* -0.05* 0.04* 0.04* -0.01 0.16* -   
8. Proximity 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.18* -0.16* 0.10* -0.01 -0.03* 0.02* 0.07* -  
9. Concentration 0.42 0.17 0.09 1 -0.08* -0.03* -0.25* -0.31* -0.07* -0.03* -0.06* -0.02* - 
 * p < 0.01 
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4.4. RESULTS 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the random effects logistic regression 
analysis with panel data that has been carried out. The coefficients 
provided refer to the marginal effects of each variable on the likelihood 
of a group entering into country. To interpret these results, it is 
important to recall that marginal effects determine the variation in the 
likelihood of a group entering a country when the independent variables 
change by one unit (Hoetker, 2007). To test the hypotheses, four models 
were estimated. Model 1 only considers the influence of the control 
variables over the dependent variable. Models 2 and 3 include cultural 
distance and formal institutional development as independent variables. 
Model 4 includes the interaction effect between cultural distance and 
formal institutional development to test the moderating effect of formal 
institutional development on the relationship between cultural distance 
and host market choice. The explanatory power of all the models is good 
according to their chi-squared values (p < 0.01). 
Model 1 shows the impact of the control variables on the market entry 
decision. As expected, both past historical ties of colonization (  = 4.52, 
p < 0.01) and geographic proximity (  = 7.89; p < 0.01) present a 
positive and significant influence, meaning that MNEs will be more 
likely to enter countries with those characteristics. Population also has a 
positive and significant effect on the probability of market entry (  = 
0.50; p < 0.01). This means that the potential size of the market is an 
important argument for MNEs to decide where to enter. Moreover, the 
higher the degree of previous internationalization of the group, the 
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greater the probability of it entering a new market (  = 0.26; p < 0.01). 
Thus, it seems that previous internationalization increases MNEs’ 
capabilities and skills to invest in new countries. As expected, market 
concentration has a negative effect on the probability of market entry 
(  = -3.20; p < 0.01). This means that MNEs prefer to enter more 
competitive markets with a lower degree of market concentration. 
Finally, both year and group dummies present significant effects. 
Model 2 includes cultural distance. Its effect on host market choice is 
significant and negative (  = -0.76; p < 0.01) as postulated in Hypothesis 
1. This means that, all other factors being constant, cultural distance has 
a negative impact on the likelihood of a group entering a new country. 
Model 3 adds formal institutional development. Hypothesis 2 predicted 
that this variable would exert a positive influence on the host country 
selection, all other variables being constant. However, Model 3 does not 
support Hypothesis 2 due to the non-significance of the marginal effect. 
For both these models, the control variables remain qualitatively the 
same. 
Model 4 is the full model incorporating not only the direct effects of 
cultural distance and formal institutional development, but also their 
interaction. Although formal institutional development did not show a 
direct and significant effect on host country choice in Model 3, Model 4 
shows that it indirectly influences the likelihood of an MNE entering a 
country by moderating the impact of cultural distance on host market 
selection. It can be observed that the marginal effect of the interaction of 
cultural distance and formal institutional development is significantly 
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positive (  = 0.92; p < 0.01). This means that the existence of a high 
development of formal institutions favors the entry of MNEs into 
countries with a higher cultural distance from the home country. In this 
way, formal institutional development reduces the importance of 
cultural distance as an obstacle to host market selection. This result 
supports Hypothesis 3 which predicted that, if there were a high level of 
formal institutional development, the negative effect of cultural distance 
would become weaker. 
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Table 4.3.  Institutions and Host Market choice (N=16,621) 
Dependent variable: 
Host market choice (M.1) (M.2) (M.3) (M.4) 
Cultural Distance  
 
 
- 0.76*** 
(0.18) 
 
-0.76*** 
(0.19) 
 
-3.84*** 
(0.70) 
     
Formal Institutional Development   0.08 
(0.23) 
-1.49*** 
(0.38) 
     
Cultural distance x Formal 
Institutional Development    
0.92*** 
(0.19) 
     
Population 0.50
*** 
(0.16) 
0.38*** 
(0.15) 
0.41** 
(0.16) 
0.46*** 
(0.16) 
GDPpc growth 
 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Number of countries 
 
0.26*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.26*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.26*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.27*** 
(0.03) 
Colonization 
 
4.52*** 
(0.85) 
 
4.23*** 
(0.94) 
 
4.18*** 
(0.94) 
 
5.52*** 
(1.05) 
Proximity 
 
7.89*** 
(1.27) 
 
6.78*** 
(1.24) 
 
6.81*** 
(1.28) 
 
7.10*** 
(1.28) 
Concentration 
 
-3.20*** 
(1.00) 
 
-3.43*** 
(0.98) 
 
-3.34*** 
(1.01) 
 
-3.45*** 
(1.03) 
 
Year Dummies 
 
YES*** 
 
YES*** 
 
YES*** 
 
YES*** 
Group Dummies 
 
YES*** 
 
YES*** YES*** YES*** 
Wald chi-square 419.79*** 430.62*** 430.54*** 380.08*** 
Log likelihood -1344.38 -1336.32 -1335.76 -1323.99 
Log-likelihood ratio test 4298.71*** 4206.40*** 4207.39*** 4042.29*** 
 Standard errors in parentheses. 
 * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** < 0.01. 
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For each international group, Figure 4.3 depicts the interaction between 
the average cultural distance and the formal institutional development of 
the host countries.5 It can be observed that international groups invest in 
countries with both high and low formal institutional development, 
although they tend to concentrate in countries that are less culturally 
distant. This figure also shows that international groups, with the 
exception of Digicel, have tended to expand into countries that are more 
culturally distant only in the presence of a high development of formal 
institutions in the host country (Hypothesis 3). Thus, cultural distance 
really becomes an important obstacle when formal institutions are less 
developed. It can also been observed that the most internationalized 
groups, whose home countries have a high development of formal 
institutions, also tend to invest in countries with a similar development 
of formal institutions. The three most internationalized groups, namely, 
Vodafone, France Telecom and Telefónica, have tended to expand into 
less culturally distant countries.  Thus, even when they have a high level 
of FDI experience, it seems clear that international groups consider 
cultural distance as a negative constraint to expansion. 
                                                            
5 For simplicity, countries with less than 50% ownership have been eliminated from 
the average calculation.  
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Figure 4.3. International groups, cultural distance  
and formal institutional development 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
4.5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter contributes to identifying the factors that affect the 
internationalization process by focusing on host market selection. It tries 
to further our understanding of this decision by considering institutional 
constraints. It closely follows Peng et al. (2009), who suggest that the 
institution-based view must be considered as the third leading 
perspective in strategic management, along with the well-developed 
industry and resource perspectives.  
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Results confirm that host country selection, one of the most important 
strategic decisions that MNEs have to take when they decide to diversify 
abroad, depends on the formal and informal rules of host countries. 
Thus, this chapter contributes to existing literature by integrating the 
institution-based view into the international business literature and by 
showing the joint effect of cultural distance and the development of 
formal institutions in the target country on deciding the destination of 
FDI flows.  
Chapter 4, then, reinforces the idea of simultaneously considering both 
formal and informal institutions as determinants of host market choice 
in the FDI process. Previous studies have tended to analyze formal and 
cultural dimensions separately. It is shown that cultural distance 
negatively influences the likelihood of a country being selected as the 
destination of FDI flows, while its formal institutional development does 
not have a direct influence on this decision, at least, in our research 
setting. These results are consistent with previous findings. For instance, 
cultural distance has been shown to be an obstacle to foreign firms 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Although we expected a positive effect of 
the level of development of formal institutions on the likelihood of 
entering a country, our results do not support this prediction. One 
possible explanation is that MNEs may also benefit from a higher degree 
of corruption – low level of formal institutional development – in host 
countries when they have developed some political capabilities to take 
advantage of the discretionary action of governments and poor 
regulation (García-Canal and Guillen, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 
2008). 
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Importantly, results show that formal institutional development has a 
positive indirect effect through its moderating role on the relationship 
between cultural distance and host market selection. In particular, a 
higher level of formal institutional development reduces the importance 
of cultural distance as a constraint to FDI flows. The stronger the formal 
institutions of a country, the more likely a MNE will enter a host 
country with a higher cultural distance from its home country. Thus, 
formal rules help to enhance foreign investment in a country when the 
cultural distance between the home and host countries is high. 
Complementarily, with a low formal institutional development, the 
culture distance plays a key role in determining FDI flows. 
MNEs have to consider the cultural distance between the home and host 
countries. When the cultural distance is low, they prefer to enter the 
new country because ownership and location advantages are not 
diminished by conflicts between contractual parts in the FDI process, 
such as suppliers, customers, governments and the local workforce. 
Home and host stakeholders tend to think similarly and there is a better 
understanding of local conditions, which allows a faster introduction 
into the business network of the new country, a faster transference of 
know-how from headquarters to subsidiaries and a reduction in 
transaction costs. However, when the cultural distance is high, MNEs 
consider the formal institutional development of the host country. They 
decide to enter that country when the formal institutions of the target 
market support economic exchanges by enhancing the protection of 
property rights and reducing information asymmetries and contractual 
and political hazards. Figure 4.5 summarizes the previous arguments. 
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Figure 4.5. Likelihood of host market entry by cultural distance  
and formal institutional development 
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Chapter 4 has several implications for management literature. It proves 
the need for integrating different approaches if we are to better 
understand existing management theories and) make them more 
relevant for managerial actions. In particular, it suggests formally 
incorporating the institution-based view of strategy into the 
international business discourse (Peng et al., 2009). In doing so, this 
chapter also responds to Bamberger (2008)’s claim for a more explicit 
incorporation of the context – in this case, the role of institutions – into 
the theories of management. In this vein, we show that it is necessary to 
simultaneously consider both the formal and informal dimensions of 
institutions in order to explain strategic actions. Formal and informal 
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rules should not be considered independently, but rather as 
interdependent parts of the institutional puzzle.  
Chapter 4 also provides interesting results from a policy point of view. 
For example, if governments want to increase FDI flows to their 
countries, they have to consider the implications both of being culturally 
distant from the MNE’s home country and of having a low level of 
formal institutional development. Given that cultural or informal rules 
are difficult to change (North, 1990; Scott, 1995), if countries are 
culturally distant from the MNE’s home country, their governments 
should try to reduce uncertainty by reinforcing their formal institutions 
such as laws and regulations. Complementarily, the judicial system and 
other government agencies have to be controlled to assure the 
observance of contracts. 
In spite of the contribution of this chapter in considering the joint effect 
of formal and informal institutions in the analysis of host market 
selection, several issues deserve extra attention. Host country selection 
has been understood as one of the main FDI decisions. However, it is 
closely related to entry mode decision. Xu and Shenkar (2002) have 
considered both decisions as key elements in the FDI process. Future 
studies should complement this research by considering the effect of 
formal and informal institutions on entry mode choice and comparing 
the effect of these two institutions on both the FDI decisions. Moreover, 
this chapter has also raised the dilemma of how to measure the 
institutional variables. We have selected cultural distance – taking 
Hofstede dimensions – and formal institutional development – through 
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the world development indicators –to explain FDI flows. However, there 
is an ample and growing literature on developing more accurate 
measures of both formal and informal dimensions. Further clarity on this 
topic is much needed, which opens a vast avenue for future research in 
the search for a greater consensus on the analysis of both formal and 
informal rules. 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
ecent history is full of incumbent failures when confronting a 
radical technological change. This is because a radical 
technological innovation often entails uncertainty, entry of new 
competitors and changes in the market structure (Benner, 2007; 
Tushman and Andersen, 1986). It frequently results in the failure of 
incumbent firms to survive in the new technological setting, being 
displaced by newcomers (Utterback, 1994) through a process that 
Schumpeter called “creative destruction”. Traditionally, literature has 
paid extra attention to the numerous disadvantages that incumbents face 
up to when this change takes place, such as lack of incentives and 
capabilities to develop the new technology which tends to cannibalize 
their current profits (Arend, 1999; Laive, 2006). Uncertainty about the 
future success of the technology, organizational inertia, and prior 
strategic commitments are examples of causes that have been argued to 
decrease incentives and capabilities to make efficient investments in the 
new technological field (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003).  
However, in the last two decades an important amount of literature has 
highlighted the existence of exceptions to the “chronic” failure of 
incumbents (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; 
Lavie, 2006; Kim and Min, 2012). For example, Hill and Rothaermel 
(2003) analyze the moderators in the relationship incumbents-
performance in a context of radical innovation. They conclude that 
factors such as the investment in basic research, the legitimization and 
institutionalization of autonomous action within the incumbent 
organization or strong downstream assets, among others, may justify the 
R 
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incumbent survival. Lavie (2006) integrates dynamic capabilities 
literature and research on technological discontinuity to maintain that 
incumbents may succeed through capability reconfiguration 
mechanisms. Under these circumstances, incumbents may have the 
possibility not only to survive but also to obtain abnormal returns in a 
context of technological disruption. 
The role of complementary assets – those that can maintain their value 
after a technological change – such as brand value, reputation or 
relationships with buyers (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002), has been 
considered as one of the key elements that incumbents should hold in 
order to maintain their competitive advantage and not to be displaced 
(Teece, 1986; Mitchell, 1989, 1991; Tripsas, 1997; Rothaermel, 2001). 
These resources support incumbents in the new stage of competition as 
they are difficult to imitate by new competitors (Helfat and Lieberman, 
2002) and potentially useful in the new technological field (Mitchell, 
1991). 
In this chapter, we empirically address the role of complementary 
resources for the incumbent success in a context of radical technological 
innovation. However, it is considered that the value of these resources is 
contingent to the institutional context. Our main premise is that it 
cannot be assumed that the value of the complementary resources holds 
irrespective of the conditions under which the firm competes. In 
particular, we bring the institutional dimension into the analysis of the 
value of complementary resources when a technological innovation 
occurs. 
Chapter 5. Institutions and performance after a radical technological change 
187 
 
Most of the empirical management literature has tended to pay limited 
attention to the institutional context in which firms operate, considering 
institutions as “background” conditions (Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008). 
Even, more specific technological management literature has neglected 
the influence of the institutional landscape on the competitive position 
of incumbents to develop and succeed after technological changes 
(Lavie, 2006). From a macro-institutional viewpoint, the influence of the 
level of institutional development on the success or failure of 
incumbents has been obviated, mainly because most studies have been 
focused on only one country, especially the United States (Banbury and 
Mitchell, 1995; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Kim and Min, 2012; Lieberman, 1989; 
Mitchell, 1989, 1991). 
This chapter aims to extend previous research on technological 
discontinuities (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Jones, 2003; Lavie, 2006) and 
the literature on institutional theory (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 
2009; Peng, Sun, Pinkham and Chen, 2009; Berry, Guillén and Zhou, 
2010). We empirically test a model capturing incumbents’ profitability 
over time after a radical technological change based on the existence of 
complementary assets. We observe that the value of complementary 
resources for an incumbent when confronting a technological change is 
contingent to the institutional context. In particular, our main findings 
show that these resources are more valuable for incumbents in markets 
with low formal institutional development. 
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, we offer additional 
empirical evidence supporting incumbents’ survival in technological 
turbulent environments. Secondly, we internationalize management 
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literature by presenting evidence on a wide sample of countries covering 
the five continents. Lastly, we respond to the claim that management 
research must incorporate more formally the role of context (Bamberger 
2008). In doing so, we consider institution-based view as a third leading 
perspective in strategic management (Peng et al., 2009), beyond the 
traditional binomial industry-based and resource-based views. 
We empirically test our hypotheses within the world mobile 
communications industry using a longitudinal panel spanning the period 
1998 to 2009. The data refers to the competitive performance of 54 
incumbents of the fixed-telephony technology that competes in wireless 
technology against 103 newcomers with a total of 3,923 observations. 
Thus, the technological change is related to the transition between 
fixed-telephony and mobile communications. The data refers to 20 
European markets (between the years 1998 and 2009) and 26 countries 
in Asia, Oceania, Africa and America (from 2005 to 2009). This wide 
scope allows us to identify remarkable institutional differences and 
determine how institutions moderate the value of firm complementary 
resources. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we offer a 
brief literature review on technological change and institutional theory. 
Section 3 develops the hypotheses of incumbent’s profitability, focusing 
on the moderating impact of the institutional context on the value of 
complementary resources. Section 4 describes the data base and the 
variables, whereas Section 5 provides evidence of the performance of 
incumbents across different institutional environments. We close the 
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chapter by discussing its main findings and its managerial and policy 
implications. 
5.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
5.2.1. Competitive Advantage, Incumbents and Technological 
Change 
A radical technological innovation involves methods and materials that 
are novel to incumbents (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003: 258). Under these 
circumstances, they have to decide on their participation in the next 
stage of the industry (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). Since they suffer 
from some incentives, capabilities and adaptation problems in the new 
technological environment, the literature has highlighted the existence 
of a process of “creative destruction” through which incumbents are 
displaced from the market (Schumpeter, 1942). In that sense, they have 
been accused of a “myopic” perspective in facing technological 
innovation. 
Hill and Rothaermel (2003) provide an overview of the main economic, 
organizational and strategic reasons that justify the lack or slow response 
of incumbents to the development or implementation of a new 
technology that threats to cannibalize their performance and, in some 
cases, displace them from the market. Firstly, the existence of economic 
uncertainty about success and future rents of an innovation decreases 
the incentives of incumbents to invest in the new technology until there 
were certain rents. Arend (1999) insists on the idea that this behavior in 
which incumbents decide to wait until the technology has been 
developed by newcomers is rational since they keep their attention on 
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short-term efficiencies, mainly derived from shareholders or stock 
market pressures. Benner (2010) observes that securities analysts are 
reluctant to strategies of incumbents which aim to extend technological 
innovations, whereas they have a more positive attitude towards 
strategies that support existing technologies. Due to this fact, external 
pressures contribute to slowing down the incumbents’ reaction. It 
frequently causes a loss of pioneer advantages and, even, the opportunity 
to compete in the new era (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995; Lieberman, 
1989). 
Recent literature has also highlighted the existence of organizational 
inertia that reduces the capability of incumbents to successfully adapt to 
the new technological environment (Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988). Organizations have developed routines, formal procedures and 
bureaucracy requirements that allow them to improve information 
systems in steady environments (Tripsas, 1997) and face the limited 
rationality (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). But when a radical technology 
innovation occurs, the environment becomes unstable and adaptation 
process to new circumstances is required. The organizational 
inflexibility, as a result of the excess of formalization of the previous 
period, makes adapting difficult. Additionally, there are adaptation 
difficulties and investments that newcomers do not have to face, which 
can give them time and cost advantages. 
The existence of strategic commitments with other firms, suppliers and 
customers has been argued to be another source of inflexibility of 
incumbents (Ghemawat, 1991). Incumbents have developed structures 
and allocated resources to satisfy the needs of their current users. But the 
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demand necessities might shift faster than incumbent’s perception. 
Newcomers may develop faster the new technology that meets their 
needs and benefit from this myopic attitude of incumbents (Hill and 
Rothaermel, 2003; Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Moreover, it has been 
argued that a radical change means an impact on the value creation 
activities of incumbents and determines the loss of value of most of them 
(Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). 
These arguments have been counteracted in the literature since they 
neglect some technological and investment capabilities and resources 
that incumbents have been able to generate (Lavie, 2006). In that sense, 
it has been argued that although there would be uncertainty about the 
success of the new technology, incumbents have been able to develop 
basic R&D routines that allow them to better identify new opportunities 
and make accurate investments. In other words, incumbents have been 
able to accumulate absorptive capacity that helps them to take accurate 
decisions in case of a radical technological change (Hill and Rothaermel, 
2003). Moreover, if in the industry where the firm operates there were 
some isolating mechanisms of pioneers’ advantages – such as network 
effects, switching costs, proprietary rights protection, etc. –, it is 
predictable that the incumbent will be especially interested not only in 
adopting the new technology, but also in developing it before the entry 
of newcomers into the market. Precisely, the existence of pioneers’ 
advantages has been highlighted as one of the isolating mechanisms of 
incumbents’ advantages (Jones, 2003). Thus, not necessarily the 
uncertainty surrounding technological change implies the lock-out of 
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incumbents from the market and their lack of incentives to invest in the 
new technological subfield. 
Those arguments that defend the inflexibility of incumbents to quickly 
react to a radical technological change are based on a static viewpoint of 
firm capabilities, which obviates the existence of dynamic capabilities 
that allow firms to adapt to changes. Lavie (2006) shows the existence of 
different mechanisms of capability reconfiguration (i.e. substitution, 
evolution and transformation) that allow incumbents to respond to a 
technological innovation. Moreover, the reaction capability also depends 
on the corporate culture about the legitimization and institutionalization 
of autonomous action. Middle-managers are less conservative and 
influenced by power struggles than top-managers. As a result, 
organizations which support their initiatives have a higher reaction 
capability (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003).  
Finally, the incumbent also benefits from the relationships that have 
been established in the past. After a technological change, some value 
chain activities can maintain their value when it does not entail selling 
to new consumers, altering the uses of products, or selling the products 
in different ways (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003: 269). It means that the 
incumbent continues interacting with the same system of producers and 
markets serving the ultimate users of the products and services to which 
a given innovation contributes (Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1994: 
657). In this case, several complementary assets such as marketing, sales 
and logistic services, market knowledge, brand or reputation can 
maintain their value since the user bases of the new technological field 
do not change (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Mitchell, 1991). The 
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importance of these complementary assets to allow incumbents’ 
advantages has been highlighted in Tripsas (1997). This chapter argues 
that the key factor of survival for incumbents is the possession of 
complementary assets that maintain their value after a technological 
change and are not imitable by new entrants. Although incumbents hold 
investment and technological capabilities, the possession of these 
complementary assets is also essential to success in the new 
technological stage. 
5.2.2. The Institutional Context 
Institutions have been broadly defined as the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, as the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction (North, 1990: 2) or as cognitive, normative and 
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to 
social behavior (Scott, 1995: 33). Although the former belongs to the 
economic perspective and the latter to the sociological viewpoint, both 
of them may be considered as complementary (Peng and Heath, 1996; 
Scott, 1995). The interaction between institutions, organizations and 
strategic choices has recently become a research issue in management 
literature (Peng et al., 2008), since the behavior and performance of an 
organization should be understood in the institutional framework where 
it operates (Peng et al., 2005; Peng, 2002; Singh, 2007). In that sense, 
strategic choices have been considered as the outcome of the interaction 
between institutions and organizations (Peng 2003, 2006; Peng et al., 
2008).  
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Surprisingly, institutions have usually been relegated to a “background” 
question, as a simple control variable in international studies. But the 
importance of institutions, mainly in international comparisons, has 
been stressed in the last two decades since they are able to condition the 
relationship between strategy and performance. Recent research has 
considered the institution-based view as a third leg for a strategy tripod 
(Peng et al., 2009), to complement the other two leading perspectives in 
strategic management – the industry and resource-based views. For this 
reason, we have observed an enormous progress in the study of 
institutions (Chan, Isobe and Makino, 2008; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and 
Peng, 2009; Peng et al., 2009; Williamson, 2000). Several authors have 
tried to integrate the traditional theories of strategy with the new 
institutional-based perspective in fields such as the study of product 
diversification (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), international diversification 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008), market entry strategies (Brouthers, 
Brouthers and Werner, 2008; Meyer et al., 2009) or country-effects over 
performance (Chan et al., 2008; Makino, Isobe and Chan, 2004). All 
these studies show their interest in integrating the influence of the 
institutional context in the outcomes of firm strategy. However, a 
further empirical development of institutional explanations with firm 
performance is needed (Singh, 2007). 
It has been argued that institutions reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
economic transactions since they condition the behavior and limits of 
what is considered legitimate (Peng et al., 2009) or, in other words, what 
is desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995: 574). 
Institutions reduce the information asymmetries among the contracting 
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parts and their possible opportunistic behavior in the future and have an 
important role in supporting the effective functioning of the market, 
reducing risk and costs (Arrow, 1971; Casson, 1997; North, 1990; Meyer 
et al., 2009).  
Institutions have been divided in formal, such as laws, regulations, 
discipline of economic and political markets and contracts, and informal, 
such as country culture, codes, norms, trust-based relationships, religion 
or traditions (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; North, 1990). The degree of 
institutional development in a country has been usually measured as the 
degree of development of formal institutions which support economic 
exchanges. Strong formal institutions are those that support the 
voluntary exchange underpinning an effective market mechanism, while 
weak ones refer to institutions that fail to ensure effective markets or 
even undermine markets (Meyer et al., 2009: 63). It has been argued that 
depending on the development of formal institutions, informal ones are 
more important in supporting economic exchanges.When formal 
institutions are weak, informal institutions have a greater influence on 
driving firm strategies and performance (Peng and Heath, 1996; Peng et 
al., 2008). In that sense, the informal ties that the firm has been able to 
build with the organizations of their environment, such as suppliers, 
consumers, investors or employees, will play an important role in 
reducing uncertainty and limit opportunistic behaviors, by replacing 
non-existent or inefficient formal mechanisms.  
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5.2.3. Incumbency, Complementary assets and Performance  
A radical technological innovation can affect the value of the 
incumbents’ assets by making them obsolete and destroying the source 
of competitive advantage which they had been enjoying (Tripsas, 1997). 
However, most recent studies have highlighted the existence of some 
kind of assets that maintain their value and increase the possibilities of 
incumbents to survive in the new technological stage (Dierick and Cool, 
1989; Mitchell, 1991; Tripsas, 1997). Helfat and Lieberman (2002) 
explain that established firms tend to enter into new industries – 
including new product or technological generations – that require 
resources with a high degree of similarity to the older ones and which 
give competitive advantages to firms.  
These resources have been named complementary assets and can be 
considered as those resources that are required to capture the benefits 
associated with a strategy, a technology or an innovation (Christmann, 
2000: 664). Hill and Rothaermel (2001) consider them as the resources 
that support the downstream activities and maintain their value after a 
technological change.  
Literature has highlighted three basic conditions that complementary 
assets have to satisfy in order to be considered as sources of incumbents’ 
advantages. An incumbent possesses a competitive advantage over their 
rivals when its resources are non-tradable, non-imitable and non-
substitutable (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). First, these assets should have 
been accumulated over time by making the appropriate strategic choices 
in a successive process of learning and training. It impedes the 
acquisition of this kind of assets by newcomers. Secondly, they should be 
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non-imitable, which happens when the stock accumulation depends on 
the time that a firm has been operating in the market or the existence of 
a previous stock of assets. It means that new entrants cannot imitate the 
level of valuable resources of incumbents and, jointly with non-
tradability, it assures the non-appropriability of these resources. And 
thirdly, it is necessary that these assets cannot be replaced by other 
different resource stock, since the assets should have an essential 
character in supporting the commercialization of the product or service. 
Not every complementary asset satisfies these three conditions. 
Literature has established a traditional classification which distinguishes 
between generic and specialized complementary assets (Teece, 1986).1 
Generic assets refer to those that do not need to be adjusted to the 
innovation, since they can be acquired in the market or built internally. 
This kind of assets is not able to confer incumbents’ advantages because 
they can easily be imitable by competitors. In contrast, specialized assets 
are critical to the commercialization of the innovation. Rothaermel and 
Hill (2005) summarize the characteristics of these assets as path 
dependent, idiosyncratic, valuable and difficult to imitate. It implies that 
specialized assets satisfy the three basic conditions to be considered as 
source of incumbents’ advantages. 
Additionally, in context of radical technological change, these 
specialized complementary assets should meet a fourth condition. It is 
necessary that they support an innovation which does not imply the 
                                                            
1 Although Teece (1986) distinguishes between specialized and cospecialized assets, 
we consider in this chapter “specialized” referred to both of them since the distinction 
is not important to this analysis. This criteria has been used in other articles (Helfat 
and Lieberman, 2002; Rothaermel and Hill, 2005; Tripsas, 1997). 
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change in the user bases (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Rosenbloom and 
Christensen, 1994). It means that core products change significantly but 
users for the new products remain largely the same from one set of 
products to the next (Mitchell, 1991: 85).  
Several complementary assets haven been argued to complying with the 
four conditions to be a source of incumbents’ advantages since they are 
specialized, non-tradable, non-imitable, non-substitutable and based on 
the existence of a previous user bases which do not change: i.e. brand 
capital, reputation, sales and service systems, market-specific knowledge 
and incremental R&D capabilities (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Peteraf, 
1993; Mitchell, 1991; Thomas, 1995). 
According to the previous arguments, the possession by incumbents of 
specialized complementary assets gives them a higher probability of 
taking advantage of newcomers. Thus, the first hypothesis of our chapter 
is stated as follows: 
H1. Complementary assets are positively related to incumbents’ 
performance 
5.2.4. The moderator role of the institutional context  
So far, we have argued that the possession of complementary resources 
may strengthen the value of other assets, thus increasing company 
performance. However, the value of these complementary assets is not 
independent of the context where the firm competes. For example, the 
institutional perspective suggests that the existence of previous 
relationships between incumbent and other organizations, such as 
suppliers, users or authorities (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) confers 
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incumbents an advantageous position that reinforces the value of 
complementary assets. As a consequence, the firm gains legitimation to 
operate in these markets (Granovetter, 1985; Peng et al., 2005; Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991). 
These informal ties will be especially important when the rules of the 
game are not too clear. This is the case when formal institutions are 
underdeveloped (Peng et al., 2005). The preeminence of informal 
institutions has been observed in emerging economies, where the formal 
market-institutions which support economic exchanges are less 
developed as a result of being in an economic transition period (Peng 
and Heath, 1996; Peng et al., 2009; Peng, 2002). 
A weak institutional context is characterized by several market failures 
which imply that firms are subject to contractual and political hazards 
(Henisz, 2000). There is a lack or insufficient development of 
intermediation institutions, such as financial analysts, investment 
bankers, auditors, solicitors, brokers, and consultants. These 
intermediaries increase information exchanges between contractual 
parties, resolving problems of asymmetric information and reducing 
costs associated to product, labor and capital markets (Arrow, 1971; 
Casson, 1997; Chan et al., 2008; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Meyer et al., 
2009; North, 1990). Thus, the lack of intermediaries increases transaction 
costs, meaning a lower predictability about the future behavior of the 
other contracting part. Under these conditions, the risk of opportunistic 
behavior increases and it is necessary to spend resources to boost the 
available information (Tong, Reuer, and Peng, 2008), which increases 
the costs of drafting and enforcing contracts (Ketchen, Boyd and Bergh, 
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2010; Peng, 2002; Peng et al., 2008). Political hazard exists because a 
weak institutional environment is characterized by imperfect judicial 
systems, unpredictable regulation, and bureaucracy constraints, such as 
importation controls, restrictive licenses and high taxation. It means a 
low protection of property rights and formal difficulties to develop 
economic exchanges, which could disincentive firms to innovate and 
invest in new activities (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Ghemawat and 
Khanna, 1998; Chan et al., 2008). 
According to these arguments, we suggest that the value of 
complementary assets will be contingent to the institutional 
environment. Incumbents will be in a better position in those markets 
with low formal institutional development because the network of 
informal relationships counteracts the disadvantages of operating in a 
context of high contractual and political hazard. The lack of clear rules 
of the game can be replaced by the information that organizations 
directly acquire from the network of relationships that incumbents have 
previously developed. The maintenance of logistic, sales or service 
systems facilitates the interaction with suppliers or consumers, which 
jointly with the accumulated market knowledge, decreases information 
asymmetries and puts incumbents in a better competitive position 
(Delios and Beamish, 1999; Meyer et al., 2009).  
When formal institutions are developed, the importance of 
complementary assets for counteracting market failures decreases. 
External mechanisms are used in order to increase information 
availability, enforce contracts and property rights protection and 
simplify bureaucracy, such as market intermediaries, efficient judiciary 
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systems, and regulatory quality (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Peng 
et al., 2005; Chan et al., 2008). Contracting with unknown parties is less 
risky and, thus, newcomers are less damaged by the institutional 
environment. 
Summarizing, we posit that specialized complementary assets influence 
incumbents’ performance more strongly when formal institutions are 
less developed. In such context, complementary assets not only support 
incumbents’ advantages, but also serve to face institutional constraints to 
economic exchanges. As a consequence, our second hypothesis is 
formulated as follows: 
H2. The lower the level of formal institutional development, the higher 
the influence of the stock of complementary assets on performance. 
Previous hypotheses are summarized in Figure 5.1. 
Chapter 5. Institutions and performance after a radical technological change 
 
  202 
Figure 5.1. Incumbency, Institutions and Performance 
 
 
5.3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
5.3.1. The worldwide telecommunications industry 
Telecommunications industry can be considered as a paradigmatic case 
of radical technological change as it has experienced the shift from fixed 
to wireless technology. Fixed telephone services are based on a 
technology that uses a solid medium, such as metal wire or optical fibre, 
to allow voice transmissions. Fixed technology had been used up until 
the last years of the 20th century as the main instrument for human 
communication. Given its consideration as a natural monopoly, fixed 
line services have been usually provided by one state-owned firm 
(Amstrong, 1997; Banerjee and Ros, 2004).2 In most of countries there 
has been a privatization process in the last three decades. Due to being a 
state monopolist for a long period of time, we expect these companies to 
                                                            
2 In several countries, such as Argentina or United States, the huge territorial extension 
justified the existence of two or more firms that developed the fixed landline services. 
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accumulate valuable assets such as reputation, brand value or users’ 
relationships (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
A new technology based on radio waves was developed in the second 
half of the 20th century (Gruber, 2005). This technological innovation 
included the use of new methods, materials and knowledge to allow 
voice transmission. Thus, it can be considered a radical technological 
disruption (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). Although some wireless voice 
transmissions had previously taken place with non-commercial and 
military uses, it was in the late 80’s that analogue mobile phones started 
to be commercialized (Banerjee and Ros, 2004). 
It was in the early 90’s with the appearance of digital mobile systems – 
Second-generation or 2G systems – when the real take-off of mobile 
communications took place. In this decade, wireless communications 
started to substitute fixed lines communications in many countries, 
especially in those that had technological problems in fixed-line 
technology (Banerjee and Ros, 2004).  It can be observed that 
penetration rates of fixed telephony during the last years of the 20th 
century and the first decade of 21st century have not substantially 
increased around the world in comparison with mobile communications 
(Figure 5.2), whose diffusion rate has been proved to dramatically 
increase during the last decade. As a result of this evolution, the absolute 
number of mobile users was higher than the fixed main lines for the first 
time in 2002 (ITU, 2003). Gans, King and Wright (2005) provide an 
accurate overview of the works that study this substitutive effect. This 
literature shows that individual’s spending on fixed-line telephony 
decreases when the user also has a mobile phone (Horvath and Maldom, 
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2002). Cadima and Barros (2000) observe a reduction in fixed-line 
services demand when there is access to mobile services. Interestingly, 
the improvement in mobile services has been translated into higher 
competition, lower prices and higher functionality, which have 
increased the attractiveness of mobile technology to satisfy 
communications needs (Gruber, 2001; Gruber and Verboven, 2001; Gans 
et al., 2005; Rodini, Ward and Woroch, 2003). This substitution effect 
can also be appreciated in Figure 1 since the penetration rate of fixed 
technology reached a maximum in 2006 (19.9%) and dropped off to 
18.9% in 2008. Due to this fact, telecommunications industry constitutes 
a useful setting to test our theoretical predictions. 
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Figure 5.2. World fixed and mobile telephony penetration rate (1989-
2008) 
 
Source: The World Bank Group (2010). World Development Indicators. 
In this context of radical technological change, incumbents from fixed-
line telephony started to operate in wireless telecommunications in most 
of countries, jointly with newcomers that entered into the market. 
Given the existence of incumbents and newcomers in mobile 
communications around the world, this research setting is showed as 
accurate to measure divergences in the performance between these 
agents. Additionally, as having information on the five continents, it is 
expected to appreciate enough variability on the institutional context in 
which the operators compete. 
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5.3.2.  Sample and variables 
Our database includes the whole population of mobile communications 
providers that operated in 46 markets between the last quarter of 1998 
and the third quarter of 2009.3 The availability of this wide scope of 
countries is needed for our institutional comparison purposes. Our data 
comes from multiple sources, but the main one is the Merrill Lynch 
Global Wireless Matrix. This publication provides quarterly information 
on several of the variables of interest such as the name of the firms, the 
number of subscribers, the number of firms per market and their 
performance. We have also collected information about incumbency and 
date of entry, mainly from industry reports and the corporate 
information of the firms. Institutional data has been obtained from the 
Heritage Foundation. The sample includes a total of 54 incumbents and 
103 newcomers that amounts 3,923 observations.  
Dependent variable  
PERFORMANCEikt. Profitability of firm i in market k in period t is 
measured through EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization) divided by the total revenues of the 
firm. 
                                                            
3 The countries considered in our research are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (from 1998 to 
2009) and, due to availability of data Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United States 
and Venezuela (from 2005 to 2009). 
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Independent variables 
INCUMBENCYik. Incumbency is defined as a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 when the firm i has been operating as state-owned fixed operator 
in market k previously to the introduction of mobile technology and 0 
otherwise.  
COMPLEMENTARY ASSETSikt. Our theoretical development suggests 
that specialized complementary assets confer incumbents’ advantages 
when they are non-tradable, non-imitable, non-substitutable (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989; Teece, 1986) and especially important to support the 
commercialization of the new product innovation in a similar user 
market (Mitchell, 1991; Rosenbloom and Christensen, 1994; Tripsas, 
1997). The measurement of complementary resources in previous 
literature has been varied from a dummy (1/0) that shows its possession 
or creation by the firm (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Mitchell, 1989; Tripsas, 1997) 
to a continuous variable that shows industry experience as a proxy of 
complementary assets accumulation (Mitchell, 1989). 
Reputation is one of the most important complementary assets that can 
lead incumbents to maintain their advantage in the new technological 
setting (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Mitchell, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). 
Reputation is the result of previous stock accumulation marked by causal 
ambiguity and time dependency (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), which 
assures the non-tradability and non-imitability conditions. It is mainly 
based on previous relationships between the firm and their stakeholders. 
The causal ambiguity and the impact of reputation on performance have 
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been considered as one of the most important resources for a firm to 
succeed (Flanagan & O’Shaughnessy, 2005). 
We have previously analyzed the substitution effect between mobile and 
fixed-line communications. In this context, we posit the 
complementarily between the fixed-line installed base for the 
incumbent and its mobile installed base. In the telecommunications 
industry, the installed base of a company is considered a strategic asset 
(Shankar and Bayus, 2003) because of the existence of network effects 
(Birke and Swann, 2006; Doganoglu and Grzybowski, 2007). This means 
that the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good 
increases with the number of other agents consuming the good (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985: 424). Users form expectations about which firm will 
be dominant in the future, since they prefer choosing a firm that will 
persist over time with an increasing installed base. For this reason, firms 
try to launch signals that create users’ expectations about their future 
dominant nature. Reputation has been identified as one of these signals 
because in markets where network effects are present, a firm can benefit 
from having a reputation for selling “successful” products; (…) even 
more than in other markets, firms with established reputations, well-
known brand names, and ready visible access to capital have competitive 
advantages (Katz and Shapiro, 1994: 104,107). 
We use this interplay between the installed base and the idea of 
reputation as a proxy of complementary assets in telecommunications. In 
this industry, incumbents have been usually operating as state 
monopolist before the introduction of mobile technology. For this 
reason, the fixed telephony penetration rate represents the number of 
Chapter 5. Institutions and performance after a radical technological change 
209 
 
users in each market that have directly interacted with the incumbent. 
Thus, it can be argued that the value of reputation for each incumbent 
will be proportional to the amount of people who know the firm. We 
closely follow Jones (2003) where the measure of complementary assets 
takes into account the average physical line sales of a firm in the U.S. 
market during the prior three years to the entry of the incumbent in the 
new technological field. We propose as a measure of complementary 
assets the average fixed telephony penetration rate of the 3-years 
immediately prior to the entry of the incumbent in digital mobile 
technology. 
DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS (DFIkt). In order to 
measure the institutional context in market k in period t, we built an 
index based on the yearly Economic Freedom Index provided by The 
Heritage Foundation. This index has been previously used in the 
literature with similar purposes (Goerzen and Beamish, 2003; Meyer et 
al., 2009). The Economic Freedom Index (EFI, thereafter) measures the 
degree in which all liberties and rights of production, distribution, or 
consumption of goods and services are guaranteed in each country. In 
this sense, a higher value of the index means that formal institutions 
(law, regulations…) provide better support to economic exchanges. The 
full Index is based on 10 items. However, this chapter only considers 
those that, according to Meyer et al. (2009), better show the efficiency in 
markets: trade freedom, business freedom, investment freedom, financial 
freedom and property rights protection. This Index has been shown to 
be correlated to other indexes that measure the institutional 
development of countries, such as the Institutional Development Index 
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calculated by Chan, Isobe and Makino (2008) or the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (r = 0.76) published by the Transparency International 
society. 
Control variables 
We control for the population in market k in period t (POPULATIONkt), 
which is expected to have a positive relationship with performance, 
since the potential market will be higher. We also control for country-
specific rivalry by taking into account the number of firms operating in 
market k in period t (FIRMSkt). This variable is expected to negatively 
affect firm performance. A third control variable is the time (in months) 
that the firm i has been operating in market k in period t (TIMEikt). 
Additionally, we control for time in the market because the literature 
has suggested that after a radical technological change performance 
could depend on the existence of first mover advantages (Jones, 2003). 
Thus, a positive relationship between time in the market and 
performance is expected. The model includes dummies controlling for 
the effect of a national merger among the firms that appear in the sample 
during the period under study (MERGERikt). We also control for the 
possibility that company i is incumbent in other markets different from 
k in period t (FOREIGN INCUMBENCYikt). Finally, the model considers 
regional and year dummies to control for geographic and time-specific 
influences respectively. 
5.3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Table 5.1 both 
referred to 3,923 observations.  As can be seen in Table 5.1, the average 
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firm has an average EBITDA ratio of 0.29, is not an incumbent and has 
been operating in a country with 63.64 million inhabitants over almost 
10 years (117 months). The average number of firms per market is 4. 
When we analyze the correlation matrix, we interestingly observe that 
EBITDA is positively correlated with being incumbent, complementary 
assets (hypothesis 1) and time in the market. The correlation of EBITDA 
is also positive with population and the existence of a merger. 
Nevertheless, the correlation becomes negative between EBITDA and 
institutional development, the number of firms that operate in the 
market or when a foreign incumbent holds the ownership of the 
national operator. The correlation among the independent variables is 
moderate. The only exception is the relationship between incumbency 
and complementary assets, since only incumbents possess this kind of 
resources. 
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TABLE 5.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (N=3,923) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. PERFORMANCE 0.29 0.31 -9.17 0.91 -               
2. INCUMBENCY 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.22* -              
3. COMPLEMENTARY ASSETS 12.94 20.33 0 68.22 0.17* 0.84* -             
4. DFI 71.37 13.49 24.29 92.14 -0.05* 0.03* 0.23* -            
5. POPULATION 63.64 137.66 3.86 1155.3 0.02 -0.09* -0.08* -0.33* -           
6. FIRMS 3.84 1.03 2 7 -0.09* -0.13* -0.04* 0.02 0.18* -          
7. FOREIGN INCUMBENCY 0.29 0.46 0 1 -0.09* -0.16* -0.24* 0.03 -0.04* -0.01 -         
8. MERGER 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.02 0.14* 0.12* 0.01 -0.03* -0.05* 0.13* -        
9. TIME 117.12 44.99 1 273 0.36* 0.33* 0.30* 0.11* -0.01 -0.02 -0.08* 0.14* -       
10. AFRICA 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.09* 0.05* -0.09* -0.23* -0.01 -0.19* -0.05* -0.04* 0.05* -      
11. ASIA 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.06* -0.10* -0.12* -0.27* 0.29* 0.36* -0.16* -0.07* 0.16* -0.08* -     
12. EUROPE 0.60 0.49 0 1 -0.07* -0.02 0.08* 0.41* -0.31* -0.31* 0.08* 0.00 -0.11* -0.21* -0.56* -    
13. LATIN AMERICA 0.12 0.33 0 1 -0.04* 0.02 -0.15* -0.41* 0.03* -0.00 0.18* 0.15* -0.11* -0.06* -0.17* -0.45* -   
14. NORTH AMERICA 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.05* 0.11* 0.25* 0.20* 0.21* 0.30* -0.09* -0.05* -0.01 -0.04* -0.10* -0.27* -0.08* -  
15. PACIFIC 0.29 0.17 0 1 -0.00 0.05* 0.09* 0.17* -0.06* -0.08* -0.05* -0.03 0.13* -0.03 -0.08* -0.21* -0.06* -0.04 - 
 * Significant at p < 0.05 or less. 
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5.4. RESULTS 
The model we estimate is the following: 
PERFORMANCEikt = β0 + β1 COMPLEMENTARY ASSETSikt + β2 DFIkt + 
β3 COMPLEMENTARY ASSETSikt  x  DFIkt  + β4 CONTROL VARIABLES 
+ εikt      
Table 5.2 shows random effect estimates4 of our model on the 
relationship between incumbents’ performance and the value of 
complementary resources across different institutional environments. 
All the equations present heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) estimates. To test our hypotheses, we estimated five 
models. Model 1 only considers the influence of control variables over 
performance. In Model 2 we include incumbency as independent 
variable (in order to confirm the positive influence of being incumbent 
over performance) whereas Model 3 analyzes the influence of 
complementary assets (Hypothesis 1). Model 4 includes the institutional 
context while Model 5 is the full model with the interaction between 
complementary assets and the institutional context (Hypothesis 2). The 
F-Tests show that the latter is the model that better fits our data.  
Model 2 shows that the variable incumbency presents a positive and 
highly significant coefficient. Model 3 shows that the possession of 
                                                            
4 The Hausman test has shown that there are systematic individual effects. By running a fixed-
effects regression, time-invariant variables are dropped. Several of these variables, such as 
incumbency or the stock of complementary assets, are the basis of our first hypothesis. 
Literature argues that, in those cases in which the non-variation of the variable is theoretically 
justified, the random effects model can be an appropriate alternative (Certo and Semadini, 
2006). 
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complementary assets by incumbents positively influences performance. 
Their positive and significant effect is maintained in the full Model, thus 
supporting Hypothesis 1: the accumulation of complementary assets by 
incumbents leads to an increase in firm performance.  
The DFI variable (institutional context) does not have a significant 
impact, which means that the level of development of formal institutions 
does not have a direct impact on firm performance. However, the 
interaction between complementary assets and the institutional context 
have a negative and significant impact. It means that the lower the 
development of formal institutions is, the higher the impact of 
possessing complementary assets to achieve a higher performance, which 
offers support to our Hypothesis 2. 
Overall, time in the market has a positive and significant effect on 
performance, while number of firms also has a significant effect on firm 
performance, but negative. Population and the existence of a merger in a 
particular market do not have any significant influence on performance 
in the full model. Interestingly, regional variables show mixed results. If 
we consider that the European region is the case base, it can be observed 
that an average operator in North America, Africa or Asia reaches a 
higher performance, which means that we can find regions that are 
more profitable than others. 
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TABLE 5.2. COMPLEMENTARY ASSETS, INSTITUTIONS AND PERFORMANCE 
Dependent variable:      
PERFORMANCE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INCUMBENCY  0.0794***    
  (3.15)    
       
COMPLEMENTARY   0.0016** 0.0016** 0.0171** 
ASSETS   (2.32) (2.41) (2.36) 
      
DFI    -0.0015 0.0001 
    (-0.98) (0.07) 
      
COMPLEMENTARY     -0.0002** 
ASSETS x DFI     (-2.26) 
      
TIME 0.0027*** 0.0023*** 0.0024*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 
 (6.72) (5.92) (6.16) (6.22) (6.14) 
      
POPULATION 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001 
 (1.76) (2.07) (1.99) (1.15) (1.52) 
      
FIRMS -0.0397** -0.0377** -0.0392** -0.0380** -
0.0379** 
 (-2.48) (-2.37) (-2.46) (-2.40) (-2.36) 
      
FOREIGN 0.0739 0.0764 0.0783 0.0784 0.0783 
INCUMBENCY (1.05) (1.09) (1.10) (1.11) (1.11) 
      
MERGER -0.0456 -0.0479 -0.0484 -0.0470 -0.0415 
 (-0.59) (-0.62) (-0.62) (-0.61) (-0.57) 
      
AFRICA 0.1488*** 0.1341*** 0.1638*** 0.1322** 0.1571** 
 (2.77) (2.66) (3.07) (2.07) (2.22) 
      
ASIA 0.0925** 0.0938** 0.0989** 0.0837* 0.0945** 
 (2.10) (2.13) (2.18) (1.86) (1.96) 
      
NORTH 0.1862*** 0.1519*** 0.1413*** 0.1555*** 0.1756*** 
AMERICA (3.64) (3.08) (2.92) (3.18) (3.53) 
      
LATIN 0.0551 0.0370 0.0575 0.0307 0.0411 
AMERICA (1.51) (1.02) (1.60) (0.69) (0.89) 
      
PACIFIC -0.0354 -0.0437 -0.0475 -0.0368 -0.0138 
 (-1.14) (-1.42) (-1.56) (-1.14) (-0.43) 
      
CONSTANT 0.1845*** 0.1651*** 0.1717*** 0.2717** 0.1438 
 (3.20) (2.76) (2.88) (2.09) (0.87) 
      
TIME EFFECTS YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** 
N 3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923 
F-Test vs. (1)  9.89*** 5.37** 7.93** 9.77** 
F-Test vs. (3)    0.96 8.25** 
F-Test vs. (4)     5.12** 
t statistics in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter sheds light on the understanding of the conditions which 
lead incumbents to survive or even outperform rivals when confronting 
a radical technological innovation. We bring the institutional theory 
into our analysis by arguing that complementary resources that allow 
incumbents to succeed in radical technological environments are 
contingent to the institutional context they compete in. Our research 
contributes to the existing literature by integrating research on 
technological discontinuities and the new institutionalism literature 
(Oliver, 1997; Peng et al., 2009). By bringing the institutional theory to 
our research, we aim at responding to both the call by Peng et al. (2009), 
claiming that institution-based view must be considered as the third 
leading perspective in strategic management, and the one made by 
Bamberger (2008) on using context theories to narrow the micro-macro 
gap in management research. 
Our conclusions confirm the importance of complementary assets as 
mediators in the relationship incumbent-performance after a radical 
technological change. This result is consistent with previous findings 
(Mitchell, 1991; Tripsas, 1997; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). The chapter 
also provides some evidence on the conditions that allow incumbents to 
survive in changing technological environments. 
Additionally, our results show that the value of complementary 
resources varies across institutional environments. More precisely, these 
resources are more important to support incumbents’ performance in 
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markets with a less formal institutional development. Under these 
circumstances, complementary assets do not only support incumbents’ 
performance, but also serve to counteract institutional constraints to 
economic activities, such as contractual and political risk, by increasing 
information, reducing transaction costs and legitimating firm to operate 
into the market. On the contrary, with high formal institutions, external 
formal mechanisms replace informal ties and protect the property rights 
of the parties. As a consequence, complementary assets become less 
important to support firm performance. 
Interestingly, our results on the influence of geographical regions on 
performance suggest that the average European market is more 
competitive, while markets in North America, Asia or Africa seem to be 
less competitive with the subsequent effect on firm performance. This 
finding is consistent with recent industry reports (Gillet, 2011) on the 
competitiveness of the European market vis-á-vis other regions. 
Companies in less competitive markets are then able to take advantage of 
their market power. This finding could be useful in future research at 
explaining the internationalization process followed by the main mobile 
communications companies in the last decade. 
Our research has also some implications for the management literature. 
Although most of the literature has been keeping its attention mainly on 
incumbents’ disadvantages, we have offered additional empirical 
evidence in that incumbents’ advantages may exist. Complementary 
assets built in previous relationships by incumbents with their 
stakeholders are difficult to copy by newcomers. This evidence could 
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also have important implications for MNE to select the entry mode into 
a new market. To the extent that complementary assets are important 
determinants of firm performance, we argue that entering into a market 
with less formal institutional context – where there has been a radical 
technological change – will be more beneficial through a joint venture 
or an acquisition of an established company than through a greenfield, to 
the extent that it facilitates the appropriation of specialized resources. 
Several studies have extended this link between institutional 
development and modes of entry (Brouthers et al., 2008; Meyer et al., 
2009; Rothaermel, 2001) and this clearly constitutes a promising avenue 
for further research.  
Our chapter also provides interesting results from a policy point of view. 
One of the main objectives of the regulator is to foster market 
competition, with a subsequent increase in social welfare. The 
availability of a regulatory framework that favours economic exchanges 
may have undesirable consequences on firm’s performance. Policy 
makers have an important role in establishing a legal context that better 
supports market efficiency and enhances the entry of new competitors, 
thus weakening incumbents’ advantages. 
For instance, extant literature (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; 
Mitchell, 1991) as well as our own research has shown that entry timing 
constitutes a strategic weapon in explaining incumbents’ survival after a 
radical technological innovation. The existence of first mover advantages 
has been shown as a determining factor at explaining the success of 
incumbents in the mobile telecommunications industry (Usero and 
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Fernández, 2009; Gomez and Maicas, 2010). If governments want to 
encourage competition after a technological innovation, it is important 
to adopt a proactive behaviour to foster the early entry of new players. 
This attitude is especially important in the case of mobile 
communications, where the availability of the radio spectrum limits the 
licences, and the regulator has to decide the number of competitors in 
the market and the number of licences it grants at any time. Thus, if the 
regulator gives a licence to the former state monopolist in fixed 
telephony (incumbent) and do not introduce competition at the proper 
time, the incumbent can obtain a great advantage over the newcomers. 
In spite of the contribution of our research by integrating literatures on 
technological management and new institutional-based view, several 
issues deserve additional attention. We have exclusively focused on the 
role of complementary resources that are based on the relationships that 
the incumbent has previously built. However, further empirical and 
theoretical study is needed to determine how these complementary 
assets are integrated with technological and investment capabilities to 
increase firm competitive performance. Besides, the link between 
resources and institutions should also be elaborated more strongly. We 
have paid attention to the development of formal institutions as a whole. 
However, other studies have tended to identify different dimensions of 
institutions, such as economic, political or social ones (Chan et al., 2008). 
Future research should develop the interplay between complementary 
resources and the dimensions of institutions. 
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De acuerdo con el artículo 13.4 del  RD 99/2011, de 28 de enero, que 
regula las enseñanzas oficiales de doctorado, la tesis puede ser 
desarrollada en el idioma habitual para la comunicación científica. El 
artículo 2.2 del Acuerdo de 17 de diciembre de 2008 del Consejo de 
Gobierno de la Universidad de Zaragoza, que aprueba el Reglamento 
sobre Tesis Doctorales, determina que en caso de que dicho idioma no 
sea el español la tesis deberá incluir en el momento de su depósito el 
resumen y conclusiones en español.  
Con el fin de cumplir con el requisito anterior, al final de los cinco 
capítulos que conforman esta tesis doctoral, escrita en inglés, se han 
añadido dos secciones en español. La primera de ellas, Resumen, sintetiza 
el contenido de cada uno de los capítulos, con especial atención a sus 
objetivos, hipótesis, resultados y contribuciones. La segunda sección, 
Conclusiones, destaca las principales implicaciones académicas y 
empresariales de la tesis doctoral a partir de los resultados obtenidos.  
RESUMEN 
La tesis se compone de cinco capítulos. Los dos primeros capítulos tienen 
un propósito descriptivo. Así, el Capítulo 1 determina los dos grandes 
objetivos de investigación de la tesis y el Capítulo 2 describe la industria 
donde se van a realizar los análisis empíricos. Los tres capítulos restantes 
son los encargados de desarrollar el marco teórico, hipótesis, análisis 
empírico y resultados de las dos líneas de investigación que plantea la 
tesis. Así, el análisis de la estrategia en industrias de red se ha 
desarrollado en el Capítulo 3, mientras que la vertiente institucional de 
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la estrategia empresarial ha sido el hilo conductor en el Capítulo 4 (que 
analiza el impacto del marco institucional sobre la toma de decisiones 
estratégicas) y en el Capítulo 5 (que analiza la influencia del marco 
institucional sobre el resultado empresarial). A continuación, se detalla el 
contenido de cada uno de los capítulos. 
El Capítulo 1, “Introducción”, describe el objetivo de investigación de la 
tesis. Éste ha sido el de analizar en mayor profundidad la influencia que 
tanto la competencia bajo efectos de red como el marco institucional 
tienen en la determinación de la estrategia empresarial y los resultados 
de la misma. La tesis ha pretendido otorgar protagonismo a dos 
elementos importantes que caracterizan las condiciones bajo las que 
compiten las empresas, como son efectos de red y las instituciones del 
mercado, y que tradicionalmente han sido relegadas a un papel 
secundario en el estudio de la dirección estratégica (McIntyre y 
Subramaniam, 2009; Peng, Sun, Pinkham y Chen, 2009). 
El éxito que en los últimos años han tenido empresas multinacionales 
que operan en industrias de red, tales como Apple, Facebook, Vodafone o 
Google, ha atraído la atención de los investigadores. Ha surgido un 
creciente interés por analizar en qué medida la existencia de efectos de 
red y los diferentes marcos institucionales a los que se enfrentan pueden 
condicionar su estrategia y sus resultados. 
En primer lugar, el rápido crecimiento que muchas de estas empresas 
han experimentado se ha venido explicado por la existencia de efectos de 
red (Gruber, 2005). Éstos hacen que las “reglas de juego” para competir 
en este tipo de industrias difieran de las tradicionales. El valor deja de 
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estar el producto para descansar en la red de usuarios que lo consumen. 
Ello implica que variables claves como el precio o la calidad hayan 
perdido protagonismo frente al tamaño de la red (McIntyre y 
Subramaniam, 2009). Uno de los principales objetivos de la tesis es 
analizar en qué medida las decisiones estratégicas de las empresas en las 
industrias de red pueden conseguir incrementar el valor de la red – en 
vez del valor del producto – a través de la gestión de la base instalada de 
usuarios. 
En segundo lugar, dada la presencia a nivel mundial de las industrias de 
red, las empresas tienen que competir en mercados que difieren 
enormemente en términos de cultura, lenguaje, códigos de conducta, 
legislación o protección de los derechos individuales. El impacto que 
dichas diferencias pueda tener sobre la toma de decisiones estratégicas ha 
atraído el interés de la literatura, sobre todo la referente a la dirección 
estratégica de grupos internacionales (Brouthers, Brouthers y Werner, 
2008; Chan, Isobe y Makino, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra y Genc, 2008; 
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik y Peng, 2009). Pero incluso las empresas que 
operan en un mercado deben ser conscientes de que decisiones 
estratégicas que otras empresas de perfil similar están tomando en otros 
mercados geográficos pueden no tener las mismas consecuencias en su 
propio mercado debido a las diferencias en el marco institucional (Peng 
et al., 2009). Por todo ello, el segundo gran objetivo de la tesis es avanzar 
en la comprensión de la influencia que el entorno institucional tiene 
tanto sobre la toma de decisiones estratégicas como sobre el resultado. 
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El Capítulo 2, “El marco de investigación: la industria de la telefonía 
móvil”, ha sido el encargado de justificar por qué se ha escogido el sector 
de la telefonía móvil como industria de referencia a la hora de testar 
empíricamente las hipótesis de la tesis. La industria de la telefonía móvil 
ha sido elegida por considerarse un caso paradigmático de industria con 
efectos de red, con presencia mundial y cuyas empresas se encuentran 
altamente internacionalizadas.  
El sector de la telefonía móvil ha experimentado un crecimiento 
exponencial que no conoce precedente anterior, ni siquiera en el caso de 
otras exitosas plataformas tecnológicas como Internet o la telefonía fija. 
Ello ha sido debido, en gran parte, a la alta intensidad de los efectos de 
red (Gruber, 2005). Asimismo, se trata de una industria que se encuentra 
presente en todas las regiones del mundo debido a la importancia  
política, económica y social que tradicionalmente siempre ha tenido el 
sector de las comunicaciones (Fuentelsaz, Maicas y Polo, 2008). Por ello, 
es posible observar diferencias institucionales entre los mercados en los 
que está presente esta industria.  
También es importante destacar que, desde mediados de los noventa del 
siglo pasado, las empresas que operan en esta industria han tendido a 
internacionalizarse (Curwen y Walley, 2008). El Capítulo 2 muestra que 
en dicho proceso de internacionalización  las empresas multinacionales 
no sólo han entrado en países próximos geográfica y culturalmente, sino 
que también se han expandido hacia países muy diferentes en términos 
institucionales.  
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Por tanto, tanto la existencia de efectos de red como la diversidad 
institucional de los mercados en los que está presente la industria de la 
telefonía móvil y los grupos internacionales que operan en ella justifican 
la selección de este sector de actividad  como contexto de investigación 
de los análisis empíricos de la tesis. 
El Capítulo 3, “Decisiones estratégicas, efectos de red y resultados: El 
valor de la red en las industrias de red”, analiza cómo la estrategia 
consigue potenciar los efectos de red en beneficio de la empresa cuando 
consigue incrementar el valor de su red de usuarios. El modelo teórico 
que plantea el capítulo determina que las decisiones estratégicas de las 
empresas incrementarán el valor de la red si incrementan las 
expectativas de los usuarios acerca del mayor tamaño de la red en el 
futuro, lanzan señales a los usuarios para coordinarlos hacia la selección 
de la red y aumentan la compatibilidad percibida de la red de la empresa 
con la red de las empresas rivales. Cuando se cumplan estas tres 
condiciones, los usuarios potenciales sentirán incentivos para unirse a la 
red de usuarios de esa empresa y eso, al final, determinará el crecimiento 
de la misma. Ello redundará en una mayor utilidad de los usuarios y en 
mayor beneficio para la empresa. 
Partiendo del anterior modelo teórico, el Capítulo 3 formula tres 
hipótesis referentes a tres decisiones estratégicas y el efecto esperado que 
deben tener sobre el valor de la red según su influencia sobre los tres 
antecedentes de los efectos de red, es decir, expectativas, coordinación y 
compatibilidad. Las tres decisiones estratégicas que se analizan son las 
referentes al momento de entrada de la empresa en el mercado, el grado 
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de internacionalización y la gestión de los costes de cambio. Además, se 
añade una última hipótesis que pretende confirmar el efecto positivo del 
valor de la red sobre el beneficio en industrias con efectos de red.  
El análisis empírico, que se desarrolla sobre un panel de datos de 
telefonía móvil de 20 países europeos desde 1998 a 2008, confirma el 
efecto positivo del tiempo de entrada sobre el valor de la red y el 
negativo de los costes de cambio sobre dicho valor. Asimismo, se observa 
que el valor de la red tiene un efecto positivo sobre el beneficio 
empresarial. Únicamente el grado de internacionalización no resulta 
significativo.  
El Capítulo 3 tiene dos contribuciones importantes. En primer lugar, 
plantea un modelo teórico que busca su aplicación empresarial con 
carácter generalizado. Estudios anteriores han centrado su atención en 
algunas decisiones estratégicas, tales como el tiempo de entrada, la 
variedad de productos complementarios, etc. Sin embargo, el modelo 
planteado en este capítulo busca predecir el efecto positivo o negativo de 
cualquier decisión estratégica sobre el valor de la red y los resultados. 
Será positivo cuando la decisión sirva para incrementar las expectativas 
de los usuarios acerca del mayor tamaño de la red en el futuro, les ayude 
a coordinarse hacia la selección de esa red e incremente la 
compatibilidad percibida de la red de la empresa con otras redes.  
En segundo lugar, y quizá más importante, el Capítulo 3 tiene una 
contribución básica para el análisis estratégico de las industrias de red. A 
la hora de medir el valor de la red, este capítulo propone una medida 
alternativa a las propuestas con anterioridad. La nueva medida tiene un 
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marcado carácter estratégico al tomar en consideración no sólo el tamaño 
de la red, sino también la intensidad de los efectos de red a partir del 
tamaño relativo de la red de una empresa con respecto al tamaño de las 
redes de los rivales. 
El Capítulo 4, “Decisiones estratégicas e instituciones en el proceso de 
inversión extranjera directa: ¿Dónde entrar?”, pretende determinar cuál 
es la influencia que las instituciones, formales (leyes, regulación, 
contratos, etc.) e informales (cultura, religión, códigos de conducta, etc.), 
tienen en la toma de decisiones estratégicas. Para ello este capítulo toma 
en consideración una decisión estratégica clave en el proceso de 
internacionalización, objeto tradicional de análisis desde la perspectiva 
institucional de la estrategia. En concreto, el Capítulo 4 analiza la 
influencia que las instituciones formales e informales de cada mercado 
tienen sobre la decisión de entrada de una empresa multinacional en ese 
país.  
Cuando un grupo internacional entra en un país espera poder explotar 
capacidades y recursos de la matriz, tanto tangibles como intangibles, en 
el país de destino de la inversión (ventajas de la propiedad). Asimismo, 
espera poder aprovechar los recursos de ese mercado, tales como una 
localización estratégica, existencia de fuentes de recursos exclusivas o 
mano de obra cualificada (ventajas de localización) (Dunning y Lundan, 
2008). Si bien, la perspectiva institucional de la estrategia internacional 
que se aborda en el capítulo plantea que la obtención de dichas ventajas, 
tanto de propiedad como de localización, depende del marco 
institucional, formal e informal, del país de destino de la inversión. 
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La aproximación a las instituciones informales y formales se realiza sobre 
la base de dos conceptos claves. El primero de ellos se refiere a la 
distancia cultural, considerada como el conjunto de factores, como la 
diferencia en lenguaje, tradiciones, educación y códigos de conducta, que 
dificulta el flujo de información entre el mercado de origen y destino de 
la inversión (Johanson y Vahlne, 1977). El segundo concepto clave se 
refiere al desarrollo de las instituciones formales, es decir, al grado en el 
que las normas explícitas de un mercado – tales como la ley, los 
contratos, las sentencias, etc. – reducen las asimetrías de información y 
ayudan a una mayor protección de los derechos de propiedad entre las 
partes contratantes en una transacción económica (Meyer et al., 2008). 
Las hipótesis del Capítulo 4 plantean en qué medida la distancia cultural 
entre el país de origen y destino de la inversión y el grado de desarrollo 
de las instituciones formales del país de destino influyen sobre la 
probabilidad de que un grupo internacional entre en ese país. Así, la 
primera hipótesis del Capítulo 4 es que una mayor distancia cultural 
entre un país y el país de origen de un grupo internacional reduce la 
probabilidad de que dicho grupo entre en ese país. La segunda hipótesis 
del Capítulo 4 es que un mayor desarrollo de las instituciones formales 
de un mercado incrementa la probabilidad de que un grupo 
internacional entre en él. Finalmente, y como hipótesis clave en este 
Capítulo, se propone la consideración conjunta de las instituciones 
formales e informales a la hora de decidir la entrada de un grupo en un 
país. Cuando el país de destino de la inversión tiene instituciones 
formales más desarrolladas, el impacto negativo de la distancia cultural 
sobre la probabilidad de entrada del grupo en ese país pasa a ser menor. 
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Esto es así porque cuando las instituciones formales de un país apoyan la 
realización de intercambios económicos protegiendo los derechos de 
propiedad de las partes, el desconocimiento de las reglas informales 
derivado de la distancia cultural pierde importancia de cara a dificultar la 
consecución de las ventajas de internacionalización. 
El apartado empírico del Capítulo 4 incluye la totalidad de decisiones de 
entrada que todos grupos internacionales de telefonía móvil realizaron 
entre 2000 y 2010 en todos los países del mundo para los que existen 
índices institucionales formales e informales. Se confirma que la 
distancia cultural influye negativamente en la probabilidad de que una 
multinacional entre en un mercado. Asimismo, se observa que el 
desarrollo de las instituciones formales no tiene un efecto directo 
significativo. Pero sí que lo tiene de forma indirecta, en la medida que un 
mayor desarrollo de las instituciones formales incrementa la 
probabilidad de que un grupo internacional entre en un país que guarda 
una mayor distancia cultural con su país de origen. Se confirma, por 
tanto, ese efecto moderador de las instituciones formales sobre la 
relación entre las instituciones informales y la decisión de entrada.  
El análisis conjunto de las instituciones formales e informales es una de 
las principales contribuciones del Capítulo 4 puesto que la literatura 
anterior ha tendido a considerar separadamente el papel de las 
instituciones formales e informales sobre las decisiones de entrada de los 
grupos. Como segunda contribución del capítulo 4 cabría destacar el 
propio análisis empírico que se realiza, al tener en consideración la 
totalidad de países a nivel mundial en los que se han producido entradas 
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de  todos los grupos internacionales de una misma industria durante un 
periodo de 11 años. 
El Capítulo 4 ha tomado en consideración la perspectiva institucional de 
la estrategia empresarial en su contexto de aplicación tradicional, como 
es el del proceso de internacionalización. Sin embargo, la perspectiva 
institucional de la estrategia empresarial aboga por determinar el 
impacto del marco institucional en otros ámbitos de investigación, y no 
sólo en el análisis del proceso de internacionalización por parte de los 
grupos internacionales. Por esa razón, el Capítulo 5, “Instituciones y 
resultados después de un cambio tecnológico radical: Cómo el valor de 
los recursos complementarios especializados varía entre mercados”, ha 
tratado de integrar la literatura sobre la perspectiva institucional de la 
estrategia con la referente a discontinuidades tecnológicas. 
El Capítulo 5 se sitúa en el contexto posterior a un cambio tecnológico 
radical en el que las empresas establecidas en la tecnología anterior han 
invertido en la nueva tecnología. Bajo este contexto, se analiza cómo los 
recursos de la cadena de valor de las empresas establecidas que sirven 
para la comercialización de la tecnología anterior continúan siendo 
valiosos para la comercialización de la nueva tecnología. Recursos tales 
como la reputación, los canales de ventas y distribución, el servicio 
postventa, los vínculos con los usuarios o el conocimiento de la industria 
conservan su valor y, en la medida que resultan difícilmente imitables 
por los nuevos entrantes, son capaces de conferir un mayor beneficio a 
las empresas establecidas sobre los nuevos competidores (Mitchell, 1991; 
Tripsas, 1997; Rothaermel, 2001). Esa relación positiva entre la posesión 
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de estos recursos complementarios y el beneficio de la empresa tras un 
cambio tecnológico radical es la primera hipótesis de este capítulo. 
La contribución principal de este Capítulo 5 descansa en la segunda 
hipótesis que propone el efecto moderador del marco institucional sobre 
la intensidad de la ventaja de las establecidas. Dado que las empresas 
establecidas mantienen el valor de los activos complementarios en la 
nueva etapa tecnológica, también mantienen las relaciones de confianza 
establecidas con los agentes del mercado con los que han de interactuar 
para hacer uso de esos activos, tales como usuarios, proveedores, 
inversores, empleados o autoridades públicas. El capítulo propone que el 
valor de los recursos complementarios, al garantizar el mantenimiento de 
la red informal de relaciones de la empresa, es mayor en contextos de 
menor desarrollo de las instituciones formales. Esta afirmación se 
sustenta sobre la base de que, a falta de organismos que faciliten el 
intercambio de información y garanticen los derechos de propiedad 
derivados de la ley y los contratos, los agentes del mercado preferirán 
realizar intercambios económicos con empresas que ya conocen con 
anterioridad. Así podrán reducir las asimetrías de información y los 
posibles comportamientos oportunistas. Los nuevos entrantes, por tanto, 
se encontrarán en una mayor desventaja con respecto a las empresas 
establecidas en estos entornos de instituciones formales débiles al carecer 
de esa red previa de relaciones informales. 
El análisis empírico desarrollado sobre 46 mercados de todas las regiones 
mundiales confirma el efecto positivo que los recursos complementarios 
tienen sobre el beneficio empresarial. Asimismo, se observa que a mayor 
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desarrollo de las instituciones formales de un mercado, menor es el 
impacto positivo de esos recursos sobre la obtención de resultados. Por 
tanto, los mismos recursos estratégicos en dos contextos institucionales 
diferentes no conllevan la consecución de una misma ventaja 
competitiva.  
El Capítulo 5 tiene tres contribuciones clave. En primer lugar, aplica la 
perspectiva institucional de la estrategia en un contexto de investigación 
novedoso, como es el de las discontinuidades tecnológicas. En segundo 
lugar, ofrece una evidencia adicional acerca de la importancia de los 
recursos complementarios en la consecución de una ventaja competitiva 
por parte de las empresas establecidas tras un cambio tecnológico radical. 
Finalmente, tal y como ocurría en el Capítulo 4, se ofrece un análisis 
empírico basado en una muestra de mercados que cubre todas las 
regiones mundiales, lo que permite un mayor grado de generalización de 
los resultados. 
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CONCLUSIONES 
A continuación se detallan las principales conclusiones de los capítulos 
que abordan los objetivos de investigación propuestos en el Capítulo 1 y 
que analizan empíricamente las hipótesis planteadas en el sector de la 
telefonía móvil, descrito en el Capítulo 2.  
Conclusiones del Capítulo 3:  
El papel de la estrategia en mercados con efectos de red 
La estrategia en industrias con efectos de red debe de estar enfocada a la 
gestión del valor de la red, que se convierte en un determinante clave del 
beneficio frente a otro tipo de industrias en las que el valor reside en el 
producto. Las empresas pueden intensificar los efectos de red en su 
propio beneficio para así generar un mayor valor de red a través de 
decisiones estratégicas que influyan sobre las expectativas y coordinación 
de los usuarios y la compatibilidad percibida de su red con la de empresas 
rivales. En concreto, se observa que el tiempo que una empresa lleva 
operando en el mercado incrementa el valor de su red. Por el contrario, 
altos costes de cambio reducen el valor de la red al desincentivar la 
selección de la red por parte de los usuarios potenciales. 
La dimensión estratégica del valor de la red se plasma en la medición 
alternativa que propone la presente tesis doctoral. Mientras medidas 
anteriores equiparaban el valor de la red al tamaño de la misma, la 
medida alternativa que se propone en la tesis resulta una función no sólo 
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del tamaño de la red sino también de la intensidad de los efectos de red. 
Dicha intensidad se hace depender del tamaño relativo de la red de la 
empresa con respecto al de sus rivales en un mercado específico. La 
consideración de la existencia de competidores en la medida del valor de 
la red permite otorgar a ésta un marcado carácter estratégico. 
La tesis avanza en el análisis del papel de la estrategia en industrias de 
red. Primero, a través de la construcción de un  modelo que explica el 
impacto de cualquier decisión estratégica sobre el valor de la red y el 
beneficio. Segundo, mediante la construcción de una medida alternativa 
a la tradicional del valor de la red que incorpora la dimensión estratégica 
del mismo. 
 
Conclusiones del Capítulo 4:  
El carácter complementario de las instituciones formales e informales 
Las decisiones estratégicas de las empresas son entendidas como el 
resultado de la interacción dinámica entre la organización  y su entorno 
institucional. En el marco del proceso de internacionalización, las 
multinacionales tienen que tomar una decisión estratégica clave como es 
la selección del país destino de la inversión extranjera directa. La tesis 
observa que la distancia cultural y el desarrollo de las instituciones 
formales determinan, de forma simultánea, la probabilidad de que un 
grupo internacional entre en un país o no. 
Las diferencias en cultura, religión, códigos de conducta o lenguaje entre 
el mercado de origen de una multinacional y otro mercado dificultan la 
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obtención de las ventajas esperadas de la internacionalización. Por 
ejemplo, la transferencia de capacidades y know-how de la matriz a la 
subsidiara es más difícil cuando descansan en rutinas que no son 
comprendidas por los trabajadores de la subsidiaria. La multinacional 
también tiene problemas para entrar en la red de negocios de otro país 
dada la dificultad para desarrollar vínculos con los inversores, 
trabajadores o proveedores de ese mercado. Ello dificulta la adquisición 
de recursos financieros y humanos valiosos. Por tanto, los grupos 
internacionales prefieren entrar en países cuyas instituciones informales 
son más semejantes a las de su país de origen. 
No obstante, las instituciones formales del país de destino de la inversión 
(p.ej., sistema legal, administrativo y judicial) pueden garantizar el 
cumplimiento de los contratos entre la multinacional y los otros agentes 
del mercado (trabajadores, proveedores, inversores, etc.) y facilitar la 
entrada de la multinacional en la red de negocios del mercado (por 
ejemplo, a través de la creación de intermediarios tales como bancos, 
cámaras de comercio, etc.). En tal caso, la distancia cultural pierde 
importancia como elemento restrictivo de la decisión de entrada en un 
país por parte de las empresas multinacionales. Por tanto, el regulador 
que desee fomentar la entrada de capital extranjero para incrementar la 
competitividad del mercado debe de reforzar los sistemas legales, 
administrativos y judiciales para que sean capaces de garantizar el 
cumplimiento de los contratos y la apertura del mercado a la 
competencia. 
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La tesis avanza en la aplicación de la perspectiva institucional de la 
estrategia a través de la consideración conjunta del papel de las 
instituciones formales e informales en una decisión estratégica clave, tal 
y como es la selección del país de destino de la inversión por parte de 
una multinacional.  
 
Conclusiones del Capítulo 5:  
La perspectiva institucional aplicada a la dirección estratégica de 
innovaciones radicales 
El desarrollo de las instituciones formales facilita la entrada de nuevos 
competidores en un mercado que ha sufrido un cambio tecnológico 
radical puesto que proporciona una mayor comprensión del 
funcionamiento del mercado, aumenta la información disponible y 
garantiza la protección de los derechos de propiedad derivados de los 
contratos. Se observa que cuando las instituciones formales fallan a la 
hora de reducir los riesgos contractuales, los nuevos entrantes se 
encuentran en desventaja con respecto a las empresas que proceden de la 
etapa tecnológica anterior y deciden invertir en la innovación radical. 
La posesión de recursos complementarios que ayudan a la 
comercialización de la innovación radical se convierte en una fuente de 
ventaja competitiva para las empresas establecidas en la tecnología 
anterior. Dichos recursos, situados en la parte inferior de la cadena de 
valor, ayudan a estas empresas a conservar las relaciones con los agentes 
del entorno tales como usuarios, proveedores, inversores, trabajadores y 
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gobiernos. Estos lazos informales son capaces de reducir las asimetrías de 
información y el riesgo contractual a falta de instituciones formales que 
se encarguen de ello. En consecuencia, los recursos de las empresas 
establecidas en la tecnología anterior tienen un mayor valor en entornos 
con bajo desarrollo de las instituciones formales en la medida que ayudan 
a la comercialización de la innovación y a mantener las relaciones con 
los agentes del entorno que reducen los riesgos contractuales. 
La tesis avanza en la aplicación de la perspectiva institucional de la 
estrategia empresarial considerando el carácter moderador de las 
instituciones formales de un mercado sobre la intensidad de la ventaja 
competitiva de las empresas establecidas.  
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